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Topic: SegWit losing Bitcoin Unlimited winning -> Moon soon - page 6. (Read 13507 times)

hero member
Activity: 746
Merit: 500
A good idea right now would be for some competent developer(s) to fork the core code (leave everything as it is) and insert another signaling option (2MB blocks for example or whatever). And keep it up to date with the core branch for any security patches not related to the scaling stuff. And still call the version BitcoinCore, just with SegWit + "xy signaling option(s)".

Well I found one: https://bitcoinec.info/ Smiley
legendary
Activity: 1246
Merit: 1000
Problem is Core is a diverse bunch of people without leadership, that is kinda what it means to be decentralized. They code and review and test, but they don't have someone pulling the strings or someone who can speak for the entire team. I'm sure other options have been reviewed within their team, but SegWit was found to be the best option for the moment as the other options would all require a hard fork and that would take more time to properly prepare for. Also at this point I don't think we'll be able to find a wide consensus for SegWit + 2MB hard fork, which is what some seem to prefer here. As SegWit already provides 2MB blocks, would the extra 2MB really be worth the trouble to do a hard fork for? I believe Core would like to prepare a much better hard fork later on to increase the blocksize limit together with other things that are on the hard fork wishlist. But I don't know, maybe you should try asking them if you're curious? Like nicely? The answer may be more technical than my explanation above though.
hero member
Activity: 746
Merit: 500
The biggest problem in all this is that both solutions are somewhat shitty in their feature set.

Why are we at a point where only two solutions exist? The good thing about signaling is you could signal multiple options, within one "dev camp"/bitcoin client.

Core should give more options for example:
- SegWit + no block increase
- SegWit + block increase to 2MB
- NO SegWit + increase to 2MB
- xxx some other option

That way the network would decide and the Core team would not damage their reputation by "forcing" SegWit as the only option.

I still consider Core the most competent of taking care of the code, but I can't get my head around this, why not provide an alternative option to signal...

The problem with only two solutions is that one usually gets picked, even if both are bad.

(I am not counting the 8MB solution as an option since its just lazy and too extreme Smiley )

Edit: I read through the whole thread, good reading Smiley

That's perhaps the biggest problem many people have with Core. It's their way or the highway. There have been lots of meetings, conventions, and dialogues of all sorts where they pretended to negotiate. It soon became clear that the negotiations were just stalling tactics, and they haven't given an inch to anyone, nor did they ever intend to.

I agree that they're probably the most competent code caretakers, but they're absolutely terrible at management and community relations.

Seems there is another option missing in all this.

A good idea right now would be for some competent developer(s) to fork the core code (leave everything as it is) and insert another signaling option (2MB blocks for example or whatever). And keep it up to date with the core branch for any security patches not related to the scaling stuff. And still call the version BitcoinCore, just with SegWit + "xy signaling option(s)".

If the change gets voted on, core can still continue maintaining the code.

One of the reasons I dislike BU as much as I do, is not so much the actual block size implementation solution, but more about the rest of the stuff that might be buggy in the BU client.

The network needs more (reasonable - not so extreme - small step change - well maintained client) choices.
legendary
Activity: 2646
Merit: 2842
Shitcoin Minimalist
The biggest problem in all this is that both solutions are somewhat shitty in their feature set.

Why are we at a point where only two solutions exist? The good thing about signaling is you could signal multiple options, within one "dev camp"/bitcoin client.

Core should give more options for example:
- SegWit + no block increase
- SegWit + block increase to 2MB
- NO SegWit + increase to 2MB
- xxx some other option

That way the network would decide and the Core team would not damage their reputation by "forcing" SegWit as the only option.

I still consider Core the most competent of taking care of the code, but I can't get my head around this, why not provide an alternative option to signal...

The problem with only two solutions is that one usually gets picked, even if both are bad.

(I am not counting the 8MB solution as an option since its just lazy and too extreme Smiley )

Edit: I read through the whole thread, good reading Smiley

That's perhaps the biggest problem many people have with Core. It's their way or the highway. There have been lots of meetings, conventions, and dialogues of all sorts where they pretended to negotiate. It soon became clear that the negotiations were just stalling tactics, and they haven't given an inch to anyone, nor did they ever intend to.

