He also emphasized the OR, which says, that he is not necessarily of the opinion, that he backs the fraud-accusations. Maybe he should clarify this.
I didn't mention anything about fraud no as there's no evidence of that, only that those coins were supposed to be locked up with no access as that is evidenced here in this thread. The only fraud I can see evidenced is Barry lied about locking those coins.
I have no idea why he was so fixated on the fraud part, if I believe someone is doing shady things then I will usually make that clearly known. Like with MF trying to get me to sweep Barry's debt under the rug and just let him keep my coins, or him offering me a fraction of my BTC back to leave it alone after so I wouldn't hurt his investment.
However, I would find it highly suspicious if the new dev is the one in control of those locked coins now.
Maybe barrysty1e was confident, that his solution would work and he made Mooncoin_Foundation and everyone else believe the same? But as the dev he should have known, that this is no 100% secure solution.
Either both overlooked, that Mooncoin is a Proof of Work-coin and thus has the weakness of a possible 51%-attack, which is what happened here? Or they ignored it and the "locking" of the coins was just marketing to drive the price?
A possible 51%-attack (and the relatively low hashrate needed to perform it, compared to the rates of LTC, DOGE etc. and in regard to the available massive amounts of hashing-power worldwide) was the reason, why I advised several times to implement other methods of securing the coin (PoS, hybrid, Proof of Human Work, mixed algos etc.). But nothing of this happened. It was more important to get a new logo several times, SmartLikes, MoonWord, lower block-rewards (to scare the miners even more away ...) and "locking" coins ...
i see too many people confused, I'll be very short:
1) about barryst1le look into Trust summary for barrysty “ agswinner 2017-05-11 0.00000000 Many jobs are incomplete, moonrush wallet for example, coinomi and electrum wallet,we have paid for having them, not so much, but we have something rather than nothing. Others dev for the same job demand a lot more!! This person is not a scammer! “ . The work done has an evident value higher than the requested amount ! (about 300usd).
2) about 51% attack unrealistic and imaginative, mooncoin blockchain has never suffered an attack 51%.
P. Vernon is the owner , he escaped to China with the private keys of the cold wallets of more than 50 coins (report 3 Fed Court) . On oct 2016 my alert of first coins moved “100 ml Mooncoin from account cryptsy moved to bleutrade. I think it's necessary to inform exchanges to freeze all the coins from the first two cryptsy addresses.
2F2RsYK3Ac6zGvENWTosF7xKor7g2bqzra
38,749,074,939.000 MOON ---- >
2FgWY2MjPn9AG3bhuRLH5mhCKyc17eVHRY 38,149,074,939.000 MOON 2PcvMEThutycp94myusjFWMFyoBT4ZPjuP (50ml) 2ab6krKewHA3XqDkNr7gkvbbr5z7NihnAY (550ml)---> 2FUg5Ay1STEroh6CQk4PXpVVEx8xQ8EY2M (100000000 MOON) “
Data: 10 novembre 2016 17:44:42 CET
A: [email protected], Fed Court <[email protected]>
Oggetto: I: Cryptsy
As is stated in the recent report, FED Court has the control of 8,421,008,915.0 MOON coins that have been gathered in this address 2M5kiseCXp6X5g75ZcWeo3BNsMYJxtDCzq
For the mooncoin community can you confirm that the first big addresses (2cLG2RzF6rDCtNws6We8o8avXs1grqARHU and 2FgWY2MjPn9AG3bhuRLH5mhCKyc17eVHRY) are under your control?
I am looking forward to a positive answer
Best regards
In archive of MF 16/10/2016 my discussion “....as you know, I'm the shareholder more damaged by the collapse of cryptsy and mr Robert Carey, Esq., Receivership Consultant Of Federal Court has not given me dettails, not clarify the situation concerning Moon addresses .As you know the largest address has been recently moved with a difference of 600 millions. This particular leads me to think that Vernon controls Mooncoin address. So i can not, for now, contribute massively, until this situation will be clear. ...”
