Topic: World War III - page 7. (Read 34342 times)

Sweden steps up hunt for 'foreign underwater activity'

(Reuters) - Sweden beefed up its military presence in the Stockholm archipelago on Saturday to scour its waters for "foreign underwater activity", a mobilization of Swedish ships, troops and helicopters unseen since the Cold War.







The search in the Baltic Sea less than 30 miles (50 km) from Stockholm began on Friday and reawakened memories of the final years of the Cold War when Sweden repeatedly hunted suspected Soviet submarines along its coast with depth charges.

There is now increasing tension with Russia among the Nordic and Baltic states - most of them European Union members - over Moscow's involvement in the Ukraine crisis. Finland last week accused the Russian navy of interfering with a Finnish environmental research vessel in international waters.

The Swedish military has said information about suspicious activity came from a trustworthy source, without providing details, and that more than 200 military personnel were involved in the search.

The Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet, citing unidentified sources with knowledge of the hunt, said it began after a radio transmission in Russian on an emergency frequency.

Further encrypted radio traffic from a point in the archipelago and the enclave of Kaliningrad, home to the Russian Baltic fleet's headquarters, was intercepted on Friday evening after the Swedish search started, the newspaper said.

The Russian Defence Ministry said on Sunday that there were no emergency situations in the Baltic involving its vessels.

"Russian Navy ships and submarines are fulfilling their duties in the world ocean waters in accordance with the plan," Interfax news agency quoted a ministry spokesman as saying. "There has been and there are no extraordinary, let alone emergency, situations involving Russian warships."

Countries in the Baltic Sea region have become increasingly wary of Russia's military ambitions since Moscow annexed Ukraine's Crimea region in March following the overthrow of Kiev's pro-Moscow president by protesters.

Last month, Sweden said two Russian warplanes entered its air space, calling the intrusion a "serious violation" and sending a protest to Moscow's ambassador in the Nordic country.

Ships, helicopters and troops from an amphibious unit as well as the home guard combed the search area in Stockholm's archipelago. The forces include HMS Visby, a corvette that has stealth technology and equipment for anti-submarine warfare.

The Swedish military said on Friday there had been no armed intervention and declined to comment on who might be responsible for the suspicious activity, or whether the report had been about a submarine.

"We still consider the information we received as very trustworthy," Captain Jonas Wikstrom, head of operations for the search, told reporters. "I, as head of operations, have therefore decided to increased the number of units in the area."

Should the search find proof of foreign military activity in Swedish coastal waters it will represent the first real test of Prime Minister Stefan Lofven's center-left minority government only weeks after coming to office.

In 1981, a Soviet submarine known under its Swedish designation U137 was stranded deep inside Swedish waters not far from a major naval base in the neutral country, sparking intense suspicion about the scale and motives of such incursions.

(Additional reporting by Alexei Anishchuk in Moscow, Editing by Mark Heinrich)

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/19/us-sweden-deployment-idUSKCN0I70L420141019

Wow... Each to their own I suppose.

I left the USA in 1999 as I didn't like the move towards the Police State that was increasingly obvious at that time.
Now the USA is probably the last place on earth I would want to live.
Even my family in Florida are looking to see if they can get out now.

I prefer Freedom to (a sense of) Security.

I do not know if this story is true or just media manipulation, I hope the news is not true, just the media stirring up course, make the news as if expecting putin will indeed do that, twisting the facts, it is usually done by the opponent politics of a country to secure its assets in other countries, hopefully the media as a messenger, delivering the news are weighted and balanced when presented to the public ... 

Why Is Russia Simulating Nuclear Strikes on Neutral Sweden?



 Russia seems to be pretty mad with its neighbouring countries in the Baltic Sea. Especially with Sweden. A couple of weeks ago, on October 2, Sweden's authority for signals intelligence, FRA, leaked a photo of a Russian fighter flying only about ten metres away from a Swedish Armed Forces intelligence plane.

Last weekend on October 11, a Russian warship threatened a Finnish research vessel in the Baltic Sea. On board were Swedish scientists. And on top of that on October 7, armed NATO-figther jets followed Russian fighters above the Swedish island Öland in the Baltic Sea. It was the Latvian army that posted on Twitter that NATO-jets had followed two Russian military planes in sharp alert over the Baltic Sea.

A government source in one of the Baltic countries neighbouring Sweden told newspaper Svenska Dagbladet that, "The actions of the Russians are sometimes aggressive and their behaviour against signals intelligence planes has been unnerving. It's like during the cold war.” When Russia invaded Swedish air space with their fighter jets, Sweden's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carl Bildt wrote on his blog that it was "the most serious air violation from Russia" that he had ever seen during the time in which he's been the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which is about eight years.

The Baltic Sea trespassings aren't the only strange behaviours from Russia lately. In fact, last year the country simulated a nuclear attack against Sweden, which sounds like something taken from a really horrible war movie. Also, the Russian fighters have been showing off their weapons, by exposing the undercarriage of their airplanes when approaching Swedish airplanes.

These recent events are eerily similar to the Cold War. Could it be that we are approaching a Cold War II? And if so, what does that mean to a country like Sweden?

Confused and terrified, I called up Tomas Ries. He's a lecturer at the Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership at the National Defence College in Stockholm. I wanted to know what the heck is going on.