I agree that they're probably the most competent code caretakers, but they're absolutely terrible at management and community relations.
hero member
Activity: 746
Merit: 500
The biggest problem in all this is that both solutions are somewhat shitty in their feature set.

Why are we at a point where only two solutions exist? The good thing about signaling is you could signal multiple options, within one "dev camp"/bitcoin client.

Core should give more options for example:
- SegWit + no block increase
- SegWit + block increase to 2MB
- NO SegWit + increase to 2MB
- xxx some other option

That way the network would decide and the Core team would not damage their reputation by "forcing" SegWit as the only option.

I still consider Core the most competent of taking care of the code, but I can't get my head around this, why not provide an alternative option to signal...

The problem with only two solutions is that one usually gets picked, even if both are bad.

(I am not counting the 8MB solution as an option since its just lazy and too extreme Smiley )

Edit: I read through the whole thread, good reading Smiley
legendary
Activity: 3038
Merit: 1660
lose: unfind ... loose: untight
Hey Shelby - I'll circle back to your previous post after this (that one requires more thought). First, I need to say that I don't 'speak for BU'. I'm just a guy that thinks their vision is correct. Most intelligent BU discussion does not happen on the more core-centric venues. I'm just trying to dispel a lot of the falsehoods told here about BU and the intent of its proponents.

To all Bitcoin Unlimited supporters, I am not against larger blocks.

Good. That's a starting point for a dialogue.

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My thought is reformulate your protocol to have some where between 2 - 8MB block size limit increasing with the Nielsen Law of bandwidth increase (slower exponential growth than Moore's law).

But BU has a block limit. The difference here is that it is adjusted in an ongoing manner by a community process. If 2 or 8MB is the proper value at one point in time, then that will be the limit. If we go with some other fixed value, we'll just be fighting this battle again in no time, with all the wasted friction, animosity, and market turmoil that it entails.

I realize there are skeptics that scoff at the emergent consensus idea, but there is science behind this concept. Granted, its application to this field is novel. At least as surfaced in this manner. But in the end, each party has the ability to change the blocksize they'll accept anyhow, by a localized change to source and recompiling. We are just making it easier for the user to make this change on the fly.

From my perspective, no. You are not going to convince me to abandon the scalable blocksize vision. With the caveat that I'm still thinking about your previous post.

I detect no deviation in the BU community at large from this principle either. Especially as -- after over a year of hard effort -- the tide seems to be turning in our direction.

Quote
Also you must adopt some of the bug fixes in SegWit, such as the new opcode which fixes malleability and enables Lightning Networks.

By and large, there is no effort against adoption of segwit (the targeted feature in isolation - not the bundle of cruft which is The SegWit Omnibus Changeset) within the BU community. We recognize that malleability is something that is worthy of addressing. However, it is really a tertiary concern. For all the heat and light, I have yet to be shown that malleability has actually caused any systemic failure. Or significant value loss. The restriction of ~250,000 transactions per day, on the other hand, is a systemic problem that needs fixing RFN.

So yes, let us fix malleability. Once we are past this tps barrier. If my read of the BU community is correct, segwit (likely without the centrally-planned magic number signature discount) is a contender for this fix. There is a conversation comparing and contrasting with (e.g.) FlexTrans that first needs to happen though.

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But do not adopt all the rest of the complexity of SegWit, including do not adopt the ability to softfork version changes as that hands too much power to Core.

Agreed. Note that the feature of which you speak is _not_ the actual segwit feature, but what I refer to above as part of 'the bundle of cruft which is The SegWit Omnibus Changeset'. I don't believe that the majority of the BU community supports this either.

Quote
Go do that, then maybe you can win. Because likely users will end up choosing to support your protocol because their transactions are not being delayed. But you need to build confidence in your competence to lead.

You can possibly win, if you get competent people working with you.

You are apparently competing against banksters who are funding the Core developers (paying their large salaries and incentives). Perhaps that may explain why you ostensibly can't attract the most competent developers?

(I've taken the liberty reorder a couple of your paragraphs)

For the most part, the BU community realizes that our dev workforce is not comparable to core's. We have no illusions on this point. The fact that the most significant core devs are highly paid is likely a factor, but probably not the only factor. Personally, I think a very large factor is that devs naturally want to work on the market-leading implementation of a given idea. Up until recently, that has unambiguously meant core. However, from my perspective, there has been a recent swing in the thought-space towards BU. If indeed BU can wrest the market share title, I would expect a commensurate movement of devs from core to BU. Of course there will be attrition, but we don't need many to double or quadruple our dev bandwidth.

