Russian hybrid warfare: what are effects-based network operations and how to counteract themArticle by: Vitalii Usenko and Dmytro Usenko
The strategy of a hybrid or irregular war followed by real war was developed in the USSR. The same scenario was used by USSR during the ‘liberation’ of Poland, Bessarabia, Bukovyna, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the attempt to ‘liberate’ Finland in 1939-1940. This liberation is now being justified as a Soviet attempt to secure its borders against Hitler, which is the same justification Russia uses now, 75 years later: “to secure its borders against NATO”.
Since its formation in 1922 following communist doctrine the USSR has made accusations against every country in the world with the deliberate intention of concealing its own role as the instigator.
Vladimir Lenin, the first leader of the USSR established the Comintern to be, in the definition of its own name, the world communist party, and gave it the objective of setting up a world Soviet socialist republic. The declaration that accompanied the formation of the USSR in 1922 included four republics; the plan was to increase this number until the whole world formed part of it. The declaration behind the formation of the USSR is an official document with the principal objective of this vast state being the destruction and subjugation of all other states in the world. Europe was the first target. This ideology was inherited by second leader of USSR, Joseph Stalin, who needed crises, wars, destruction and hunger in Europe. The worse for Europe the better. It would create opportunities for Stalin and provide justification for him to send the Red Army into Europe as its liberator.
In 1939, the Soviet Union started actively pursuing the reconquest of the provinces of Tsarist Russia lost during the chaos of the October Revolution and the Russian Civil War, after the agreement with Nazi Germany in August 1939. The same rhetoric is used by Putin to back up his claim that in returning Crimea to Russia he is correcting not just a historical injustice, but an outrage.
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History is being repeated and it seems that a similar strategy to the one described in US NSDC (National Security Council) Report 68 “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” (April 14, 1950), a Report to the President Pursuant to the President’s Directive of January 31, 1950 should be reconsidered in respect of Russia. The President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense undertook a reexamination of US objectives in peace and war and the effect of these objectives on US strategic plans, in the light of nuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union. The challenge which faced the USA and the West at that time involved preempting the destruction of not only the US but the civilization itself.
“The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas under the Soviet sphere of influence. The means employed by the Kremlin in pursuit of this policy were limited only by considerations of expediency. Doctrine is not a limiting factor; rather it dictates the employment of violence, subversion, and deceit, and rejects moral considerations. The only apparent restraints on resort to war are, therefore, calculations of practicality”, stated the report.
Russia has not changed its mentality much from its predecessor USSR with its communist ideology. The mistakes and misconceptions of the West were explored in the article “A need to contain Russia” by Anne Applebaum in The Washington Post on March 29, 2014: “Openly or subconsciously, since 1991, Western leaders have acted on the assumption that Russia is a flawed Western country. Perhaps during the Soviet years it had become different, even deformed. But sooner or later, the land of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, the home of classical ballet, would join what Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, so movingly called “our common European home. For the first time, many are beginning to understand that the narrative is wrong: Russia is not a flawed Western power. Russia is an anti-Western power with a different, darker vision of global politics”, concluded Anne Applebaum.
In the 1990s, many people thought Russian progress toward that home simply required new policies: with the right economic reforms, Russians would sooner or later become like West. As it turned out Russia is not a flawed Western power. Russia is an anti-Western power with a different, darker vision of global politics.
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Edward Lucas, UK journalist in ‘The Economist’ author of the books “New Cold War” and Deception: “Spies, Lies and How Russia Dupes the West”, has similar point of view. He argues that Russia is a revisionist power:
It has the means to pursue its objectives;
It is winning ; and
Greater dangers lie ahead.
He recommended that the United Kingdom (but it applies to US and NATO countries) and its allies:
Give up any hope of a return to business as usual;
Boost the defense of the Baltic states and Poland;
Expose Russian corruption in the West;
Impose sweeping visa sanctions on the Russian elite;
Help Ukraine; and
Reboot the Atlantic Alliance.
Edward Lucas supposes that Putin is tempted to destroy NATO via Baltics: “Putin has seen the West weakness in Ukraine, and he wants to exploit that. I fear very much that he will try something in the Baltic states because he can see that if he destroys NATO’s credibility in the Baltic states, then he destroys NATO, and this is a very tempting target for him.”