VICE: Why is the Russian military behaving so aggressive in the Baltic Sea?
Tomas Ries: There are different interpretations about why. One essential thing is that Russia has a ten-year plan to build up their military forces. So they are increasing their military budget to an extreme extend, which means that there are more Russian forces in and around the Baltics than ever.

But a main reason is that Russia are sending a message to the outside world, saying that the "old" Europe is over. What I mean with that is that the thing with NATO and EU dictating everything – with EU preaching [to Russia] about things such as, democracy and respect for human rights – isn't something that Russia will agree to anymore. Putin wants to emphasize that this era is over and that it's important to understand that Russia is strong. And that we [the rest of the world] need to respect their requests. I think that's the fundamental answer to Russia's behaviour in the Baltic Sea.

But if you want to look at each case individually, it's obvious that Putin dislikes when Finland and Sweden cooperate with NATO. That means that Russia is sending signals that it could get dangerous if you operate military exercises with NATO. For example, they simulated a nuclear attack against Sweden at the same time as Sweden had NATO operations.

You could also question their actions as if they're testing the readiness of the Swedish military. They’re using classic tactics that they used during the Cold War era, when they would fly close to the border, or precisely over the border to see what kind of surveillance system Sweden has and how fast the military will react.

 Could you interpret their actions as a build-up to a Cold War II?
I think it's problematic to use analogies like that because it's different nowadays. But one thing is similar: Russia is going back to their old European security agenda as an independent player with interests that often differ from the rest of the world – for example the ongoing war in Ukraine. So we're going back to a Europe where the tensions between Russia and the rest of Europe escalates and where Russia will increasingly use their growing military capacity.

What exactly does it mean when Russia violates Swedish airspace? And what can Sweden do about it?
It’s a very serious action basically. It means that they're violating Sweden's territorial integrity. Sweden's answer to an air violation is to show Sweden’s defence resources by sending out fighter jets to dismiss Russia's actions. Afterwards Sweden will send a diplomatic message, explaining that Russia’s behaviour is not appreciated.

How serious is it to simulate a nuclear attack against another country?
To violate airspace is one thing but to simulate a nuclear attack against another country – even if you don't violate airspace – is something I interpret as very serious and enormously unfriendly. What scares me the most about the Baltic Sea situation, is events like this.

What's Sweden's relationship with Russia like?
If you look at it historically, and go back to the Cold war, you will see that Sweden has always been something of a disguised partner with NATO. Sweden would have taken NATO’s side if a war broke out. Russia looked at Sweden as a false player, someone who would be on their main enemies' side if war became reality. This is still virtually how Russia sees Sweden today.

You could also add that Carl Bildt, our former Minister of Foreign Affairs, brought an activist foreign policy relating to Russia. He was openly critical to Russia on many occasions. Which also had an affect on their view on Sweden.

What can we do to stop their actions in the Baltic Sea?
This is part of Russia’s new action pattern. I don’t think it's possible to get them to quit their behaviour. The important thing is not these individual incidents, but rather the long-term military power shift in Europe.

What do you think will happen during this long-term power shift?
Well, we know for sure that Russia started a serious rearmament back in 2011. And their military power is going to grow substantially during the next ten years. This means that we will once again have a very big power right next to us. Russia wants to make a new balance in Europe, where the countries in Europe need to respect Russia. It's probable that Russia will use military actions against, what they think are important areas.  Europe is currently almost entirely disarmed when it comes to military defences. Europe as one has one of the world's largest defence budgets, which isn't used, except for in a few countries close to Russia’s borders. They are serious about their defence. Sweden has completely disassembled their defence capabilities. That obviously increases a chance of pressure from Russia.

What would happen if Russia made reality of their intentions now when Sweden doesn't have a defence?
I can’t speculate on that. But what I can say is that Sweden isn’t that vulnerable as you may think – we have Finland, the Baltic countries, and the Baltic Sea between us. However, Gotland [a Swedish island to the East] is very vulnerable. An attack with today’s politics is very unlikely. What is likely, is that one of the Baltic countries could be next. That could lead to crisis in the Nordics where Sweden could get involved.

What would Sweden normally do in situation like that?
We have never done anything like that. The worst thing is that I don’t believe that anyone is thinking about the possibility of that happening. This is still something too new for Sweden to get involved in. It was just a few months ago that Swedish politicians awoke from their ignorant behaviour due to the Ukraine war. And raised the question about the current problematic situation: What if it would happen to Sweden’s neighbouring countries? The new generation of Swedish politicians have no experience in power politics.

So what would happen if Russia nuked us?
I can't really say, but one thing is for sure: as long as you don’t have a military defence you’re very vulnerable. And if they wanted to do anything against us, we’re in great danger.

@molekyl

http://www.vice.com/en_se/read/why-is-russian-military-hanging-out-on-swedish-territory

Poland — and NATO’s — New Espionage Scandal

Two days ago, Polish security officials arrested two men on suspicion of espionage for Russia. Given the current climate of high tension on Poland’s eastern frontier, thanks to Russia’s war on Ukraine, the timing of this arrest is important. For NATO, too, the stakes are high.

Polish officials have been tight-lipped about the case and the names of those under arrest have not been released. However, we know that one man is a colonel in the Polish military, assigned to the Ministry of Defense (MoD) in Warsaw, while the other is an attorney in Poland’s capital, a dual Polish-Russian national who works on economic matters.