(One other factor would be untruths repeated far and wide about features, capabilities, and even motivations of BU - some intentional and some merely repetition of falsehoods. But getting into shouting matches over this would be unproductive)

Yes, there have been bugs. Fortunately, none have caused persistent or systemic issues. And likely, more will be found. (Of course, more will likely be found within core as well). But a mediocre implementation of the right design is infinitely more valuable than a nearly-perfect implementation of the wrong design. For the former will asymptotically approach the ideal, while the latter will always be targeting off in the wrong direction. We expect BU will be that goodness.

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But you need to rein in these talking heads who are not sufficiently competent, i.e. Wu and Ver. They can talk when they cite competent developers. Those guys need to understand the limits of their role and competencies.

Look. This narrative really ought to stop. Neither Ver nor Wu have any official relation to the BU community. Are they visible BU community members speaking their minds? Yes - but only in their personal capacities. The idea that they are somehow official thought leaders in the BU community is merely a false redditism. Neither of them were responsible for brainstorming nor initiating BU, and neither of them participate regularly in discussions in the primary BU venue.

Quote
I am not against what you want in terms of fixing the block size problem. I am just being pragmatic. Find a confidence building and realistic way to win. I don't like being on the losing side.

I highly advise that you all back down from your current ultimatum and reformulate and get the token holders on your side before you proceed.

Backing down is unlikely at this point. I'm certainly not.

The majority of Bitcoiners are likely unsure or ambivalent of a choice between core and BU. There is a hard core minority and a hard BU minority. I don't know the proportions, but BU seems ascendant at this moment.

No discussion of sentiment would be complete without mention of the intentional manipulation of the dialogue. While this has recently lifted to a large degree, it is undeniable that the discussion in this and other venues has been steered to marginalize BU. Accordingly, many BU supporters have left these controlled venues for others. As a consequence, core supporters -- whether out of ignorance or out of malice -- have had free reign to poison the discussion by parroting untruths re: BU. This has two consequences: 1) the actual number of BU supporters is likely larger than you perceive; and 2) this number is likely to grow as misconceptions are corrected.

Quote
You really need a more capable leader than Wu or Ver. But don't enlist me, because I am too busy on my own "shitcoin" project and I am not interested in investing my effort in Satoshi's PoW. It is good to have those guys on your side, but not as the outspoken de facto leaders, because they have by now proven they are rash, irrational, and somewhat technologically incompetent.

Again. Neither Ver nor Wu are in any way central to the BU project. They are merely passionate supporters much like myself. They just have bigger megaphones than I due to their stature in other Bitcoin areas.

And yes - I would like to see you devote more time to your alt. While I am skeptical, not having seen your paper -- and despite our occasional inability to see eye-to-eye in the past -- I respect your intellect. Someone will make the next breakthrough in cryptocurrencies. It might be you? I have no way to judge currently, but I would not find it inconceivable.
sr. member
Activity: 406
Merit: 250
i do not agree the difference is only 10% based on the chart, they are there, just more number of percentage for BU because a pool decided to test the new chain, antpool is not fully going with BU yet, don't be deceived, until it pass 50-60% i'm not worried about a hard fork for good reason
legendary
Activity: 1246
Merit: 1000
Although I do not agree with the sentiment against Core (I think Greg Maxwell and most others are very reasonable people who truly care about censorship resistance and monetary freedom), the points 'iamnotback' raises about the technical and game theoretic incompetency of BU and their supporters are correct in my opinion. BU can't win in their current state, even if they get a large majority hashrate behind them. I used to be critical of Core and supported Bitcoin XT for a short while, but that was because I didn't understand Core's position and reasons for not supporting a larger blocksize limit and they weren't exactly communicating much with the community at that time. This has changed and I understand their reasons a lot better now, and so they have earned my support back. My opinion on the whole blocksize issue also blinded me from looking critically at XT, and this is a bias I do not wish to repeat with BU or other alternative implementations. I don't like entrenched positions and opinions, I prefer an unbiased and open look without assuming bad faith upon the other one. I see both sides assuming bad faith here and it saddens me. We should be more united as a community, even if we have individual disagreements about the way forward. Ditching Core is not the solution, we can't throw away the best developers in the field because of unfounded conspiracy theories or because of censorship on reddit. We should adopt SegWit as soon as possible and then work together forward towards Lightning and a HF with wide support from the entire community.

