Broken Crypto in Shadowcash and OZ-coin:
https://shnoe.wordpress.com/2016/02/11/de-anonymizing-shadowcash-and-oz-coin/
Credits to NobleSir (Shen Noether).
Topic: [XMR] Monero - A secure, private, untraceable cryptocurrency - page 679. (Read 4671660 times)
February 11, 2016, 06:42:24 AM
February 11, 2016, 06:36:00 AM
Update from Shen Noether regarding Ring CT implementation for Monero. I have to admit I spotted this one a bit late:
Quote
edit 2/3/2016:
Python version of all checkpoints: https://github.com/ShenNoether/MiniNero/blob/master/RingCT2.py
(You can run this with https://github.com/ShenNoether/MiniNero/blob/master/RCTUnitTests.py )
C++ version of all checkpoints:
https://github.com/ShenNoether/RingCT/blob/master/rctSigs.cpp
(You can run this with https://github.com/ShenNoether/RingCT/blob/master/Test.cpp )
Python version of all checkpoints: https://github.com/ShenNoether/MiniNero/blob/master/RingCT2.py
(You can run this with https://github.com/ShenNoether/MiniNero/blob/master/RCTUnitTests.py )
C++ version of all checkpoints:
https://github.com/ShenNoether/RingCT/blob/master/rctSigs.cpp
(You can run this with https://github.com/ShenNoether/RingCT/blob/master/Test.cpp )
In addition, Shen Noether posted this on reddit:
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I've been working on some other fun stuff this week like multisig, and this https://github.com/ShenNoether/ge_fromfe_writeup
February 10, 2016, 10:29:11 PM
Not really significant. In testing, we were never even able to construct an invalid pathname that would fail the utf8_to_utf16 function, so in practice that error branch can never get executed. And even if it did, in Monero code the program would just quit - it can't run without a valid DB pathname.
Quote
Also a Question for Howard Chu, After looking at your code I'm wondering if you had a hand in the original cryptonote code?
Nope. Besides, unlike original cryptonote, my code is actually documented.
February 10, 2016, 06:08:14 PM
Peter Todd acknowledging the value of a tail emission:
https://twitter.com/petertoddbtc/status/697532042553065472
EDIT: One should also read the whole conversation, it is an interesting one.
https://twitter.com/petertoddbtc/status/697532042553065472
EDIT: One should also read the whole conversation, it is an interesting one.
February 10, 2016, 05:48:56 PM
Update from Shen Noether regarding Ring CT implementation for Monero. I have to admit I spotted this one a bit late:
Quote
edit 2/3/2016:
Python version of all checkpoints: https://github.com/ShenNoether/MiniNero/blob/master/RingCT2.py
(You can run this with https://github.com/ShenNoether/MiniNero/blob/master/RCTUnitTests.py )
C++ version of all checkpoints:
https://github.com/ShenNoether/RingCT/blob/master/rctSigs.cpp
(You can run this with https://github.com/ShenNoether/RingCT/blob/master/Test.cpp )
Python version of all checkpoints: https://github.com/ShenNoether/MiniNero/blob/master/RingCT2.py
(You can run this with https://github.com/ShenNoether/MiniNero/blob/master/RCTUnitTests.py )
C++ version of all checkpoints:
https://github.com/ShenNoether/RingCT/blob/master/rctSigs.cpp
(You can run this with https://github.com/ShenNoether/RingCT/blob/master/Test.cpp )
February 10, 2016, 04:52:00 PM
Has this been noted?
https://github.com/LMDB/lmdb/commit/fcac8d07742891cedcf94b982e5094315132f62a
Also a Question for Howard Chu, After looking at your code I'm wondering if you had a hand in the original cryptonote code?
BTW, Congrats luigi1111 and ArticMine!!! Your contributions have been immense.
https://github.com/LMDB/lmdb/commit/fcac8d07742891cedcf94b982e5094315132f62a
Also a Question for Howard Chu, After looking at your code I'm wondering if you had a hand in the original cryptonote code?
BTW, Congrats luigi1111 and ArticMine!!! Your contributions have been immense.
February 10, 2016, 10:46:22 AM
** MONERO MISSIVE SPECIAL EDITION - 2015 YEAR IN REVIEW **
Best missive yet IMHO. Great update, and great work from the devs. I'm sure other will join me in saying thanks to David and eizh, and congratulations to luigi1111 and ArticMine. The project is in good hands.
In for the long haul.
Q
February 10, 2016, 10:22:49 AM
** MONERO MISSIVE SPECIAL EDITION - 2015 YEAR IN REVIEW **
February 10, 2016, 07:05:12 AM
My blockchain got corrupted when the electricity stopped. I resynced from scratch and it took about 24 hours. Previously I resynced from scratch a few times on the same machine on the same USB3 external hdd and on the same internet connection for 1-3 hours (it was on bitmonerod 0.9.0 tagged and before tagged, not 0.9.1). What could be the issue with the slow sync this time?
I'm not sure I'm understanding. Are you using the same version as before?
What CPU do you have?
Thank you for clarifying. We are looking into it.