Although the men were arrested on the same day, their cases were investigated independently; it is not yet clear whether they are linked. Poland’s Internal Security Agency (ABW) has said little about this affair, officially not citing which country the men are believed to have spied for, although an ABW spokesman stated coyly, “I think you can probably guess which country.” Yesterday, however, a member of the parliamentary commission for the security services revealed that the men had been secretly working for Moscow, specifically for Russian military intelligence (GRU).

Anytime a colonel in the defense ministry is suspected of espionage is a moment to worry — Polish counterintelligencers will be very busy in the weeks ahead trying to assess the damage — but to make matters worse, it has been revealed that the officer had access to NATO secrets, so the Atlantic Alliance must now assume the worst. Polish counterintelligence has a long history of tangling with GRU, and the results have not always been edifying for Warsaw, as I’ve previously explained, because the Russians excel at espionage.

We can take the Polish MoD’s word that the charges facing these men are “very serious” indeed. Warsaw has promised to reveal more details of this case in a few days, and I’ll be reporting on that and giving my analysis. Watch this space.

UPDATE (18 OCT, 1400 EST): It has been confirmed that the lawyer under arrest, Stanislaw Sz., works for the Warsaw firm Stopczyk & Mikulski, where he was engaged on a project to build a terminal for importing LNG at Poland’s Baltic Sea port of Świnoujście, which has strategic significance as it is intended to reduce Poland’s high dependence on Russian LNG. He only received Polish citizenship two years ago, and according to today’s reports his main target for GRU was the Sejm, the Polish parliament, and he had compiled lists of possible recruits. In other words, he was not merely an agent but was charged with recruiting others — “news analysts, PR specialists and experts, politicians, and those employed in the energy sector.” A new statement from an anonymous source that Stanislaw Sz. “had patriotic motivations. He was professionally trained in espionage and behaved very carefully,” implies that he may be a GRU Illegal, i.e. a spy operating under what U.S. intelligence terms “non-official cover” (although the Russian concept of Illegal is a good deal more specialized in tradecraft terms) which represents a more serious problem for ABW and the Polish government. More is sure to emerge in this case.

UPDATE (18 OCT, 1630 EST) A Polish website has revealed that the lawyer suspect’s full name is Stanisław Szypowski (left), who goes by the nickname Staszek. The site includes a video clip of Szypowski discussing (in Polish) business opportunities in Belarus. He is a well-known lobbyist in Warsaw who made his presence known at the Sejm and at key NGOs, which is standard GRU practice, as I’ve explained before.

http://20committee.com/2014/10/18/poland-and-natos-new-espionage-scandal/

dude, zhydomasonbanderovcy paid very well in pure gold and brilliants

@pagan seriously how much are you paid to constantly post such dubious things?
 

Putin's Secret Weapon

Russia's swashbuckling military intelligence unit is full of assassins, arms dealers, and bandits. And what they pulled off in Ukraine was just the beginning.



There are two ways an espionage agency can prove its worth to the government it serves. Either it can be truly useful (think: locating a most-wanted terrorist), or it can engender fear, dislike, and vilification from its rivals (think: being named a major threat in congressional testimony). But when a spy agency does both, its worth is beyond question.

Since the Ukraine crisis began, the Kremlin has few doubts about the importance of the GRU, Russia's military intelligence apparatus. The agency has not only demonstrated how the Kremlin can employ it as an important foreign-policy tool, by ripping a country apart with just a handful of agents and a lot of guns. The GRU has also shown the rest of the world how Russia expects to fight its future wars: with a mix of stealth, deniability, subversion, and surgical violence. Even as GRU-backed rebel groups in eastern Ukraine lose ground in the face of Kiev's advancing forces, the geopolitical landscape has changed. The GRU is back in the global spook game and with a new playbook that will be a challenge for the West for years to come.

Recent years had not been kind to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, the Glavnoe razvedyvatelnoe upravlenie (GRU). Once, it had been arguably Russia's largest intelligence agency, with self-contained stations -- known as "residencies" -- in embassies around the world, extensive networks of undercover agents, and nine brigades of special forces known as Spetsnaz.

By the start of 2013, the GRU was on the ropes. Since 1992, the agency had been in charge of operations in the post-Soviet countries, Russia's "near abroad." But Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have seen it as increasingly unfit for that purpose. When the Federal Security Service (FSB), Russia's domestic security agency, was allowed to run operations abroad openly in 2003, one insider told me that this was because "the GRU doesn't seem to know how to do anything in our neighborhood except count tanks." (It may not even have done that very well. Putin regarded the GRU as partly responsible for Russia's lackluster performance in the 2008 invasion of Georgia.) There was a prevailing view in Moscow that the GRU's focus on gung-ho "kinetic operations" like paramilitary hit squads seemed less relevant in an age of cyberwar and oil politics.

Political missteps also contributed to the GRU's diminished role. Valentin Korabelnikov, the agency's chief from 1997 to 2009, seemed more comfortable accompanying Spetsnaz assassination teams in Chechnya than playing palace politics in Moscow. His criticisms of Putin's military reforms put him on the Kremlin's bad side too. Korabelnikov was sacked in 2009 and replaced with soon-to-be-retired Col. Gen. Alexander Shlyakhturov, who, within two years, was rarely seen in the GRU's headquarters due to his bad health. In December 2011 the GRU welcomed its third head in nearly three years, Maj. Gen. Igor Sergun, a former attaché and intelligence officer with no combat experience and the lowest-ranking head of the service in decades. By the end of 2013, the Kremlin seemed to be entertaining the suggestion that the agency be demoted from a "main directorate" to a mere directorate, which would have been a massive blow to the service's prestige and political access.

