screw it lets repeat myself and add some more to it
using gmaxweles own mindset
so libsecp256k1 "efficiency gain" is also an attack because it improved efficiency by 5x
so segwit quadratic/linear 'fix' is an attack because it improved efficiency
so fibre making its own tier ring network around the pools is an attack for propagation efficiency
so diluting full node count using prunning is an attack for making home computer efficiency
so diluting fullnodecount by having segwit nowitness mode is an attack
so making LN is an attack
.. at this point i can feel the rage of blockstreamists ready to pounce with their blockstream defender responses
so when something developed by blockstream is used to get more efficient, its ok. but its not blockstream sanctioned=attack
. hmmm i see..
might be easier for blockstreams partners to become more efficient instead of spitting out the dummy because they are not as efficient.
P.S if blockstream are so perfect and have the best codebase.. there should be no reason for so many 'fixes' via segwit because utopia should already have been coded in 2013
An ASIC moving from 56nm to 28nm is an efficiency gain, because it does more work (more operations) for less electricity.
ASICBoost doesn't do more operations for less electricity. ASICBoost lets the ASIC skip doing some of the work. It does not contribute any additional security to the network. If everyone used it, it wouldn't make a difference, it would still require the same number of operations to attack the network prior to it existing.
This is why ASICBoost is a shortcut, not an efficiency gain, it does not contribute any additional security.
PoW is about RELATIVE security. That's all PoW can deliver, because it is bad cryptographic security: the bad guys and the good guys are on equal footings. Normally, in cryptographic security, the good guys have a (secret key) advantage over the bad guys (ignoring the secret key). But PoW is the silliness incarnated when it comes to security.
Also, PoW is not even PoW: it is proof of hash result. If by some magic, I can provide you with an input that hashes to a funny hash starting with a lot of zeros, you MAY BELIEVE that that is a proof of me doing a lot of calculations, but all I had to provide you with, cryptographically, was a specific input. How I got to that input is my business. The hypothesis is that I had to do a lot of trial-and-error, and hence that my providing with a solution is a "proof" of that lot of trial and error. However, how one does that, is one's own affair.
You could think that it is only fair to do it with paper and pencil. You might say that all those people using computers to compute "proof of work" are not being fair. The work has to be done by the human, not by a machine. Ok, then we allow for machines, but only CPU. Until a smart guy comes along and does it with a GPU or an FPGA. Then another guy makes an ASIC. These are all tools to render more efficient the ways of transforming economic resources (human time, machine cost, design time, electricity....) into the demanded result. Thinking of how to make a more efficient ASIC or thinking of how to do a smarter organisation of the calculation are just different ways of making the transformation of economic resources in resulting "difficulty solution" more efficient, that is, using less economic resources to produce more spectacular (higher-difficulty) results.
As PoW is only as secure as the waste of the economic resources of the enemy needed to do so (which is utterly stupid btw) any progress by "the good guys" that is kept secret for "the bad guys" is in fact an extra security feature. By making more public the "secret efficiency" of miners, in fact, one has lowered somewhat the competitive advantage of the "good guys" securing the block chain. But it wasn't a secret: a paper on the Arxiv lined out already how to make a smarter use of calculations to obtain results.
There is absolutely no difference between "making better asics", "using computers over pen and paper", "using asics over computers" or "improving the calculational scheme". All these methods improve the efficiency of producing more "difficulty solutions" with less economic means. For the good guys, and for the bad guys. So the relative security remains the same, if both of them have access to the same tech ; it improves if the good guys keep it secret.
And in any case PoW is stupid security.