Topic: "Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary" -- A post by Peter Todd - page 3. (Read 2760 times)

In my model, and not Paul's, the mainchain, or to be more accurate, the upperchain, is not supposed to be informed about the ledger, only the work, and not even an SPV proof, whatsoever, just the mere fact that blocks coming up from the lowerchain, are consistently and continuously asking for the funds to be released.

I'll share this model asap, but it doesn't matter right now, just take it as an example of how a PoW network should be scaled: by PoW.

I couldn't find an answer to my argument, but I do strongly admit that software architecture and design is about elegance and simplicity and about restriction rather than utilization. It is all I have learned in the field where I used to be anti-fatware, since very beginning.

Back to the discussion, my point was something as follows:
For your proposal to work (as a cryptographic proof and still, not a cryptocurrency one), you need to track down the set of sidechain coins which are going to burn (in an outchain txn), to respective outputs of their genesis (inchain txns) such that they are quantitatively matched. How feasible is it without too many restrictions on the sidechain? Or something like dedicated bots, crawling exhaustively, hunting occasional matches etc.

It is impractical because of propagation delay, let alone other stuff.  
Mining decentralization can be realized  without any chain (in any layer) being involved in (fully) validating anything other than its own blocks, it is a nutshell design principle, elegance and simplicity, remember?

Let's have a bit more elaboration:  
What makes the current, centralized mining pools, more efficient than a decentralized alternative like P2Pool, is that P2P designers were obsessed with full validation of the blocks, even though %95 of the shares are not going to the blockchain ever. As a result, P2Pool is not able to offer more than a 20 times leverage (the factor by which a pool reduces the target difficulty) to its participants, otherwise orphans and chain splits will show-up, hence as a participating miner, you need 5% of total bitcoin hashrate to hit a share in ~ 10 minutes. It'd be mostly useless, compared to what centralized pools offer, leveraging up to a factor of 10 million where home miners with a single average device are able to generate enough shares per minute to use the pool's dashboard for monitoring the device's online status!


From your post, I suspect you may be trapped in the same rabbit hole as P2P guys: the excessive verification discourse, which is crafted deceptively to undermine PoW, the true and the only source of value in bitcoin.

EDIT: the closing paragraph was bootstrapped.

Govs banning btc because of PoW mining energy bans, FUD FUD FUD, crys the bitcoin cultists.  

Reasonable people, see Proof of stake as the tech evolution needed to propel the tech to new heights of innovation.

Here is some reality for your digestion, take your time as it may be hard to swallow.  

PoS users don't care what happens with PoW coins, we moved on.
(Their are so few PoW coins left, and fewer every year, who cares.)
PoW users are way more obsessed about PoS Tech, ignore it, as we Ignore you.  

So your only real problem is
what is PoW BTC going to do to avoid government bans.
education program on how PoW energy waste is a good thing, good luck with that.  
(See BTC is more secure crys the bitcoin cultist.)  
I doubt that Texans will believe that when they are sitting in the dark for a year,
because the BTC PoW miners cause their power grid to collapse when their transformers exploded.
Kind of Proves China was smarter than Texas, since they already banned PoW mining.  
Texas would have to buy new transformers to repair the damage , wait for it, from China, (currently 1-3 year backlog.)  


BTC was designed to move from rewards based profit to transactions fee based profit.
Segwit , refusing to increase block size, offchain networks such as LN & Liquid have blocked that evolution of pay structure for the miners.
With limited blocksize , the PoW miners only option is to increase transaction fees to offset the loss of rewards.
This insures that the regular person will never transact onchain due to costs, and offchain networks are the only game in the house affordable to the normal people,
while the banks , whom LN and Liquid are really being made for , can still profit by making millions to trillions of transactions offchain, with only a single monthly onchain transaction to update their ledgers.
With that future as BTC goal, having an ridiculous low onchain transaction capacity becomes it's designated design, which is also why you see tons of research going into offchain , and basically none on improving onchain BTC. For actual onchain improvements you have to look to other coin networks.
 
FYI:
In an earlier comments, you mentioned what would happen if the whales took over.
Answer is apparent : They would make BTC network less expensive to maintain.
By one of the following.
1.  Regulate who was allowed to mine and how much % of the hash rate allowed, keeping the energy used down to a sustainable level.
    *This also allows regulated miners to control transactions, which would give control to the government to block btc transactions.*
or
2.  Switch to another algo.

