So not bragging about your holdings is another easy security layer.
Part of the reason why 0.63 BTC will have to be downgraded, at some point.
@AlcoHoDL, Trezor vulnerability is something that has been known for years, there was a lot of discussion about it in the technical discussion boards, but luckily every user can protect himself by setting a passphrase, and there is also another option, which is the use of an SD card.
When it comes to passphrase, the conclusion is that they should be at least 37 characters long :
A physical access to a Trezor One, Trezor T, Keepkey, or B-wallet allows an attacker to extract the 12/24-words within a few minutes using a low-cost setup (~100$), with a very high reproducibility (we had 100% success). We finally proved it can be fully automated allowing anyone to use it in case someone would sell the Extraktor box (similar to old Playstation hacks). This attack can not be fixed. The only mitigation is to use a strong passphrase: we recommend 37 random characters to maintain the same level of security.
For those who are interested in how to protect themselves additionally with the help of an SD card :
Trezor T (2.3.0) and Trezor One (1.9.0) firmware updateAlso, one thing I forgot is that it is possible to set a so-called fake PIN that can be left as a bait, and if it is entered, all data from the hardware wallet will be deleted.
The Wipe Code
Another exciting new feature is the wipe code that acts as a “self-destruct PIN” that erases your Trezor if someone tries to unlock your device without your consent. If the wipe code is entered into any PIN entry dialog, then all private data will be immediately erased from your Trezor and the device will be reset to factory defaults. You can write the wipe code somewhere near your Trezor as a decoy PIN, so if someone tries to unlock the device without your consent, they will cause it to erase itself. You can also use the wipe code to reset your Trezor without using a host device. This update can be enabled on both Trezor models.
A 128 bits PIN should do the trick as well, as it is used to encrypt the seed on the chip.
(Please let me know if you think I'm wrong)
I still have problems with the need for 37 random characters for the 25th word.. and let's say if someone just has 10-15 somewhat random characters, then how long is it going to take to break into the Trezor?
Remember each time that we log into the device and sometimes we might get disconnected and have to log in again, it can take quite a bit of time to be logging in these 37 random characters each time...
I am not going to say how many digits that I actually use, and I also am not going to give any hints either... and it is bad enough that I said that I use such a device, in theory.
By the way, we have a long term member in these here parts that swears by that piece of crap, aka Ledger, and surely there are probably quite a few members who may or may not be in the closest about their use (and apparent belief) in the Ledger crap.
~snip~
A 128 bits PIN should do the trick as well, as it is used to encrypt the seed on the chip.
(Please let me know if you think I'm wrong)
You are definitely right, considering that I am not a user of Trezor, I was not even aware that in 2021 they increased the maximum PIN length to even 50 digits, and they say that 39 digits is quite enough to protect the seed from hacking. It's actually a good thing for those who for some reason don't want to use a passphrase or maybe don't even know such an option exists - although it's an option they always recommend to advanced users.
Everyone should use the passphrase.. and it should not be considered advanced... and maybe using 37 random characters might be considered advanced.
But I still wonder if a relatively short password might just be considered a less advance version. and is better than no password at all.. so why do we have to have a need to overly complicate matters by suggesting so much complication, when surely it must add quite a bit of difficulty to just have a shorter 25th word in there (or 13th word seems to be more standard) rather than no extra word (passphrase) at all.
In other words, why let the perfect be the enemy of the good?
We have a lot of cases where users wonder why they don't see anything on their balance even though they have the correct seed, and then it turns out that they actually added an extra password without which the seed creates a completely new set of addresses.
It might be a bit impractical to enter a PIN that's 39+ digits long, but for the average user it's probably easier than setting a passphrase.
Oh I see that the 39+ pin is different from the extra word...and that 39 character pin would resolve the other issue regarding a hacker getting ahold of the physical device and breaking into it.. so that still leaves the issue of the 13th or 25th word actually not needing to be very complicated, and a 8-15 character passphrase may well make it quite difficult to get at the wallet because they would first need to know (or suspect) that such a wallet (or extra portal to a wallet) actually exists in connection with the 12 or 24 word seed that was extracted from the device.
Some thoughts:
If nobody can access your seed your won't need any passphrase,
if the seed was created with sufficient entropy ...which should always be questionable though!
Also, you are right, even a short passphrase will leave anyone who gets your seed in doubt if there even
is a hidden passphrase wallet and if it makes sense to put in the work to
look brute force for any.
A 128 bits phrase can secure your seed with the same security the seed secures your BTC,
if that's what you want/need for ease of mind.
Nice thing: totally independent from all that passphrase science is the PIN which can secure your Trezor 100% against seed extraction from the open source chip. If the PIN is strong enough, your device will be worthless to any attacker.