In many ways, a demotion for the GRU seemed inevitable. Since 2008, the GRU had suffered a savage round of cuts during a period when most of Russia's security and intelligence agencies' budgets enjoyed steady increases. Eighty of its hundred general-rank officers had been sacked, retired, or transferred. Most of the Spetsnaz were reassigned to the regular army. Residencies were downsized, sometimes even to a single officer working undercover as a military attaché.

What a difference a few months can make. What the Kremlin had once seen as the GRU's limitations -- a focus on the "near abroad," a concentration on violence over subtlety, a more swashbuckling style (including a willingness to conduct assassinations abroad) -- have become assets.

The near-bloodless seizure of Crimea in March was based on plans drawn up by the General Staff's Main Operations Directorate that relied heavily on GRU intelligence. The GRU had comprehensively surveyed the region, was watching Ukrainian forces based there, and was listening to their communications. The GRU didn't only provide cover for the "little green men" who moved so quickly to seize strategic points on the peninsula before revealing themselves to be Russian troops. Many of those operatives were current or former GRU Spetsnaz.

There is an increasing body of evidence that the so-called defense minister of the separatist Donetsk People's Republic, Igor Strelkov, whose real name is Igor Girkin, is a serving or reserve GRU officer, who likely takes at the very least guidance, if not orders, from the agency's headquarters. As a result, the European Union has identified him as GRU "staff" and has placed him on its sanctions list. Although the bulk of the insurgents in eastern Ukraine appear to be Ukrainians or Russian "war tourists" -- encouraged, armed, and facilitated by Moscow -- there also appear to be GRU operators on the ground helping to bring guns and people across the border.

    It was only when the Vostok Battalion appeared in eastern Ukraine at the end of May that the GRU's full re-emergence became clear.

It was only when the Vostok Battalion appeared in eastern Ukraine at the end of May that the GRU's full re-emergence became clear. This separatist group bears the same name as a GRU-sponsored Chechen unit that was disbanded in 2008. This new brigade -- composed largely of the same fighters from Chechnya -- seemed to spring from nowhere, uniformly armed and mounted in armored personnel carriers. Its first act was to seize the administration building in Donetsk, turfing out the motley insurgents who had made it their headquarters. Having established its credentials as the biggest dog in the pack, Vostok began recruiting Ukrainian volunteers to make up for Chechens who quietly drifted home.

Alexander Khodakovsky, a defector from the Security Service of Ukraine, subsequently announced that he was the battalion's commander. But this only happened a few days after the seizure of the Donetsk headquarters. The implication is that the battalion was originally commanded by GRU representatives. Vostok appears intended not so much to fight the regular Ukrainian forces -- though it has -- but rather to serve as a skilled and disciplined enforcer of Moscow's authority over the militias if need be.

The Vostok Battalion makes Moscow's strategy clear: The Kremlin has no desire for outright military conflict in its neighbors. Instead, the kind of "non-linear war" being waged in Ukraine, which blends outright force, misinformation, political and economic pressure, and covert operations, will likely be its means of choice in the future. These are the kinds of operations in which the GRU excels.

After all, while Moscow is not going to abandon its claims to being a global power, in the immediate future Russia's foreign-policy focus will clearly be building and maintaining its hegemony in Eurasia. These are also the areas where the GRU is strongest. For example, in Kazakhstan, whose Russian-heavy northern regions are a potential future target for similar political pressure through local minorities, the GRU is the lead intelligence provider, as its civilian counterpart, the SVR, is technically barred from operating in Kazakhstan or any of the countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States by the 1992 Alma-Ata Declaration.

The combination of these factors means that the GRU now looks far more comfortable and confident than it did a year ago. Kiev outed and expelled a naval attaché from the Russian Embassy as a GRU officer, and Sergun, the GRU's head, made it onto the list of officials under Western sanctions. But neither of these actions has done the agency any harm. If anything, they have increased the GRU's prestige.

Talk of downgrading the GRU's status is conspicuously absent in Moscow circles. The agency's restored status means it is again a player in the perennial turf wars within the Russian intelligence community. More importantly, it means that GRU operations elsewhere in the world are likely to be expanded again and to regain some of their old aggression.

The GRU's revival also demonstrates that the doctrine of "non-linear war" is not just an ad hoc response to the particularities of Ukraine. This is how Moscow plans to drive forward its interests in today's world. The rest of the world has not realized this now, even though Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov spelled it out in an obscure Russian military journal last year. He wrote that the new way of war involves "the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures … supplemented by military means of a covert nature character," not least with the use of special forces.

This kind of conflict will be fought by spies, commandos, hackers, dupes, and mercenaries -- exactly the kind of operatives at the GRU's disposal. Even after the transfer of most Spetsnaz out of the GRU's direct chain of command, the agency still commands elite special forces trained for assassination, sabotage, and misdirection, as Ukraine shows. The GRU has also demonstrated a willingness to work with a wide range of mavericks. In Chechnya, it raised not just the Vostok Battalion but other units of defectors from guerrillas and bandits. The convicted arms dealer Viktor Bout is generally accepted to have been a part-time GRU asset too. The GRU is less picky than most intelligence agencies about who is cooperates with, which also means that it is harder to be sure who is working for them.