Let us have a brief look at the Eurasian ideology and Russian Doctrine and then go the application of these doctrines to current hybrid warfare and network operations. There is practically no difference with its precursor’s Communist ideology, which promoted a continuous program of expansion and world domination. The terminology is slightly different, but the final goal of world domination in the communist doctrine and the Russian doctrine is virtually identical. It was too early to assume that Russia changed and could potentially become part of the West.
The Russian Doctrine and Eurasian ideology are unofficial documents, they have not been approved by the Russian Parliament. Elements of the doctrines are present in political programs or in theories of the “Russian National Idea.” It seems that the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church perceive both Russian Doctrine and Eurasian ideology as an essential worldview, the spiritual foundation for the entire Russian nation.
The doctrine’s major goal is to carve out Russian civilization as a separate world phenomenon and to lay out the Russian Global Project. There isn’t much difference with the communist ideology where communism was considered to be a separate world phenomenon, in essence a Red Global Project.
The Russian Doctrine is a collection of different scenarios, each of which not only describes one variant of the future and warns against possible threats, but at the same time lays out strategies outlining the vision of the desired Russia, the Russia that should be. It is a voluminous document, which is why we will only highlight some points relevant to the current situation.
In the introduction to the Russian Doctrine, we find quotes from different speeches by Vladimir Putin: “The Russian Federation is doomed in today’s world.” “The collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”
The Russian Doctrine sees the “final and irreversible overcoming of the US and Western hegemony by ousting them from the geopolitical arena” as Russia’s only chance for survival in the 21st century. “Only those countries will be successful in the first 20 years of the 21st century which are hard, severe, persistent, and consistent.”
“The Russian empire has revived several times. Based on the values of the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium), even after the long-lived Tatar-Mongol yoke, the renewed mighty empire-successor of Kyivan Rus of King Sviatoslav has arisen in Eastern Europe.” Moscow is described as the Third Rome, the sole successor of Rome.
The Russian Doctrine presupposes that the crisis of Western civilization will inevitably lead to an urgent search for a new world leader. The international potential of Russian civilization is again on the agenda of history.
The Russian Doctrine defines three major principles of foreign policy:
Concentration: The return and re-unification of all territories of historical Russia, first of all Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, followed by reunification with the rest of the Russian world
Fight ‘terror-globalism:’ Russia shall declare openly that Russia does not recognize the civilizing missions of the USA and the West;
‘Big Clench,’ ‘Alternative globalization’: Strategic cooperation with China, India, and Iran, resulting in a military union between Russia, China, India, North Korea, and Syria.
Possible further extension to other Arab countries and countries from other regions, such as Africa and South America.
Alternative globalization, ousting the US and the West from the geopolitical arena, will start from ‘the near abroad,’ from countries like Ukraine. The initial territories initially would include Ukraine’s Tavria region (Crimea, Mykolaiv Oblast, and Kherson Oblast) and the Donbas (Donetsk Oblast). Please note that the Russian Doctrine was published in 2005, not in 2014.
The Soviet Union started actively pursuing the reconquest of the provinces of Tsarist Russia lost during the chaos of the October Revolution and the Russian Civil War in 1939, after the agreement with Nazi Germany in August 1939. The same rhetoric is used by Putin to back up his claim that in returning Crimea to Russia he is correcting not just a historical injustice, but an outrage.
We will return again to US NSDC (National Security Council) Report 68 “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” (April 14, 1950). The document’s summary of Soviet priorities is equally applicable to Putin’s Russia:
“The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas under the Soviet sphere of influence”. “The means employed by the Kremlin in pursuit of this policy were limited only by considerations of expediency. Doctrine is not a limiting factor; rather it dictates the employment of violence, subversion, and deceit, and rejects moral considerations. The only apparent restraints on resort to war are, therefore, calculations of practicality”, stated the report.
Ukraine is learning not only how to fight an undeclared hybrid was against Russia; some ‘humanitarian’ aspects of this hybrid war were not left without attention either.
Many questions exist why the worldview and history (more precisely, the distortion of historical events and wrong interpretations of history) are so important for Putin’s Russia as integral part of information and network operations. The issue is that Russian extremists consider worldview and history as warfare tools in this hybrid war as well.
Russian extremist theories of world dominance see the warfare from a perspective which could be unusual for Western audiences. Russians have a far broader conception of warfare than you might expect. They see 6 major priorities in warfare (the more potent is to create an irreversible result and the more sustainable, but slower in time are at the top, the less potent to create sustainable result but faster are at the bottom). This concept is known as the Social Security Concept of the all-Russian political party “Truth and Unity Course”. Hearings of this concept in the Russian Paliament (State Duma) took place on November 28, 1995 (text of the hearings can be found here). It was at the time when the West considered that democratic developments in Russia were irreversible and that Russia would be an allied country with Western democratic values.
