He was suggesting a fork that would block some or all transactions unless they have ID attached, a form of whitelisting. It is the method of 51% attacking the coin to hold it hostage to demand design changes. It might work, but waiting out the attacker is another option. The more of a backlog of fee-paying transactions develop that the attacker won't process, the more incentive there is for other miners to join.
IC, thx for clarifying that for me.
smooth thank you for the honest re-summary of my statement.
smooth actually including the viewkey, not necessary an ID.
smooth I am thinking of 10X hashrate attack as well, not just a 51% attack, which I had explained in the other thread is much more brutal on the other miners. In either case, the attacker can change the protocol to award his miners the fees from "incorrect transactions", while refusing to process the other outputs. So sorry your logic is refuted. The payer's input becomes spent/confiscated and the Cryptonote rings can do nothing to stop this.
Mea culpa. I got some sleep, then upon awakening, I realized smooth is correct. If the 51% (or 10X) attacker adds the transaction to the block chain, even if it interprets that only the fee UXTO is spendable, then when the other outputs are spent, it must add those transactions in order to take their fees.
So indeed as the transaction fees excluded from the block chain accumulate to be greater in value than the excess hashrate possessed by the attacker, then honest miners are economically incentivized to process the blacklisted transactions.
However, the attacker may drive the exchange value of the token so low by attacking it, that the transaction fees might have to accumulate over very long periods of time. Perhaps the excessive delays (a year?) would spiral the exchange value downwards and/or many users would capitulate and provide the viewkey required.
So actually smooth is only correct if the number of users of the token who don't capitulate is greater than those who do (presuming the attacker has an externally funded incentive to attack providing the excess hashrate in the first place), otherwise the attacker will have more funding than the honest miners. Because even if the honest miners include the capitulated transaction, the attacker can blacklist those blocks due to the attacker's higher level of base hashrate aforementioned.
In other words, the success of the defense smooth advocates is quite slim, because if the token ecosystem is only composed of diehards, then it is likely won't have a very high base hashrate, thus an attacker with a higher base hashrate is more likely. Whereas, if the token ecosystem is composed of the masses, then most are likely to capitulate.
Even if the token's protocol made anonymity mandatory on every transaction, such that users' clients would choose the minority hashrate fork which enforced the ban against capitulating users, the problem is it is possible to capitulate external to the block chain data, thus there would be no means by which the users' clients could discern which transactions capitulated.
It seems that it is impossible to make a minority block chain protocol that defies the desires of the majority and their collectively funded State (which can charge the cost of attacking a minority block chain to the collective, even surreptitiously). Ironically,
AnonyMint had written about this in 2013.
This is why I became less focused on the anonymity feature over time. I always wanted it and was trying to find a way to perfect it, but really what we need is to make decentralized money popular. And hope that some good comes from that. We can't actually succeed by fighting the majority, unless our minority is very significant in size. I am hoping that microtransactions are so numerous and tiny, that the State can't afford to enforce some form of taxation on all of them. But I admit that eventually the global State will get organized and perfect the systems of digital control. It just seems inevitable. Only the will of the people at-large will decide if the State's power is curtailed.
Privacy on block chains could be a popular feature. But preventing the State from tracking criminals will not be popular. Thus the State must be given a viewkey. This is why I am more focused on scaling block chains, not only absolute anonymity. Privacy can be added with much less costly technology than the very heavy RingCT. That is why I was excited last month when I discovered a way to fix off chain anonymity and scale it.