FYI2:
Tail emission is a non-issue for btc, as lost coins are to be replaced not by new coins,
but by increasing the decimal points used to the right side of the decimal.
BTC currently uses 8 points to the right of the decimal,
LN will use 12 points  to the right of the decimal.
And that number can always be increased , which increases the usable units, while never increasing the actual coded 21 million supply.
It is a math scam that can only happen in a virtual setting, and is totally impossible to achieve in the physical world.
1/1 =1   usable unit
1/.1=10 usable units
1/.00000001 = 100000000 usable units
1/.000000000001  =1000000000000 usable units

micro and pico satoshis .  

And how the mainchain is informed about that ledger in Paul Sztorc's proposal? By voting. And that's all, because sidechain rules can be anything.

Yes, it is hard, but it is Worse is Better approach. You can decentralize mining by collecting all shares from all miners, so if there are 4 MB blocks, and you have 1000 miners, you can collect 4 GB of data, and validate them all. Excluding repeated parts, it will be smaller in practice, but as miners can include their own transactions, you have to be prepared for the worst case, where all miners will mine their own coinbase transactions, and they will include an artificial traffic between themselves, making transactions that won't repeat. So, it is not technically impossible, it is only inefficient. And blockchains are inefficient by design, if everything else will fail, then we will be forced to decentralize mining in such way, just by processing everything. Fortunately, on-chain settled data can be later pruned, because each sidechain has a mainchain, when it can be settled, and deeply confirmed. So, only the mainchain has a problem of "non-removable data". For sidechains, historical data can be removed, because they are only temporarily needed to handle disagreements.

Maybe i took it differently, but fine let’s not discuss about this one.

I get it, but that’s just the nature of the thing. There’s certain opportunities to get something for way below it’s worth, but that’s only possible if you’re there earlier than most other people. They went in when it was barely worth anything and needed to hold it for a long time and trough a lot of uncertainty to make gains. I don’t think there’s another way to handle this, as you need some incentives for earlier holders so this thing takes off in the first place. These opportunities will be there again for other things, for people who missed this one. One door closes and another one opens. This only matters for people who wished to get rich from Bitcoin tho. To me that’s not the goal, i just think the soundest money will benefit society the most, no matter if average workers or millionaires. But the real benefit being for regular people.

On an individual level Bitcoin still offers the same properties to everyone in a time where it couldn’t be needed more, that’s valuable. Just having a money that won’t inflate over time could be huge for the average family over time. It doesn’t matter if someone holds 1000x more than us, because Bitcoin still serves everyone and the potential is still huge, with a lot less uncertainty than back then.

It could be considered unfair, the same way you could consider it unfair that older people had the opportunity to buy apple and amazon shares at pennies, but the future is uncertain and we have expenses in the present, there was a reason they were traded at this price in one point in time and people had to take real risks. I would focus on future opportunities instead of missed opportunities, as there will be plenty. Mining costs will even increase in the future and people will look the same way at us now and think it’s unfair and we’re lucky. But it’s not easy to just go in and mine for most people, even tho we know that we have a unique opportunity rn.

Actually, the only practical no-double-spend-proof is the ledger maintained by the sidechain, committed by work. Additionally, homomorphic DS has limited application in real-world applications, as the locked utxo is usually dispersed too much as a result of fee collection by sidechain miners on one hand and the rapid circulation of ligh txns on the other hand, it is hardly fit in coin-join model efficiently as it needs to have a set of consumed output exactly match the amount of the reclaimed balance, hard to achieve AFAICS.

Let's stay focused on this part, waiting for your reply. I'll come to the next part afterwards.

Indeed, there's a huge difference in mining costs. However, if one change is made wrong, Bitcoin price can easily go south badly. So bad that even mining price won't matter. So bad that you will look to and sigh "bitcoin could have been even better".
This is always to be taken into account, hence you should not dismiss so easily people like @TraderTimm or @tadamichi (or their opinion), no matter how badly or offensive they express this reality.

Now, to @TraderTimm: don't worry, this discussion is more at academic level (i.e. ideas and nothing more), I don't expect anything really change.