Methodological priority: World view and methodology – changing the worldview and methodology of the individual as a means of warfare method (how a person sees the world) is the most potent from the sustainability point of view. That is why the Russian Orthodox Church and the creation of the “Russian World” as an all-encompassing worldview is of utmost priority for Russia in order to achieve its long-term goals.
Chronological priority, the warfare of history – to distort history and chronology in order to justify claims on new territories both for external and internal users as well as to brainwash external and internal victims with propaganda for them to regard Russian claims as legitimate.
Priority based on facts and their interpretations: ideology, technology, methodology. The examples: Russian Doctrine, ideology of Russia as Third Rome, Alexandr Dugin’s ideology and his Eurasianism, Panslavism based on distorted historical interpretations (see above – 2nd chronololgical priority).
Economics priority: eсonomics and finance warfare (example – trade wars against Ukraine, use of the unjustified gas price as an instrument of war against Europe and Ukraine, Russian banking and finance system as warfare tool against Ukraine, currency speculations and throw-in of counterfeit local currency in order to destabilize Ukrainian currency and the Ukrainian monetary system, strategy to buy sovereign debt of victim country and then to request immediate debt re-payment etc.)
Ecological priority, “Genetics” warfare (alcohol, tobacco, environmental pollution e.t.c.) – to promote in the victim country a tolerance to abuse of alcohol, narcotics, to support environmental pollution, deliberately destroying the infrastructure and industrial capacities of the victim county e.t.c. In line with this priority Russia is making efforts to destroy the infrastructure of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast. The terrorists mined the Stirol chemical plant, threatening to cause an environmental catastrophe in the Donetsk Oblast.
Military priority: conventional warfare. Military warfare was used by Russia in a new form of an undeclared hybrid war with a wide application of newly created Special Operation Forces (SSO) in combination with use of local residents brainwashed by the ‘higher’ priorities of warfare described above.
As we can see that information and network operation strategies are key and cover 5 priority of 6 (Methodological priority, Chronological priority, Priority based on facts, Economics priority, Ecological priority) and only one priority is a conventional military priority.
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Until recently not much attention was paid in US and EU to Russian doctrines and strategies, but fortunately situation is changing. Mark Galeotti in his article “Moscow’s Spy Game. Why Russia Is Winning the Intelligence War in Ukraine”, published in Foreign Affairs concludes: “Russia has long been preparing for the kind of conflict underway in Ukraine—one that combines espionage with firepower, economic pressure, information warfare, and political maneuvering. The Russian intelligence services use all these tools effortlessly—a skill that they inherited from their Soviet predecessors and further refined for today’s world, in which influence is as much about economic leverage and the ability to spin the story as about actual facts on the ground. It is telling that even the head of the Russian army, General Valery Gerasimov, admitted last year that “nonmilitary means” have become indispensable to Russia and sometimes even exceed traditional firepower in importance.”
In fact conventional warfare, the military priority was not the topic of this article. However one of the recent novelties in terms of Russia’s concept of war was the creation of full scale Special Operations Forces in Russia.
The Special Operations Forces of the Russian Federation (SOF or SSO in Russian) is a highly mobile group of trained and equipped forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense designed for specific tasks abroad and domestically. The Russian SOF is new unit in Russian army.
Valery Gerasimov, Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia announced the creation of the Special Operation Forces on March 6, 2013. Speaking to foreign military attachés, he said, “We created the command of the forces which is engaged in routine work and conducts planned activities within the framework of the preparation of the Armed Forces”.
The Special Operations Forces are troops designated to achieve Russian political and economic goals in any geographical part of the world which is of interest to the Russian Federation. These troops are fighting in peacetime.
The Russian SOF, besides such acute operations, usually solve the most incredible and ‘delicate’ tasks. They come into action when diplomatic methods are no longer useful. They can distract the energy and attention of ‘certain’ countries from external problems, creating problems inside these countries, shake the political system of these countries, destabilizing the political situation within these countries, including the use of third parties and local residents of the victim country. Special operations forces are designed to create, train and supervise foreign guerrilla movements, eliminate unwanted leaders on foreign territory without any UN sanctions.