NATO and the West still have no effective response to this development. NATO, a military alliance built to respond to direct and overt aggression, has already found itself at a loss on how to deal with virtual attacks, such as the 2007 cyberattack on Estonia. The revival of the GRU's fortunes promises a future in which the Cold War threat of tanks spilling across the border is replaced by a new kind of war, combining subterfuge, careful cultivation of local allies, and covert Spetsnaz strikes to achieve the Kremlin's political aims. NATO may be stronger in strictly military terms, but if Russia can open political divisions in the West, carry out deniable operations using third-party combatants, and target strategic individuals and facilities, it doesn't really matter who has more tanks and better fighter jets. This is exactly what the GRU is tooling up to do.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/07/putins_secret_weapon_military_intelligence_gru_ukraine

Sweden hunts damaged Russian sub: report

BREAKING: A Russian mayday call prompted Sweden's hunt for "foreign underwater activity" in the Stockholm archipelago, newspaper Svenska Dagbladet (SvD) reports.

 Swedish signals intelligence officials first heard an emergency call on Thursday evening, the newspaper said. Fourteen hours later, around midday on Friday, a foreign vessel was spotted in the Stockholm archipelago.

Sweden intercepted further communications after it began its military operation in the waters off Stockholm, as encrypted messages were relayed between transmitters in the archipelago and the Russian enclave Kaliningrad, SvD said.

More to follow

http://www.thelocal.se/20141018/sweden-hunts-for-damaged-russian-sub-report

  
Preparing for War Against the US on All Fronts—A Net Assessment of Russia’s Defense and Foreign Policy Since the Start of 2014

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 11 Issue: 183
October 16, 2014 05:15 PM Age: 7 hrs
By: Pavel Felgenhauer



In a series of recently published interviews, President Vladimir Putin (kremlin.ru, October 15), Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (Interfax, October 15) and national security council secretary Nikolai Patrushev (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, October 15) have outlined Moscow’s strategic vision of the world after the Ukrainian crisis, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Moscow-inspired proxy war in the southeastern Donbas region of Ukraine, and resulting punitive sanctions imposed by the West. The view from Moscow is uninviting—A new cold war with the West is in the making; Russia is under attack and will use all means at its disposal to resist, including the nuclear option. Putin accused Washington of deliberately provoking the Ukraine crisis by supporting extreme nationalists in Kyiv, which in turn ignited a civil war. “Now they [the United States] accuse us of causing this crisis,” exclaimed Putin, “It is madness to blackmail Russia; let them remember, a discord between major nuclear powers may undermine strategic stability” (kremlin.ru, October 15).

Under mounting Western pressure this year, Russian leaders have been repeatedly and unambiguously reminding the West of the ultimate weapon at Moscow’s disposal—nuclear mutual assured destruction. The Russian military is also rearming and conducting massive exercises, preparing for a possible global war. The consensus view in Moscow within the political, military and intelligence community is that relations with the United States are beyond repair and, quoting Medvedev, there is no possibility of any new US-Russian “reset.” Moscow has come to believe that there is no possibility of any genuine détente with Washington until 2020 at the earliest. Indeed, National Security Council Secretary Patrushev’s interview in the official government-published Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper has the title: “Second Cold War.” Patrushev openly describes the US as Russia’s eternal foe and accuses Washington of planning for many decades to fully isolate Moscow and deprive it of any influence in its former dominions in the post-Soviet space. Patrushev announced (which seems to be an officially held policy opinion) that the US is today fulfilling a strategic plan to marginalize and destroy Russia—a strategy that he says was initiated in the 1970s by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the then–United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter.

The US is now seen in Moscow as irredeemable and determined to destroy Russia, which must resist by reinforcing and rearming its military, investing in technological independence (the so-called import replacement or “importozamescheniye”), and by building a world-wide anti-US alliance. To that effect, over the past year, Moscow has been strengthening its ties with Beijing. In particular, Russia has been opening itself up to Chinese investment, seeking much needed hard currency liquidity in the Chinese banking system, as well as looking for Chinese technologies (including civilian, double-use and maybe eventually military) to replace those technologies, materials, components and investments that are not forthcoming from the West because of punitive sanctions. Patrushev, in his interview, confirmed that Russian strategic planners see in the future a divided multipolar world with increasingly scarce natural resources (oil, gas, food, clear water) where Russia could dominate resource-poor Europe (see EDM, October 9). Moreover, Washington is believed to have deliberately provoked the Ukrainian crisis to reinforce the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and blackmail its allies into full submission. As Patrushev argues, Russia, in turn, must build alliances with non-European emerging powers like China, while working to undermine the Transatlantic link to liberate Europeans from US domination.