It actually is. If we would have sidechains, it would be the first real Layer Two (because Lightning Network is Layer One And A Half). And it is about compression, because you first peg funds in, then you transact inside, and then you peg funds out (and LN cannot "transact inside" if you never had a channel). It would be the same if you would have transaction joining on-chain, on mempool level, where you could send transactions to nodes, and where miners would mine A->Z transaction with a no-double-spending-proof, instead of mining A->B->C->...->X->Y->Z transactions. Another thing is that making the real Layer Zero is also about compression, because each sidechain should trace the heaviest Proof of Work chain, and distribute coins accordingly. So, if some attackers have 99% of the whole SHA-256d mining power, then the honest nodes should get only 1% of the coins, because in other case, it would be unsafe, and because of Merged Mining, those chains could be easily reorged (or lose a peg) if they would grant the full amount, and if they would have their own difficulty. That was another NameCoin's mistake.

From discussions on the mailing list, you should know, that it is very unlikely to get BIP-300, BIP-301, or similar proposals activated. And for that reason, it should be introduced as a no-fork, because it won't be accepted as a soft-fork, not to mention hard-forks, that would be instantly rejected (and they are also unnecessary in case of sidechains). And that's the point when I disagree with Paul Sztorc, because he still seems to believe that doing it in a soft-fork is reachable. Technically it may be, but practically it is unlikely. The mainchain should have no idea that there are any sidechains at all, and that's why the whole logic should happen on each sidechain separately. So, that means:

1) each sidechain should collect all SHA-256d headers, to get the heaviest Proof of Work chain
2) coins should be created by signing the mainchain coins (because any kind of peg is needed, to get 1 BTC = 1 sidechain_BTC)
3) it should be impossible to know, how many sidechains there are, and what is their internal state, from the mainchain perspective (because then they could be blocked by some kind of soft-forks)

You won't get sidechains by telling people that "sidechains are good, so we should activate them". Paul Sztorc tried that way and failed. Also, that way is not sufficiently decentralized, because it means that you need to reach some kind of "permission" to use sidechains at all. So, to make it permissionless, the best way is to find out, how to make it without touching consensus. One of those ways can be homomorphic encryption, but it is only one possible way. There are other ways, like adding new sighashes, that could also activate sidechains "as a side-effect". For example, it could be something like "if you want eltoo, you will also get sidechains", or "if you want SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT, you will also get sidechains". I don't expect people will tell you "yes, we want sidechains". They probably won't choose that route, it is harder than that, and it is a test of decentralization: if you can introduce sidechains without going through any soft-fork procedure, then your solution is decentralized enough.

@tadamichi,
No offense, but don't play it this way, the guy comes here bragging about his money and insulting people, deserves a backlash, this is it. Let it go.

As of the old coins being fairly acquired or not:
Mining one bitcoin costs more than $15K nowadays, check for the costs in 2011 and make a judgment for yourself.

Bitcoin needs a saviour?

Im not even an early holder, but saying early coins were acquired unfairly is kinda insanity.

How does this matter when you’re actually decentralized?

Cringe, when soft and hard money circulate together, the hard money will be hoarded and circulates less, aka bad money drives out good money. Until the soft money lost too much value and then hard money starts to be used as a means of payment, aka good money drives out bad money. Simple economic principles, no need to insult people for doing what’s rational or trying to fiddle with things that can’t be solved artificially. There’s speculators and gamblers but over 60% of Bitcoin is being hodld even now, ridiculous to assume the majority of people are gamblers or speculators. Simply storing value is a legitimate use case when inflation is over 10% and we’re still early in the adoption cycle.

We didn’t even reach a point yet were TPS hindered mass adoption, mass adoption is a long process that depends on many factors outside of this. Just increasing tps alone isn’t what will make mass adoption happen overnight.

Reclaiming sidechain balance is an old problem and is not addressable easily, LN was originally designed to circumvent this problem without PoW, some people are so pissed with PoW, you know.  
1- THEY got LN, won't cooperate.
2- Using homomorphic signatures to validate transfer of funds in the sidechain, is not the way to go, the sidechain should've approved the transfer in its ledger by accumulating work, it is all about work, forget about the minerphobic talking points in the dominating bitcoin cult, it is just whale discourse.

The latter argument leads me to the most important point: Besides the vision,  we need a model, a universal one, for the way chains interact in a hierarchy, then we need a roadmap for fitting bitcoin in the model, on top of it. As of now I'm thinking of an impedance layer and special treatment, hence homomorphic signatures, convenants, coinpools, ...,  all are worth considering, but the model is to be established priorly.

No, it is not. I can't imagine full-fledged sidechains without mining decentralization and vice versa, long story.  