The first drill of the Russian Special Operation Forces (SOF) units was conducted on a mountain range in the Kabardino-Balkaria region in April 2013. During the drill, an airlift of SOF units by military transport and army aviation occured, landing groups and cargo to the special assignment area. As described by the Russian military journalist Aleksandr Sladkov (video + article in Russian) during this drill, the SOF demonstrated variants of their possible actions in nieghboring countries. Drills were an imitation of the redeployment of SOF units to the territory of a neighboring country. As Censor.net[block]28[/block], the same Russian military journalist, Aleksandr Sladkov, was seen fighting with terrorists against the Ukrainian army (perhaps learning more about Russian SOF fighting in Ukraine)
The first baptism of these forces tool place in Ukraine during the seziure of the Crimean Parliament on February 27, 2014 (video with the Crimean report of unit No. 090900, February 22-28, 2014) and then in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.
Besides USSR experience and practical concepts Russia has watched closely the development of military doctrines in the West in the late 1990s to early 2000s, especially after 9/11. Some concepts are in further development or reconsideration now: Effect-Based Operations, Network-Centric Warfare, Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences, Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, Network-Enabled Operations, Effects-Based Information Operations.
Western approaches on effects-based operations and network-centric warfare were in active development in mid-1990s . One of them is “Five Rings for Strategic Warfare concept” of John A.Warden,. III, published in his work “The Enemy as a System” in 1995.
Clayton K S Chun in his overview mentioned that “Colonel John Warden believed that nation-states operate like biological organisms composed of discrete systems. In a perfect world these systems function in harmony and the organisms survive and flourish. However, certain systems controlled other systems and were thus significant, while other elements might appear to be vital, they were actually not important for sustaining the organism. Warden believed that like a biological organism a nation could be stunned. Military action could produce strategic paralysis. Strategic paralysis in Warden’s terms would make an enemy incapable of taking any physical action to conduct operations”
“Every state and every military organization will have a unique set of centers of gravity or vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, our five-ring model gives us a good starting point. It tells us what detailed questions to ask, and it suggests a priority for the questions and for operations from the most vital at the middle to the least vital at the outside. These centers of gravity, which are also rings of vulnerability, are absolutely critical to the functioning of a state.”
Leadership was at the center of Warden’s ring model. In his biological system analogy, leadership equated to the brain of a living organism. Leadership targets can include executive, legislative, judicial, and other functions. Campaign planners could target physical governmental facilities
Organic essentials: sources of energy, food, and financial resources to maintain its existence
Society’s infrastructure includes among other things road and rail networks, airports, power grids and factories.
The fourth ring is the population. Attacking the population does not focus solely on bombing civilians, but could also include using psychological warfare or other activities to reduce a populace’s morale.
The last ring comprises fielded military forces. Fielded military forces represent the “fighting mechanism” that protects the state from attack.
All these rings could be targeted and approach could be both inside-out as the case with information and network operations and outside-in as in case of conventional wars.
Russians have modified this model in accordance with their needs of information and network warfare. They modelled nation-state as six rings each of which could be targeted by different means. This model was published in a book by Valeriy Korovin “The third World Network War”
National state is made-up in accordance with following model. Leader of the state, political elites around the leader, an expert community forming political meanings and interpretations, undertaking mass conversion of these meanings and interpretations and bringing them to the masses (Russian terminology) – society and population. The outer ring isthe armed forces.
We can see from current developments that Russia tries to wage a so called “inside-out” war which starts from attempts to influence first of all EU leaders, then the EU expert community followed by mass media with adding social networks and Internet blogs as new forms of communications. The tools used for this are effect-based operations.
The reflection of the application of this model we can clearly see now. “A strategy for damaging Russia’s propaganda machine” by Stephen Komarnyckyj, published in Euromaidan Press, showed the mechanisms which Putin has deployed for his attack:
Agents of influence including politicians, businessmen, corporations with a stake in Russia’s localization program, energy sector etc.;
Networks of journalists who may be sectarian Communists (such as Seumas Milne), or social conservatives attracted by Putin’s superficially Christian agenda (such as Peter Hitchens);
Sectarian left wing sites (such as Counterpunch and Global Research) which exploit a linguistic disconnect to create a sanitised Russia and a conversely stigmatised Ukraine;
Political proxies (such as Stop the War and numerous politicians);
PR Agencies and consultancies;
The Troll army of paid internet commentators, all working to a script.
be continued