Patrushev spells out what most of the Moscow ruling elite believes: Europeans, as well as misguided Ukrainians will soon inevitably see reason and understand that without Russia and its supplies of various natural resources, they cannot survive; whereas, Russia can do without them thanks to its warm strategic embrace with China. Moscow will not withdraw from Crimea and will not give up on its attempts to prevent Ukraine from moving closer to NATO or the European Union. Actual fighting in the Donbas region may die down as the ceasefire line of control continues to be slowly and painfully established, but the overarching new cold war with the US will endure and Ukraine shall be a major battleground—though not the only one. Therefore, the Kremlin is preparing to fight the United States on all possible fronts to push back US attempts to “contain” Russia. In line with the plans reiterated this year, additional Russian forces will be deployed in the Arctic to fend off a possible US assault. Moreover, dozens of Cold War–era military bases and airfields will be reinvigorated across the whole of the Russian Arctic; troops will be deployed together with bombers and MiG-31 interceptors. In addition, new or reinforced military garrisons will be deployed in Crimea, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, October 15).

Thanks to months of sanctions and falling oil prices, the ruble is sliding against the dollar and euro. The Russian economy has continued to stagnate and may go into recession in 2015. A contraction in household income is also expected. The finance ministry is considering cuts in budget spending, but it seems defense expenditures will continue to grow. The defense budget in 2015 is planned to reach an all-time post–Cold War high of 4.2 percent of GDP or 3.3 trillion rubles ($81 billion). In 2012, defense spending was 3 percent of GDP; in 2013, it reached 3.2 percent; and in 2014, it was 3.4 percent (Interfax, October 16). Overall federal budget spending to finance Russia’s massive intelligence services and other militarized services is almost as big as the defense budget per se. And as the new cold war–type standoff widens in scope and the Russian economy flounders, the Russian people will be increasingly paying for guns instead of butter.

But the population, which has continued to be fed vicious state propaganda—especially after the Ukraine crisis began to escalate—seems to agree with the Kremlin. According to the latest poll by independent pollster Levada Center, a majority believe Western sanctions are designed to punish the overall population, but the majority have not yet felt any sanction effect. Furthermore, some 60 percent agree that the property and assets of Western companies in Russia may be confiscated as a practical reply to sanctions, and 58 percent agree with a possible boycott of foreign produce. Fifty-nine percent believe that Western punitive sanctions and Russian countermeasures like the ban on Western food will, in fact, enhance Russia’s economic development. And the vast majority of Russians—79 percent—are against giving up Crimea (Interfax, October 16).

During all of 2014, Russia’s rulers and most of the population seem to have been living together in a daydream. Consequently, Russian defense and foreign policy plans as well as the country’s decision making apparatus have, for months, been based on little more than strange fantasies and outlandish assumptions. Yet, these fantasies are backed up by a formidable military machine, billions of petrodollars and a nuclear superpower arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. And this is a truly dangerous mix.

http://bit.ly/1sYYRcD]

US Army drafts blueprint for World War III

http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/10/14/pers-o14.html


TL;DR: game is on, bitches.

Putin Intimidation Tactics Kill Entente Hope for Finnish Premier

Less than two months ago, three incursions by Russian planes into Finnish airspace caused the government in Helsinki to put its F/A-18 Hornet fighter jets on alert ready to intercept foreign aircraft. Finland has published all airspace violations since 2005, after Russia breached the border 11 times without owning up. The diplomatic freeze between the two countries is worse than ever, Aaltola said.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-14/putin-intimidation-tactics-kill-entente-hope-for-finnish-premier.html

Russia to open airbase for fighter jets in Belarus in 2016

The airbase will be established in eastern Belarusian city of Babruysk and deploy Sukhoi Su-27 fighter jets



KAZAN, October 15. /TASS/. Russia is due to establish an airbase in Babruysk, in eastern Belarus, in 2016 and deploy Sukhoi Su-27 fighter jets, Russian Air Force Commander-In-Chief Colonel General Viktor Bondarev said on Wednesday.

“The airbase of the Russian and Belarusian Air Force will be created in 2016. Su-27 fighter jets will be based there,” Bondarev told reporters during his three-day visit to the facilities under construction.

The Russian aircraft will be stationed at a military airfield, which is expected to be reconstructed.

Russia decided earlier this year to send 24 Su-27SM3 fighter jets to Belarus’s Baranovichi airfield to be used to provide inviolability of the airspace of the Union State of Russia and Belarus.

The Su-27 Flanker is a twin-engine supermaneuverable fighter jet, which can be used to perform various combat operations, including reconnaissance and interception of enemy aircraft.

http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/754464

Russia Deploying Tactical Nuclear Arms in Crimea



Obama backing indirect talks with Moscow aimed at cutting U.S. non-strategic nukes in Europe

BY: Bill Gertz   
October 10, 2014 4:40 pm

Russia is moving tactical nuclear weapons systems into recently-annexed Crimea while the Obama administration is backing informal talks aimed at cutting U.S. tactical nuclear deployments in Europe.

Three senior House Republican leaders wrote to President Obama two weeks ago warning that Moscow will deploy nuclear missiles and bombers armed with long-range air launched cruise missiles into occupied Ukrainian territory.

“Locating nuclear weapons on the sovereign territory of another state without its permission is a devious and cynical action,” states the letter signed by House Armed Services Committee Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (R., Calif.) and two subcommittee chairmen.

“It further positions Russian nuclear weapons closer to the heart of NATO, and it allows Russia to gain a military benefit from its seizure of Crimea, allowing Russia to profit from its action.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent months “has escalated his use of nuclear threats to a level not seen since the Cold War,” they wrote.