If this is not possible, then just fork already so we can move on with SegWit and no longer have to listen to these endless debates that are going nowhere. I'm sure BU supporters have their own forum somewhere where they can discuss their stuff.
legendary
Activity: 889
Merit: 1013
sr. member
Activity: 336
Merit: 265
To all Bitcoin Unlimited supporters, I am not against larger blocks. I haven't been following all the detailed developments, so the following might contain some errors.

My thought is reformulate your protocol to have some where between 2 - 8MB block size limit increasing with the Nielsen Law of bandwidth increase (slower exponential growth than Moore's law). Also you must adopt some of the bug fixes in SegWit, such as the new opcode which fixes malleability and enables Lightning Networks.

But do not adopt all the rest of the complexity of SegWit, including do not adopt the ability to softfork version changes as that hands too much power to Core.

Go do that, then maybe you can win. Because likely users will end up choosing to support your protocol because their transactions are not being delayed. But you need to build confidence in your competence to lead.

You can possibly win, if you get competent people working with you.

But you need to rein in these talking heads who are not sufficiently competent, i.e. Wu and Ver. They can talk when they cite competent developers. Those guys need to understand the limits of their role and competencies.

You are apparently competing against banksters who are funding the Core developers (paying their large salaries and incentives). Perhaps that may explain why you ostensibly can't attract the most competent developers?

I am not against what you want in terms of fixing the block size problem. I am just being pragmatic. Find a confidence building and realistic way to win. I don't like being on the losing side.

I highly advise that you all back down from your current ultimatum and reformulate and get the token holders on your side before you proceed. You really need a more capable leader than Wu or Ver. But don't enlist me, because I am too busy on my own "shitcoin" project and I am not interested in investing my effort in Satoshi's PoW. It is good to have those guys on your side, but not as the outspoken de facto leaders, because they have by now proven they are rash, irrational, and somewhat technologically incompetent.
sr. member
Activity: 336
Merit: 265
If you wanted to upend Core, then you should have more competent people who would have advised you that unbounded block size doesn't have an equilibrium.

If you have successfully demonstrated  that unbounded block size cannot reach an equilibrium outside a majority-collusion environment, I have missed it.

Yes you missed it. I have already explained the math for why there is no relationship between an average orphan rate and a cost per byte (which is a necessary prerequisite for a supply curve as explained by @Peter R's paper). In other words, if we model that every miner has the same orphan rate, then there is no level of block size which is more or less favorable to the miner, because difficulty adjusts to the same level for all the miners. In other words, the wasted hashrate of the orphan rate is paid for by income from the block because all miners have the same costs (@Peter R's model inherently presumes that hashrate and propagation delay are uniformly distributed).

It is only when we model relativistic orphan rate (which @Peter R's paper doesn't even consider) that we will see any relative profit levels and able to model orphan rate as a cost. @Peter R should have realized this, but he apparently didn't quite realize that his model was meaningless although he did mention some of these issues that perplexed him in his concluding remarks.

Once we do model differing orphan rates for different miners, then the optimal strategies for mining come into play. And if you work out the game theory of that, you realize that collusion and centralization are the only possible outcome.

...(if you don't understand why then you need to study the original selfish mining paper and the followup on optimal mining strategies)....

Also I received a reply in private from one of the people I asked to peer review the issue:

If your argument is that there is no equilibrium in a majority-collusion environment, then your fear is as valid for today's Bitcoin than it is under unbounded blocksize. Nakamoto consensus is -- as far as we know -- dependent upon 'a majority of honest [miners]'.

You are making a similar error as those two others did upthread. A 51% (or even 33% selfish mining) attack is not a change in protocol. In other words, in BTC the miners can't make huge blocks, because it violates the protocol limit of 1MB.

And as a practical matter, Bitcoin operated just fine for multiple halvings with no practical bound on blocksize.

There was minimum advised fee and there were pools doing anti-spam such as I think I've read that Luke Jr's pool rejected dust transactions. I haven't studied that period of time in great detail, so perhaps someone else would be better qualified to discuss that with you.
legendary
Activity: 3038
Merit: 1660
lose: unfind ... loose: untight
If you wanted to upend Core, then you should have more competent people who would have advised you that unbounded block size doesn't have an equilibrium.