The report 3 Fed Court confirmed what was my suspicion..
Look this 2FgWY2MjPn9AG3bhuRLH5mhCKyc17eVHRY —�-> to Vassilis donation fund
PVernon have the private key , why a 51% attack to rewriting Two years of Blockchain?
Hi agswinner,
you know I appreciate your work and what you have done for Mooncoin (donations etc.).
But let me explain in detail, how the 51%-attack worked:
barrysty1e wrote a new wallet-code, that was intended to prevent the one being in control of the private keys of the (believed to be) former Cryptsy-addresses (Vernon) could send them away. This works, if at least 51% of the mining-network uses this code. The coins are "locked".
Mooncoin is Open Source, so everyone can take its code and alter it the way, he/she likes. This ranges from the graphical surface up to its core-elements, like the hashing-algo and the such. Thus it is absolutely NO problem for an experienced coder, to take out the passages of the wallet code, that prevents the coins from the believed former Cryptsy-address to be sent. Now he only would need to make the rest of the network play by its (edit: his) rules, i.e. accept a transaction he sent from that address. Because all of the rest of the miners, namely the honest ones, follow the rules set by barry's wallet and would not use his altered code, he must "convince" them by his sheer majority of mining-power. Now as Mooncoin has a relatively low hashrate, compared to other PoW-coins, it is relatively cheap, to rent enough hashing-power, to "convince" the (honest) network, to accept the transactions sent by the attacker's code.
If the attacker has the majority of hashing-power, he does not need to rewrite the whole blockchain, but only "over-vote" the other honest miners to let the network accept his transaction, as he can now decide, which transactions are made final and which not, namely: written into the blockchain and be confirmed. In other words: as he wants his malicious txes to become part of the blockchain, he only needs to mine as long as needed with the majority of hashing power, until his txes have been fully confirmed, so cannot be reversed by other miners without investing the same or more of hashing-power to rewrite the blockchain regarding these transactions. Normally other miners/nodes accept the longest chain as the valid one and if they have those formerly invalid txes included/confirmed, won't revert them, but simply take over at the chain-position, where the attacker left and then just mine along from there, because for them this then is the most plausible chain, hence accepting the previously blocked-by-code transactions without knowing them to be wrong.
Everybody with a bit of knowledge could know right from the start, that this is a serious attacking-scenario, hence knew that it (edit: "locking") would almost surely not work in the long run, because - as I said earlier, it would only be a matter of time until it became profitable for the attacker to perform this attack. Most probably that is, why the attack was happening in the end of the markup-phase of the recent market-cycle, so that he could at least sell the ~17 bln coins, that where not sent to Vassilis' address, with a good profit at the highest prices possible for a longer time. See here for explanation of market: https://www.investopedia.com/articles/technical/04/050504.asp (I assume, you know of market cycles already, but as others are reading also, it helps to understand, how markets work, and why it happened now).
So to come back to what I said earlier: A 51%-attack is a VERY real attack-vector for any PoW-coin, even for BTC, but very unlikely, because it is THE coin with the highest hashrate, by far, so it is very unlikely an attacker would gain more profit by buying the hashrate for a 51%-attack, then by simply following the rules for mining. With comparatively low hash-rates, which - to be clear - Mooncoin has, I was constantly voting for mitigating this attack-scenario by working on mixed algos, PoS-component etc. And we still need this to do. The danger is exactly as high as before. This is, why many of the other smaller scrypt-coins moved to better security-models long ago.
Now to close my notes: if you argue, that there was no 51%-attack, then it would be best to let barry chime in and let him explain, how it was possible to unlock the coins, despite his efforts to "freeze/block them". As long as there is no better technical explanation, the 51%-attack is the best. Just remember, that it could be understood as part of a fraudulent action, to first tell the community, that these coins are locked, when - in effect - they are not.
Maybe another technical more savvy, independent user here could look at all this (especially the code) and explain it further.
I'm open for serious discussion.