In a related development, the Obama administration is funding non-official arms control talks with Russia through a Washington think-tank that are aimed at curbing U.S. tactical nuclear arms in Europe.

The first round of talks was held in Vienna Monday and Tuesday.

Critics say Obama administration arms control officials at the State Department and Pentagon are using the informal nuclear talks as groundwork for future tactical nuclear arms cuts.

Such cuts are likely to be opposed by NATO allies, especially in Eastern Europe, worried by growing Russian military threats to the continent.

Regarding the nuclear deployments to Crimea, Senate Armed Services Committee ranking member James Inhofe (R., Okla.) first disclosed last month that Putin had announced in August his approval of deploying nuclear-capable Iskander-M short-range missiles along with Tu-22 nuclear-capable bombers in Crimea, located on the Black Sea.

“The stationing of new nuclear forces on the Crimean peninsula, Ukrainian territory Russia annexed in March, is both a new and menacing threat to the security of Europe and also a clear message from Putin that he intends to continue to violate the territorial integrity of his neighbors,” Inhofe stated in a Sept. 8 op-ed in Foreign Policy.

In their Sept. 23 letter to the president, McKeon, Rep. Mike Rogers (R., Ala.), chairman of the subcommittee on strategic forces, and Rep. Michael Turner (R., Ohio), chairman of the subcommittee on tactical air and land forces, noted Russia’s violation of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty by building a banned cruise missile. The missile has been identified by U.S. officials as the R-500.

The lawmakers said the Russian nuclear deployment in Crimea represents the “clear, and perhaps irrevocable tearing” of the 1997 agreement between NATO and Russia that allowed Russia to maintain a military presence within the alliance.

The Russian nuclear deployment plans and treaty violation should have been discussed during the recent NATO summit in Wales but were not, they said.

As a result, the congressmen urged the president to brief Congress on the threatening Russian nuclear deployments in Crimea. They also called on the president to suspend the NATO-Russia accord and demand the removal of all Russian military personnel from NATO facilities.

Additionally, they asked that the United States and its allies halt all arms control surveillance flights by Russia carried out under the Open Skies Treaty.

Significantly, the three House leaders called on the administration to begin research and development on deployment sites for new U.S. intermediate-range ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles, if Russian refuses to return to compliance with the INF accord.

Putin “must be made to understand that his actions will accomplish nothing more than the alienation [of] Russia from the West, its economy and its security architecture,” the lawmakers said.

“Until we have a strategy that convinces Mr. Putin he cannot achieve his dream of a ‘New Russia’ through illegal annexations, covert invasions, and nuclear saber-rattling, statements and sanctions along cannot be expected to have an effect on his actions,” the letter warns.

“Too much is at stake to continue to allow Russia’s dictator to continue to proceed on his current path toward regional destabilization without serous opposition.”

The action “further undermines Russian credibility in terms of the Budapest Memorandum that the Russian Federation signed in 1994,” the congressmen said.

The memorandum promised Ukraine would have security assurances against threats or use of force in exchange for Kiev giving up its Soviet-era nuclear weapons – at the time the third largest arsenal in the world.

On the Track 2 talks between Russian experts and a group hosted by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the program leader was identified as anti-nuclear arms advocate Sharon Squassoni.

Squassoni took part in a study three years ago sponsored by the leftist, anti-nuclear weapons group Ploughshares Fund that called for removing all U.S. tactical nuclear arms from Europe.

Thomas Moore, a former senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who quit CSIS over concerns about Squassoni’s anti-nuclear slant, said he felt the Track 2 program, which was to cost $215,000 in federal funding, was unwise after Russia’s military takeover of Crimea which began last February.

Moore said in an interview that the administration could be using the CSIS Track 2 talks as a way of conducting direct negotiations to further reduce U.S. nuclear arms in Europe.

“Now is the wrong time to entertain any such ideas with any Russians, whether they are official or unofficial Russians, because they all support Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine and violation of the INF treaty,” Moore said, noting that verifying any tactical nuclear arms reductions is nearly impossible.

“My goal was to verify and keep our nukes in Europe,” he said, noting that Squassoni knows little about nuclear arms and has been “a partisan for Obama and his anti-nuclear agenda in Europe.”

CSIS spokesman Andrew Schwartz confirmed that the Track 2 talks involving U.S., Russian and European experts are aimed at “limiting non-strategic nuclear weapons.” He declined to identify the U.S. or foreign members of the project and said a report on the program would be published in summer or fall of next year. He said the notion that the project has not been adjusted to account for the Crimea crisis is wrong.

Squassoni confirmed her participation in the Ploughshares study but said in an email that the recommendations of that project were not discussed during the first Track 2 meeting this week.

“I can assure you that my personal views do not interfere with my ability to facilitate balanced, analytically sound dialogues,” she said.

The CSIS-Russia Track 2 nuclear talks also are being supported by Rose Gottemoeller, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security; and Andrew Weber, who recently resigned as assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defenses amid allegations of insubordination and improper personnel activities.

A Pentagon spokeswoman declined to provide details surrounding Weber’s resignation but said he would be taking a lesser position at the State Department.

A U.S. official close to the Pentagon said Weber ran afoul of his superiors as a result of his anti-nuclear arms positions, and practices related to hiring and the use of personnel within his office.