If you have successfully demonstrated  that unbounded block size cannot reach an equilibrium outside a majority-collusion environment, I have missed it. If your argument is that there is no equilibrium in a majority-collusion environment, then your fear is as valid for today's Bitcoin than it is under unbounded blocksize. Nakamoto consensus is -- as far as we know -- dependent upon 'a majority of honest [miners]'.

And as a practical matter, Bitcoin operated just fine for multiple halvings with no practical bound on blocksize. This may be partially explained by a relatively amount of mining centralization, but such does not seem monotonically increasing. Certainly, we've had actually naked over half hashpower in a single entity before.
legendary
Activity: 3038
Merit: 1660
lose: unfind ... loose: untight
However presuming some transactions pay less per byte than others (and higher valued transactions can afford to pay more per byte), the economic converse effect occurs wherein the miner has the incentive to make the smallest block possible or below the size where propagation latency is linearly proportional to block size (i.e. the latency that is a constant factor independent of data transferred), which is again not a free market limit on block size and not a fee market.

So if I understand you correctly, you assert that the fact that not everyone is willing to pay the same transaction fee rate in BTC/B, this is somehow demonstrative of a failure of free markets? Cause that's what it looks like you are claiming.

You seem to have successfully demonstrated the central argument that each miner is incentivized to include as many high-BTC/B transactions up to the point where transaction fee = marginal orphanage cost. So what is the problem? Why do you consider this as 'not free market'?

I see nothing in this that suggests BU is worse than core in this regard. Help me understand.

You've entirely missed the point, which that so called equilibrium point doesn't exist as explained below...

That was an important insight. Thanks. And it is exacerbated by the fact that the network hashrate and propagation is not equally distributed, thus it gets much worse for everyone but the winner-take-all cartel, ...

Folks Satoshi's PoW is broken and it can't be fixed. You are hereby forewarned that something new will be required. But no one has yet shown what can scale up decentralized. None of the other altcoins shit does either, and I have analyzed it all in very great detail.

So if I read this correctly, your insight is that a collusion of parties can force their will upon the network? Yes - we've known this since 2009.
sr. member
Activity: 812
Merit: 250
A Blockchain Mobile Operator With Token Rewards
oh ic
" if miners have 51% they can be rendered immune to block propagation time. "

You have entirely not paid attention where I wrote upthread that the cartel can sign their blocks and propagate the block headers and begin mining immediately with very low propagation times. But for the non-cartel members they can propagate the entire block. That applies no matter what % of the hashrate the cartel has, even as low as 33% (or even lower).

Just because you can't assimilate all that I've written, doesn't mean I have the time to convince you about your forthcoming errors and noise.

You Bitcoin Unlimited people are not competent about blockchain technology and game theory.

Core probably got tired of repeating the same explanations and seeing your inane replies that evidenced to them that you had 0% reading comprehension.

will you stop with the superiority complex.

how about to start thinking about what you're going to say when the miners dont create huge blocks, and incress blocksize little bits at a time such that fee pressure is low-ish and relatively constant, in order to maximize fee, and ehhhhhhhh NOT destroy bitcoin.
sr. member
Activity: 336
Merit: 265
oh ic
" if miners have 51% they can be rendered immune to block propagation time. "

You have entirely not paid attention where I wrote upthread that the cartel can sign their blocks and propagate the block headers and begin mining immediately on the next block with very low propagation times. But for the non-cartel members the cartel can propagate the entire block. That applies no matter what % of the hashrate the cartel has, even as low as 33% (or even lower).

Just because you can't assimilate all that I've written, doesn't mean I have the time to convince you about your forthcoming errors and noise.

You Bitcoin Unlimited people are not competent about blockchain technology and game theory.

Core probably got tired of repeating the same explanations and seeing your inane replies that evidenced to them that you had 0% reading comprehension.
sr. member
Activity: 812
Merit: 250
A Blockchain Mobile Operator With Token Rewards
please tell us more about how BU is vulnerable to 51% attack.

I didn't write that. You don't even understand what I am writing. I understand why Core blocked you guys. It is impossible to have technical discussion with those who can't comprehend it. It becomes noise.

oh ic
" if miners have 51% they can be rendered immune to block propagation time. "

I didnt realize that!
i'm going to run a core node now

thanks!

sr. member
Activity: 336
Merit: 265
please tell us more about how BU is vulnerable to 51% attack.

