Where the address is from/who controls the address (or, source of funds) should actually be one of the questions asked during a KYC process, especially if they are suspecting the user of violating AML.
That aside,
how do you propose rollbit knows it's a "dead" address?
That is exactly my point. They don't know, and therefore they should ask before sending someone's hard earned money to potentially, the oblivion.
Why wouldn't a company confirm that the address that they are sending the funds back to is valid and owned by the user, especially after more than one year? People lose their wallets, people forget their passwords, people withdraw from exchanges...just assuming that after 1 year the same wallet is still accessible for that same person is irresponsible at best.
That it's no longer accessible purely because OP waited more than one year to perform KYC?
What difference does it make when the person does KYC? You are asking them to sacrifice their personal and sensitive information to get their own money back. To some people, that is such an untrustworthy act, that wagering this information for the chance to get your money back might seem less worth it than the money.
Circumstances also change. Maybe the OP's circumstances changes and now he values the money enough to give his information. Whether that is the reason or not, it is his money that the company is holding for "verification" purposes. At no point does this money actually belong to the company. If he gives the information requested 1 year, 5 years, or 20 years later, the company owes the money to the user they held it from, and are obligated to giving the full amount back if the user met the requirements asked of them.
Do you disagree?
Though the idea you propose is not without merit, especially for totally innocent customer who will probably lost their fund when this kind of scenario happened, I have to disagree for the same reason I gave to BGC on #37.
Two things that probably worth adding, normal users during normal situation will tend to try to solve their KYC issue as soon as possible, so this whole cluster mess can [and probably will] be avoided. And two, regarding sacrificing their personal and sensitive information, KYC is part of the ToS they agreed, that platforms can ask it whenever they deemed it necessary. Thus, as they've agreed that they can be "subjected" to a "random" KYC, there should be no reason to feel like they're wagering their sensitive information for a chance to get their money, they sign themselves up with the full awareness of this clause, not to mention that it doesn't need to be a wager if they do it in time.
The scenario here, where the fund went to oblivion, is simply because the user dragged their KYC, and losing control of their own wallet. Wouldn't that mostly the user's fault then? To prolong the KYC and to lose their keys or access to their wallet. Suppose they clear the KYC within weeks [if not days], they'll most likely still have access to their wallet. And suppose they lost access to their wallet... how is this not the user's fault and carelessness?
Simplified, what I tried to argue, as they've agreed to KYC, why bother dragging it for over than a year, with a chance of losing the access of their wallet and got their fund delivered to a "dead" address, while they know it's an inevitable process once asked [the request will still be there an hour later, tomorrow, or the next decade] and they have nothing to hide? Granted, it's inconvenient, I myself will mostly shy away from KYC if I can, but when I agreed to it when I enlist myself to something, and it's forced to me, I think I'll do it, given I have nothing to hide.
If I may reverse the situation though, do you disagree that it'll be risky for a platform and probably expose themselves in abetting money laundering [and thus jeopardizing their license] because they go lenient with user by removing the second layer of AML policy and allow user to withdraw their fund to a different wallet, with consideration to the point I raised in #37?