Alexandra Bell, a spokeswoman for Gottemoeller said: “The administration is supportive of the domestic and international non-governmental community’s right to conduct research, scholarship, advocacy and Track 2 dialogues as they see fit.”

Both the Pentagon and State Department spokeswomen would not address the question of whether holding informal nuclear talks on cutting nuclear weapons in Europe with the Russians will undermine NATO security in the aftermath of the Crimean crisis.

Former Pentagon official Mark Schneider, a strategic nuclear arms specialist, said the Track 2 and any formal arms talks on tactical nuclear arms would fail.

“They can have as many tracks as they want but the Russians will not agree to limits on tactical nuclear weapons,” Schneider said. “Their advantage is too great.”

The United States is believed to have around 200 nuclear weapons in Europe. Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal is at least 2,000.

“NATO politics will prevent any cuts in U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe,” he said. “This is obviously about the worst possible time to talk about something like this.”

Schneider said nuclear policymakers should focus on deterrence now instead of disarmament.

A Russian Defense Ministry spokesman told state-run Interfax March 26 that a “missile-carrying regiment” of Tu-22 Backfire nuclear bombers will be deployed to the Crimean airbase at Gvardeyskoye within two years.

IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly described the nuclear-capable Tu-22s to be based in Crimea as “the backbone of Soviet naval strike units during the Cold War.”

Rogers, the strategic forces subcommittee chairman, said Sept. 18 that the Russians have discussed “plans to station tactical nuclear weapons in Crimea.”

http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-deploying-tactical-nuclear-arms-in-crimea/

You sound very sensible, the sort of person that would not issue wads and wads of IOUs for chores that you will (or wont) do in the future.

The sort of person that would not neurotically amass a giant store of weapons and ammo.

Very sensible indeed, live for today and keep the decks for tomorrow clean, if only every human were the same.

This is all pointless speculation but anyway, my take is yes and no. Here in Europe, the population are scaringly oblivious to the fact that we inhabit a soil drenched with blood, and that the short period that has passed since 1945 is a peace of a seldom and very fragile character. The European Union, with it's motive that grew out of the Steel and Coal agreement, is trembling over a disfortunate population in the south, and a substantial growth in political extremism all over. If the EU ever falls, Europe has taken a huge step towards nationalism. Fueled by a large, immigrant population. Historically speaking, we know this is the ultimate recipe for complete fuck- up. Fubar.

For what I know, if the EU falls and the economy keeps getting worse, I might find my self in the USA, a place I consider to be the most politically stable place in the world, and they sure have a good record to show for as well. Shit, I might migrate regardless of what happens

Two belated reports of Russian warship interference with Finnish research vessel at sea

Russian warships disrupted the work of the Finnish marine research ship Aranda on two occasions in August and September, trying to prohibit the ship from accessing international waters east of the Swedish island of Gotland. The Finnish Environment Institute reported the incidents well after the fact on Saturday, adding that the ship’s crew felt threatened on both occasions.



The Russian Navy has twice interfered in the movements of the Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE) marine research vessel Aranda in international waters. According to SYKE, the two incidents occurred in August and September, when Aranda was conducting research for the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute off the coast of Sweden. In both incidents, the Russian warship attempted to prohibit the research vessel from accessing a sampling location in international waters east of the Swedish island of Gotland.

In the first incident on August 2, the Russian warship made radio contact with Aranda and urged it twice to change course. The Aranda initially obeyed the request, but at the second warning, the ship’s crew replied that it would not deter and intended to stop at the research point as planned. At this time, the crew of the Aranda observed a submarine moving along the surface of the water.

The second incident on September 2 saw a Russian helicopter approach Aranda several times. After this, a nearby Russian warship took a course directly towards the ship’s stern, passing the boat in very close proximity. The Aranda maintained its course and speed throughout the incident.

At the time of the incidents, the vessel was manned by a Finnish crew and researchers from the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute, all of whom felt the situation was highly ominous.
Incidents coincide with airspace violations

The incidents at sea coincide with Russian airspace incursions into Finland, which took place in the same time period. Russian aircraft violated Finnish airspace on August 23, 25 and 28. A fourth suspected airspace incursion in late September was not confirmed by the Finnish Defence Forces, despite Twitter confirmation of Russian planes over the Baltic Sea from the Latvian Defence Forces.

SYKE informed the media about the incidents only this week, after having first confirmed the chain of events with several sources. SYKE also said that all of the necessary authorities were duly informed, but Pertti Savolainen, deputy chair of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, said on Saturday that news of the events came as a surprise to him and that his committee was not told.

http://yle.fi/uutiset/two_belated_reports_of_russian_warship_interference_with_finnish_research_vessel_at_sea/7523596

We're doing a documentary on the upcoming potential World War 3

If anyone well researched on this topic would like to consult with us we'd much appreciate it

Our last documentary detailed how the end of the dollar as world reserve currency is coming; this of course is the most likely reason for a potential WW3

propaganda is goin both sides. errbody's crazy. fuck. me drunk.

these sort of guys wish that regular russian forces invaded them already. obviously to justify all the propoganda. this hysteria is eating them alive as they are absolutely unable to comprehend the fact that taxi drivers, mine workers and simply ideological volounteers ar kicking ukrainian army's ass. they will go insane when/if they realise what happened and how they've been used over the past year or so. sad.