I didn't write that. You don't even understand what I am writing. Even with only 33% of the hashrate, I had written the cartel has a 0 orphan rate on the blocks they produce which gives them a disproportionate advantage (c.f. the famous selfish mining paper). I understand why Core blocked you guys. It is impossible to have technical discussion with those who can't comprehend it. It becomes noise.



Quote from: Peter Rizun
We conclude by noting that the analysis presented in this paper breaks down when the
block reward falls to zero. It suggests that the cost of block space is zero; however, this would
suggest zero hash power, which in turn would suggest that transactions would never be mined
and, paradoxically, that no block space would be produced.
Happily, questions about the
post-block reward future can be explored at a leisurely pace, as we have a quarter-century
before it begins to become a reality. Into the distant future then, a healthy transaction fee
market is expected to exist without a block size limit.

It makes perfect sense that averaged across all miners cost per byte ~ inflation rate (et) where t is propagation time and ~ means proportional to. Because difficulty adjusts, thus hashing cost rises to match the block reward (i.e. inflation rate) multiplied by wasted hashrate losses due to orphan rate.

It is independent of the amount data in the block (meaning there is no cost constraining amount of data to put in a block). That is because the equation he chose is modeling everyone having the same orphan rate, thus it models that no miner attempts to use a smaller block size than the other one.

But miners will strategically employ this block size choice and it turns out that it is a power vacuum with winner-take-all property that forces a cartel to use large blocks as a weapon against those not in the cartel.

So IMO he hasn't entirely acknowledged his error. He noticed there were problems in his analysis, but he didn't entirely home in on the holistic conclusion. His model is meaningless. It makes no sense to model average orphan rate as a limiting factor providing an equilibrium, because miners have incentive to do whatever it takes to reduce the waste of their individualized orphan rate and they can do so at their advantage by not including the minority in their cartel, so that the non-cartel minority has a very high orphan rate and the cartel has an ultra low orphan rate. The only equilibrium is due to centralization of control.
sr. member
Activity: 812
Merit: 250
A Blockchain Mobile Operator With Token Rewards


The orphan rate rate doesn't impact the cartel that wins 51% of the blocks, because they see the winning blocks instantly (whereas the non-cartel miners have to eat the propagation time of those slow blocks and thus the high orphan rate).

Your extreme ignorance of blockchain technology is on display.


please tell us more about how BU is vulnerable to 51% attack.
sr. member
Activity: 336
Merit: 265
As a full node operator I have a power to reject blocks larger than my threshold of confidence. Core does not even provide the users with such an option which is incredibly selfish of them.

A miner can always reject a block and continue mining on the current block or next block in Satoshi's PoW. That doesn't necessary stop unbounded sized blocks in BU from being the winning block. Read on for why...

As a market equilibrium expert you should know that miners are definitely not going to increase block size to infinity. Even if they wanted to it would be physically impossible due to orphan rate.

The very large blocks are a weapon that the mining cartel can use to bankrupt those who aren't in the cartel. If you had read my upthread explanations, then I wouldn't need to repeat myself.

The orphan rate rate doesn't impact the cartel that wins 51% of the blocks, because they see the winning blocks instantly (whereas the non-cartel miners have to eat the propagation time of those slow blocks and thus the high orphan rate).

Your extreme ignorance of blockchain technology is on display.


But those who have so far been neutral in this debate will most likely choose the side that does not censor opposing arguments (which by the way is a big red sign of weakness).

Gmaxwell was very condescending to me in the past as well and censored my posts numerous times. Core has some arrogance, but they are collectively very darn smart about the technological details. Hey I'd love to kick Core's ass in the market place (and I am actually hoping to do it!). So don't think I am in love with Core.

I am not condoning all the political fighting that has been going on. But personality issues are not a justification to switch to an extremely flawed protocol of unbounded block size.

If you would just realize that I support everything you want in terms of we need a solution to the block size problem. I just don't want you to destroy Bitcoin because you don't know what you are doing. Blockchain technology is complex.
hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 500
when consesus abot segwit and bitcoin unlimited is end
or now consensus is end, and bitcoin can use block size bitcoin unlimited
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