Topic: Wall Observer BTC/USD - Bitcoin price movement tracking & discussion - page 2267. (Read 26630696 times)

Reason for the dippity dip probably:

Fed's Powell opens the door to higher and possibly faster rate hikes
https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/feds-powell-hill-appearance-update-views-status-disinflation-2023-03-07/

No surprise.

I will try... from how I would picture it....

Alice is on a treasure hunt, and Bob tells Alice that the Treasure is located 500KM from the Empire State Building. Alice could draw a circle from the ESB with a 500KM radius and knows the treasure lays in that circumference. It will take a while, but eventually she will find it (brute force). However, she may ask for more clues, but each time Bob tells her where to find the treasure, he also hides it in a new location. So this time it is 600KM from Statue Of Liberty, again she will have to draw a circle with a  600KM radius from SOL and knows the treasure lays within that circumference. Again She will find it eventually....

Now lets say Bob, was lazy, and didn't want to re-bury the treasure, so when Alice asked for another clue, Instead of moving the treasure, Bob leaves it where it is and tells Alice that is is now 400KM from Liberty Bell. Using those two clues, She can now plot the two circles and where they intersect, two points, the treasure will be at one of the two points. Now imagine she asked for a third clue, assuming Bob is using the same spot he hid the treasure, the third clue will allow Alice to triangulate the location, where all three circles intersect is where the treasure is located.

That's pretty much what they did, they assumed people wouldn't "re-bury the treasure", each time they signed a transaction, and by scanning the blockchain database they were able to identify wallets that did reuse their nouce and using that information and mathematical equations. They were to derive the private key...

Fun fact: If I hid a grain of sand somewhere on earth, you would have more chances of finding it, than brute forcing a 256bit key....

EDIT: Grammar, too early in the morning!

Well I guess the only positive is that it's clearer than fiat money going from 100% to 1% of its original value over 100 years and everyone pretending that it's a great system.

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-06/perth-mint-gold-doping-china-cover-up-four-corners/102048622

Whew?

Explanation

🇨🇳 China is able to put an expiration date on its digital yuan, forcing people to spend and not allowing them to save.

CBDC’s are slavery, #Bitcoin    is freedom

https://twitter.com/BitcoinMagazine/status/1632803621560791041?t=6EQZ1rrrPcVu3cN39bA0QA&s=19

That's not a source to what you're claiming. This is speculating that in the future quantum computers could crack private keys, this is also nothing new.


So quantum computers could, theoretically, crack private keys in the near future. You said they can, but there is no evidence of this, only theory.


You're also confusing the two vulnerabilities here, considerably.

One is based on nonce reuse, that out of 424m public addresses, only managed to crack 773 addresses (less than 0.0002% of all addresses).  The idea with quantum computers has nothing to do with nonce reuse, but brute forcing SHA256 private keys (as far as I understand). If successful, that would theoretically mean 100% of addresses are at risk, as opposed to 0.0002%, and a soft fork would be needed.

So to say quantum computing isn't needed anymore to crack a private keys, is clearly complete nonsense. The point with the 773 addresses hacked is that the damage has more or less already been done (mostly years ago), with the exception of maybe around 50 addresses per year getting hacked, from people not using secure software or safe practices predominantly.

So for example, all wallets with unspent outputs - or even just 1 output, as referenced attack requires 2+ outputs minimum, but realistically 4+ - currently have no vulnerabilities.

https://punchbowl.news/archive/3723-punchbowl-news-am/

you can view the full draft law here:
https://punchbowl.news/wp-content/uploads/MCHENR_KIA.pdf

Ouch.

https://www.tomshardware.com/news/quantum-computer-development-could-put-bitcoin-security-at-risk-by-the-2030s

Another day, another drop.
Still below 2017 high when we consider inflation.

All is hunky dory with the economy apparently. Nothing to worry about. House prices are in fact up according to the lamestream UK media. (Thought there was 10% inflation? No mention of that, why would there be)

But sure, I'm the one being negative.

ThInGs ArE aBsOlUtElY fInE.

Explanation

 Would someone be able to explain this to me like I'm Alice or Bob?  ELIAB for short.

Cryptography = OK!
Crypto = batslap for Jay!

Randomness generated from a computer... something so simple to us humans, remains such a complex task for computers. That was a rabbit hole I went down for a few hours as well.

Explanation

For a total layman like me it seems to boil down to the old "Every cryptographic algo is only as good as the RNG feeding random numbers into it".
One of the of (very few) takeaways I learned from Bruce's Applied Cryptography is:
1. Good randomness is key <- pardon the pun! (I think that's one of the ways the NSA subverted Crypto AGs cipher machines by making the RNG less random than customers expected and later they just went with broadcasting the private key along the ciphertext)
2. If you have a true random key that is equally long or longer than the data to encrypt, XOR is perfectly safe encryption (I am still astonished by that fact)

In the past the TLAs (and FLAs for the britons) employed brigades of ladies that ran bingo drums the whole day to create one time pads. It is said they only employed women because men were generally unable to follow the procedure correctly all day long and started to make up numbers from their head or whatever, while the ladies produced high quality OTPs.

So, when our ladies for once behave totally random and unexpected, that's a feature in them, not a bug.
^Couldn't resist, sorry gals. It is depressing and embarassing enough that men are apparently unable to operate a bingo drum reliably for more than a few minutes.

Edited to add: Apologies for the repeated use of the banned c-word, I was assuming it might be safe in this context (*ducks to evade the mandatory incoming batslap*)

Indeed. For anyone who wants to read up on this:

2014: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/reused-r-values-again-581411
2016: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/more-signatures-with-repeated-nonces-1431060

Definitely nothing new, just a research team providing further info.

It definitely is scary when you read the heading... But dive a little deeper and you realize it is an issue that has been discussed before.

Hence, most, and i hope most, bitcoin wallets are programmed to use different/random nonces with each signing, therefore eliminating the novel attack.

I've been studying/readying and trying to understand ECDSA (still learning, especially the mathematics) and Public/Private Key and how it all works... then you would really appreciate, that with proper implementation, ECDSA is secure.

I recommend everyone to at least understand the difference between Symmetric Encryption vs Asymmetric Encryption, if you don't already know it...

Interesting read. I'd say vroom is not correct here, exposing your public key does not mean quantum computers can crack private key. At least that's not what the article is about.

(Please provide source if this is the case).

vapourminer is closer to the truth here, but it's not just about exposing your public key. Exposing pub key with 1 signature isn't the risk described, based on trying to find a common demoninator to private key. The risk is about exposing pub key is related to nonces, in this case, nonce reuse. Because then determining the private key, based on two different signatures with same nonce, becomes a lot more straight forward.


Notably, they weren't able to hack any wallets with different nonces, or addresses that used a single nonce (they didn't even try) but this is somewhat besides the point based on the "mishap" of ECDSA implementations which creates this vulnerability of repeated nonce use. Somebody can no doubt explain it better and more accurately than me, but after reading the article in full, I get the jist of it.

Ultimately, this isn't really information that we didn't already know - hence it's always been recommended to use different addresses due to possibility of "reverse engineering" signatures (ie those with the common variable of nonces, when those variables become a constant due to implementation error). Even the first implementation of Bitcoin in 2019 protected against this with the use of change addresses it's worth noting.

It's only newer implementations that have encouraged (or forced) address reuse that becomes the problem here, combined with nonce reuse.