No, neither the separation nor the compression argument is correct.
Sidechains are there to scale bitcoin as well, (otherwise what would be the source of the extra income of miners as discussed by Paul?
Actually, there is no decentralized solution to scaling other than sidechains, period.
And scaling is not about compression, you achieve throughput improvements by compression which are not scalable as it becomes harder exponentially to apply in each recursion.

Speaking about recursion and back to the model issue, I strongly believe that recursion is the most important characteristic of a software model and the key to scalability in both horizontal and vertical sense.
Again, you are wrong. Altcoins don't help, as they are heterogeneous and maliciously governed. No sidechains, No mass adoption.  

It is not your sub-forum buddy, keep calm and don't panic you lucky, greedy bastard

P.S.
For saving your BTCBTC from next crashes, I'm hardly working on a project on my exhausted personal budget, are you committed wise enough to donate like half a percent of your unfairly acquired old coins?  

Allow me to simplify:

• Govs all over the world are targeting bitcoin miners for imposing bans, extra taxes, etc. Meanwhile, PoS shills are aggressively promoting their stupid ideas about PoS being the next generation, environmentally correct, energy efficient alternative to PoW, blah, blah.  
• Bitcoin is not adopted as means of payment, not even in the horizon, instead ,speculators (people like you), along with gamblers and scammers are dominating the marketplace.
• Bitcoin is not even ready for mass adoption, right now with 4-5 TPS.
• ...

The most stupid and irresponsible thing would be ignoring everything and sticking to your stash, don't do this, help us as a reasonable stakeholder would.

Cheers and bye,

Because they cannot get the same things as in centralized pools. So, to convince them into P2P way, it should be possible to redirect the traffic first, and then miners should see, that they could switch from centralized pools to decentralized ones, and claim their rewards by themselves. Because even in 100% decentralized model, it is still possible to build centralized pools on top of that. So, miners first should redirect their shares, and mine in centralized and decentralized pools at the same time, and then they should see, that decentralized model is stable enough to fully switch into that. Because as long as centralized pools have more features, people won't switch. And because of Merged Mining, it is possible to mine on both, to see, how it works, and why decentralized pools can give miners more control over blocks they mine.

Allow me to simplify.

Don't fuck with my money.

This isn't an "experiment" anymore. The moment people incorporated it into their lives and DEPEND on it -- it ceases to be something that you can view as your personal petri dish.

Let me paint a theoretical picture for you:

You, enterprising software engineer have the itch to change Bitcoin. Maybe you do, through hook or crook, and the entire ecosystem falters.
Do you really want to be the idiot in the hotseat when millions of pissed off former Bitcoin holders come looking?
I'd think not.

Take this shit seriously, and don't propose changes just to soothe your ego. This is a real system that people depend on. We could give a shit about how clever you think you are.

Don't fuck with OUR money.

Got it?

Are you trying to imply Bitcoin protocol and it's implementation should be closed source? I find it's ridiculous. Even Windows have to deal with people/company who reluctant to upgrade through WoW and LTSC.


Unfortunately Bitcoin miner not interested to use P2Pool[1] which development stopped on 2018[2]. Since Monero is mentioned here, i'd like to mention P2Pool for Monero is actively developed[3] with ~4.7% network hashrate[4].

[1] http://p2pool.in/
[2] https://github.com/p2pool/p2pool
[3] https://github.com/SChernykh/p2pool/
[4] https://p2pool.io/#blocks

It is not that surprising, because it is not a secret that we know each other.

What else is incomplete here? https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-June/020532.html

That idea is quite simple: you have the mainchain, you sign your coins, and then they appear on the sidechain. Then, you move those coins on the mainchain, and then they are destroyed on the sidechain. So, the whole problem is simplified into making the right output scripts.

If you think that technical description is incomplete, then you can try to see, what is really needed. To sign anything, it is needed to make an invalid transaction, that would prove you own some coins on the mainchain. To do that, you can use the signet way of signing blocks, just make "to_spend" and "to_sign" transactions, and place them on your sidechain. As far as I know, vjudeu is working on a technical description for signet-based signatures. Also, I noticed that it was recently touched on the mailing list, and BIP-322 is a good starting point, because it can be used to prove any funds, including Taproot outputs, that could contain some hidden TapScript branches, designed especially for things like sidechains.

