The only way for private property to survive against the crazy devolution of society that always occurs with widespread economic failure and defaults, is for the private property to be mobile and well private.
But this is wrong. Private property isn't going to survive a crazy devolution of society. That's why it's a crazy devolution of society. If the establishment kicks and screams so hard to stop it, there is nothing to be done for western society.
Private wealth surely won't like your altcoin then if crazy devolution comes!
Some private wealth escaping is the only thing that stops a 600 year Dark Age from reigning every where. While Rome fell for 1000 years, Eastern Byzantine did not.
Your logic is too binary. There are gradients of result and strong IP anonymity helps those who want to move to where the freedom is.
We were additionally talking about dealing with coin taint in a normal functioning society (non-devolutionary) case.
As I mentioned previously to you in a PM, it becomes time for the "3rd world" economies to take the reign where the governments have much less power.
Exactly. And anonymity helps capital move there.
They can't go after everybody, so anything that is a hindrance to adoption by everybody slows down the possibility of a quick and hopefully less painful switch.
I never proposed implementing anonymity that added any hindrance whatsoever. It should be even easier and less intrusive than Tor. And I've written down such an algorithm already. Serious implementators can PM me.Even in a normally functioning society, taint is a very big problem if the money carries your identity or traces of crime in a decentralized system like cash or bitcoin, at least for gold it can't even carry a drug residue like paper cash can. Issues range from the ones I already wrote about upthread, to even identity theft. Even with a credit card, you run some risk of your identity being stolen and used for nefarious activities.
Coin taint is only an issue with a transaction ledger--less so with the "mini-blockchain" but still there. Rather than square pegging the round hole, the universally better design of the account ledger solves it natively.
Incorrect on both points.
Coin taint is no problem in the ledger if your IP address is never known and you never otherwise reveal your identity on any spend. Thus the ledger alone is not the problem.
And the mini-blockchain solves/improves nothing on taint, because the full history has been saved by someone. It just isn't required to be a full verifying client.
Additionally, in lieu of "sending coins", one can simply send accounts by changing keys.
You mean EXchanging (transferring) the private key.
Following this principle, it is impossible to follow more than one hop in an account's life without rubber hosing each person down the line. If done correctly, it is impossible to know how much was even sent.
That does nothing for solving taint. This can't be anything more than a mixer at best (which I already explained upthread are useless without EVERYONE using IP anonymity and otherwise not revealing their identity), and at worst it is simply the recipient using your private key to transfer to a new address.
Also it isn't secure until the receiving party sends it to a new address and 6 or so blocks have elapsed.
You still need IP anonymity when transferring the private key. It is very unlikely you can find a FX exchange bid without going online.
You simply have not thought this out deeply yet.
As far as IP anonymity, the NSA cannot be everyone.
Agreed. But it doesn't help your point.
Timing attacks on tor cannot isolate individual transactions from the noise.
Incorrect. The traffic+timing analysis adversary can, unless the data is encrypted (which it is not on Bitcoin) without any control of any node nor pool nor peer. Additionally even if encrypted it can be known if the adversary also controls the peer decrypting the data, i.e. the pool server (or the ISP that hosts the pool server). How can you know the pool is safe? You can't. Bitcoin is a target.
With a healthy mix of clear net and tor nodes, very good IP anonymity is possible with very little effort
They are all low-latency (unless you are talkig freenet, which isn't practical for this use case), and thus it doesn't matter how many you chain, traffic+timing analysis still applies for a global adversary such as the NSA.
And, if they do catch something, all they have is the tiniest window of information that is stopped in its tracks at the next account change.
What account change? You mean the exchange of private keys idea which is wrong. Or you mean restarting your Tor session. IN any case, you are wrong sorry.