Mining club and club wiring
leaders may take most or all of the block reward.
However, every user is free to choose which mining
club to join. Therefore, market competition will bring
an equilibrium between mining club leaders, who
charge a certain percentage of reward, and club
members, who contribute their mining power.
Abusive transactions
With new POT consensus, TAU can be susceptible to
new types of attacks that are based on manipulation
of transactions. Potential abusive transactions fall into
two categories: for-profit, whose goal is to maximize
profit in future block reward; and for-control, whose
goal is to manipulate block generation and control the
network regardless of economic gain or loss.
As discussed in Chapter 4, reward clipping can thwart
for-profit abusive transactions. If future block reward
is bounded by current block transaction fee, there will
be no room for any for-profit abusive transactions.
The clipped reward can be redistributed into the
network through several possible ways, including
lottery, redistribution to club members, or burn.
Unpredictability of block generator
In addition to mining power, randomness is also
needed to pick the block generator. TAU’s current
solution comes from NXT, which uses a series of
generation signatures and their hash. In the long term,
it is very difficult to predict block generator. However,
short term prediction can be very accurate. In
particular, if one club controls 1
𝑀
of total mining power,
then on average it has a chance of producing 𝑘
consecutive blocks every 𝑀𝑘 blocks. Its club leader
can predict when this is about to happen. This opens
door for various attacks such as double spend.
Hi dear imorpheus,
There are certain problems that you mentioned in your whitepaper. I have collected very important problems or attacks that will create problem
in TAU ecosystem which you will see by red marking here in quote.
First of all, if these problems and attack can be solved TAU will be unbeatable. Without these problems, everything can be solved gradually by time.
Problem1: leaders may take most or all of the block reward.Solution: Market competition will bring
an equilibrium between mining club leaders, who
charge a certain percentage of reward, and club
members, who contribute their mining power.
I think there should have a trust system/feedback system also for mining club. So that, people can choose the best one. And to protect the feedback system you also need to reduce the creating of fake wallets. So, for this, you can add a simple physical authenticator in wallet like (yes or no).
Other Problems: for-profit, whose goal is to maximize
profit in future block rewardwhose
goal is to manipulate block generation and control the
network regardless of economic gain or loss.This opens
door for various attacks such as double spend.Solution: All these problems can be solved or reduce 80% by simple physical authenticator in wallet like (yes or no). or think about something like google authenticator.
What do you think?
Thanks.