It is a separate problem, I wrote some posts about it, but there are many possible solutions, and it is still discussed here and there (for example, making pay-to-block-hash address type could solve it, if it would be possible to claim such coins by using Taproot (if everyone agreed on everything), or use on-chain settlement as a fallback, and revealing enough data to make sure that miner X can claim N coins from such address). Another option is to always fully verify every share, but then I am not sure if there are enough resources for that.

Scaling is again a separate problem, and it is mainly about compression. One possible option to compress things, is to allow transaction joining, but some people are against it, because this kind of feature can also enable sidechains and other things, so it is hard to accept for those who are afraid that something will be activated, and that feature will have more, unintended consequences, that nobody is aware of now.

Again, it is entirely different problem, also because if there are no sidechains, then some features will happen only on altcoins. As long as there is no convenient, decentralized way, to try new things, users are forced to choose: use Bitcoin with its features, or sell Bitcoin, and buy something else, to get another features.

It is possible only because of speculation, and endless fiat inflation. In normal circumstances, it would be possible to have a slow, stable growth, and then there would be no cult. But it is a human factor, that no source code will eliminate entirely.

Again, it is a different problem, related to something like "not everyone is a programmer, and it will never be the case".

I sincerely apologize for failing to be on-time.

From where we left in Part 1:
1- Peter Todd's "tail-emission" suggestion is settled as being strongly rejected as far as it is about a solution to the zero-subsidy dilemma, and as long as it is about bitcoin, @tromp nailed it.

2- The security concerns he has about the issue, disincentivized mining industry, mostly, is recognized as being serious.
2- Different alternative approaches/mitigations are presented.
This part is a walkthrough of the latter class of posts: alternatives to continuous subsidy or mitigations to the problem for bitcoin where tail subsidy is cut.


Before starting to summarize the two major alternatives to tail subsidy, discussed in this topic, let's take a look at a third, less vocal, yet important view:

Alternative #0: In Whales, We Trust!
In case, God forbid, bitcoin security becomes fragile because of a drop in the hashrate due to miners' marginal profits vanishing which in turn would be the result of subsidy decrease/cut, whales will do something about it, like by bribing miners/donating large fees, and so on as they have huge incentives to keep their wealth secure, no worries.

Actually, Gregory Maxwell has drafted the groundwork for this approach in his first post:
Few posters have mentioned the whales solution, explicitly in the thread, not followed so much as it causes the discussion to be deferred infinitely, but taking into account Maxwell's mindset, I think it is where the community is for now: Nothing to worry about, it is working, miners are just stupid business people, whales and/or devs, God bless, will take care of us.

MY Take
Disclaimer: I hate whales because of jealousy or my left leaning mindset, or both.  
Objection 1: Bitcoin is not a stake based system, you can't leave its security in hands of holders, they are mostly a bunch of greedy bastards.
Rather than the hodling (ugh) discourse, a true bitcoiner is the one who depends on transaction processing, the one who accepts bitcoin for his or her goods/services. Miners are awarded the silver badge for burning their fortunes and securing the transactions, so providing the infrastructure for the hero merchants aforementioned.
Miners deserve more respect than what bitcoin cult leaders show, on the contrary, whales go never close to the top of the bitcoin respect list. BTW, read the disclaimer above, again.  
Objection 2: Since mass adoption is a critical priority, we need an established theory inclined toward newcomers and resilient against fiat-fed academic debunks, it can't include a whale based security justification.  


Now we examine the two major alternatives presented in the topic, they share the same idea that there is something to be fixed but ...
Alterntive #1:
Subsidize The Tail By Taxing The Head.
It is the first and the main trend proposed and supported firstly by @vujdue, @garlonicon (surprisingly, the same guys who presented the second approach as well ) The core idea being something like this:
It is possible to force, via a soft fork, an extra fee which is locked for long future, such that future miners, as a block builder, would be able to claim the reserved satoshis gradually, and as an extra income, a virtual block subsidy which infinitely continues without touching the 21M hard cap.
An alturistic version of this is discussed (no soft forks) as well, where people voluntarily chip-in for the same purpose.

MY Take
Disclaimer: check the disclaimer above again
Objection #1: This works as a negative pressure towards mass adoption because of the fees being lifted.
Objection #2:  It fails to answer Greg Maxwell's original objection to Peter Todd, i.e.: How much tail subsidy is adequate and why?


Alternative #2:
Just follow Paul Sztorc!
It is the second trend, advocated (again!) by @vjudeu and @garlonicon. Putting it in the simplest sense, Sztorc says other than hard forking/ruining bitcoin by violating 21M hard cap or 1M block size limit, you have this beautiful option to support merge mined side-chains which provide new source of income hence incentives for miners.
@tromp, this wise guy, is the only one who has made a reasonable (though, mild) objection to the idea in this thread:
Unfortunately, it didn't get enough attention let alone a proper answer, I'll fill this gap.

MY Take
Disclaimer: I've been busy for a long time working on a project based on the same ideas as what Paul Sztorc has been advocating for half a decade and more; DYOR!

As of @tromp objection:
If it is just about solving the subsidy dilemma, @tromp objection would be plausible. IOW, you can't solve just one problem by such a disruptive idea, you shouldn't. Leaving the situation with pools and BIG mining farms that has centralized bitcoin mining scene so much, as is, makes it impossible to fix/improve anything in bitcoin.

As of Paul, @vjudeu, @garlonicon, ..., and the whole idea of zero emission, side-chain:
I'm a believer, but you need to read my take against @tromp's argument as well: It should be presented as a complete package, a framework, a project, even a cult-fork (just made it up) with established roadmap for fixing most crucial bitcoin issues including, not limited to, the dilemma under consideration. The most important candidates would be mining centralization, scaling, and mass adoption. I'd add two covert problems as well: whale cult and hacktopia (again, made it up just now).


P.S.
Wish you guys find this part useful, if so, you are welcome to correct me in case I've missed or misrepresented anything.

I think it is more likely that people will stay with fixed supply, no matter what. Too many people entered the system because of that, so if there will be any proposal to make it mandatory to produce blocks with tail supply, I guess people will simply act against it, and such coin will end up being an altcoin.

If you think that it is really reachable by some kind of smart contract, then go on, and implement that. Then, if people will be interested, you will see, how soft-forks can alter your contracts. And you will also see, how easily someone could just take your code, and make a clone. Because, guess what, altcoins are more opened to hard-forks than Bitcoin, so the most likely scenario is that your code will be simply hard-forked. But it is also possible that if your code will be rock solid, then it will be soft-forked, no matter how "smart" your contract will be. If you will use for example any typical signatures, then you will open the door for commitments, and for soft-forks.

i don't think alot of people would go along with it but that's not the point. the point is bitcoin being opensource means people can look at and change the code and given that, we can pretty much assume every aspect of bitcoin will be put under a microscope and there will always be factions that want this change or that. one of the weaknesses of bitcoin not being immutable code...

Surprisingly, those two topics could meet, when it comes to microcode in the Script: imagine treating OP_CHECKSIG as a bunch of opcodes, related to some ECDSA operations, having OP_SHA256 somewhere, or even just treating OP_HASH256 as a compressed version of "OP_SHA256 OP_SHA256". This topic is still open, it appeared some times in the mailing list, and I guess there will be some proposal like that in the future, also because Bitcoin Core is going further into descriptors, that would redefine the way we think about the Script (and could potentially redefine the rules of counting such opcodes into any computation-based fees, currently they are size-based, but they don't have to be, other things like UTXO-complexity, or even Script-complexity are possible, and guess what: 100 OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY opcodes are more complicated than 100 OP_2DROP opcodes, but the transaction cost could be identical).

True, the whole topic cannot be taken seriously. The only thing we can do is to prepare for any kind of tail supply attacks, and counter-attack by rejecting any such proposals, burning those coins, selling them if it will be profitable, or simply ignoring them at all, if they are harmless.

Listen up, and listen good.

If you think changing Bitcoin's issuance or fee structure makes sense -- then I can tell you as someone who has been deeply immersed in this since 2011 that I'm not going to go along with it.

First -- no one is giving the original design a chance. Why in the fucking fuck are proposals to change something that hasn't even run a decent course in the first place? If you're bored, go program something in assembly, leave Bitcoin alone.

Second -- malleable monetary policy isn't why I'm involved with Bitcoin. You try to change this, I will evaluate and likely dump/leave. This also goes for proposals that try to pursue altcoin strategies for Miner Extracted Value..

I'm not alone, and I'd rather you fucking fuckers worked on problems that need solving instead of being tempted to twiddle the knobs on the best scarce digital asset on the planet. Seriously, what the fuck. Just fork it and make your own nightmare, thanks.