February 10, 2016, 07:01:56 AM
Crosspost from https://forum.getmonero.org/20/general-discussion/2424/help-an-80-years-old-women-bojia-bikova-to-pay-her-fine-for-a-few-uprooted-strings-of-hemp:
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Quote
Help an 80 years old women Bojia Bikova to pay her fine for a few uprooted strings of hemp. She has to pay 1100$ fine, which is near the amount of pension she is receiving for the whole year. 3 min video about the case: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gqmGkti9uUQ Bojia Bikova campaigns: USD: Indiegogo - https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/help-old-mother-to-pay-her-fine-for-hemp-possesion--2#/ BTC: Bithope - https://bithope.org/campaign/help-the-old-mother-bojia-campaign/ XMR: promena.org (OpenAlias address)
If everything goes smooth we'll give the money collected (about 50% of the sum needed) to Bojia next Wednesday (February 17, 2016). I'll post scans of the donation agreements short after that (3 agreements - one for USD, one for BTC and one for XMR, all of them exchanged to BGN. Personal data will be erased where appropriate). I'll also post video/photos of the donation when those are ready. February 10, 2016, 06:56:38 AM
My blockchain got corrupted when the electricity stopped. I resynced from scratch and it took about 24 hours. Previously I resynced from scratch a few times on the same machine on the same USB3 external hdd and on the same internet connection for 1-3 hours (it was on bitmonerod 0.9.0 tagged and before tagged, not 0.9.1). What could be the issue with the slow sync this time?
I'm not sure I'm understanding. Are you using the same version as before?
What CPU do you have?
February 10, 2016, 06:50:16 AM
My blockchain got corrupted when the electricity stopped. I resynced from scratch and it took about 24 hours. Previously I resynced from scratch a few times on the same machine on the same USB3 external hdd and on the same internet connection for 1-3 hours (it was on bitmonerod 0.9.0 tagged and before tagged, not 0.9.1). What could be the issue with the slow sync this time?
I'm not sure I'm understanding. Are you using the same version as before?
What CPU do you have?
February 10, 2016, 06:37:02 AM
My blockchain got corrupted when the electricity stopped. I resynced from scratch and it took about 24 hours. Previously I resynced from scratch a few times on the same machine on the same USB3 external hdd and on the same internet connection for 1-3 hours (it was on bitmonerod 0.9.0 tagged and before tagged, not 0.9.1). What could be the issue with the slow sync this time?
February 09, 2016, 05:54:21 PM
Hey I was just wondering... can ring-signature works on proof-of-stake ?
These guys should know, they've been developing a proof-of-stake Cryptonote coin for a while:https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/louisdorcodename-first-anonymous-pos-cn-based-currency-technical-review-887482
February 09, 2016, 05:25:29 PM
Hey I was just wondering... can ring-signature works on proof-of-stake ?
For normal transactions yes, this is independent from how you validate blocks. For the coinbase transactions, from the top of my head I don't see how it can work.
It can work as long amounts are visible (no ring ct) and coin-age is not used. A staking hit is recorded as a spend transaction which records the key image as spent. The stake reward is added to the transaction outputs.
February 09, 2016, 05:23:58 PM
This is a sign that XMR is starting to take shape in terms of perception of value.
Once people are willing to scam for XMR and they go through the trouble to do so...it says XMR is valuable.
How valuable? The free-market will decide that.
Once people are willing to scam for XMR and they go through the trouble to do so...it says XMR is valuable.
How valuable? The free-market will decide that.
It was probably an old BTC scam: Look for any BTC addresses in the content and replace them with your own. There was similar malware a while back that did the same thing using the copy-paste buffer on Windows.
February 09, 2016, 05:11:35 PM
WARNING: Always check you're using https when connecting to xmr.to, a malicious TOR exit node made a victim already.
Somebody was recently scammed of a significant amount of XMRs when he tried to use XMR.TO over TOR.
After a little investigation, we found out what happened: the TOR exit node was malicious, and created an order going to a different address than that requested by the victim. The victim payed the XMR, but never got the BTC, as they were sent by XMR.TO to the scammer address. XMR.TO had no way to know something wrong was going on.
This type of man-in-the-middle attack is not possible when you use https connection. What the exit node did is to downgrade the connection to a normal http, and sadly the victim must not have noticed the lack of secured connection in his browser.
The malicious exit node has the IP 109.201.154.186.
Be safe: ALWAYS check within your browser that your connection is secure when you connect to XMR.TO. If it's just http, that's a phishing version and you're not talking to XMR.TO directly.
This is a sign that XMR is starting to take shape in terms of perception of value.Somebody was recently scammed of a significant amount of XMRs when he tried to use XMR.TO over TOR.
After a little investigation, we found out what happened: the TOR exit node was malicious, and created an order going to a different address than that requested by the victim. The victim payed the XMR, but never got the BTC, as they were sent by XMR.TO to the scammer address. XMR.TO had no way to know something wrong was going on.
This type of man-in-the-middle attack is not possible when you use https connection. What the exit node did is to downgrade the connection to a normal http, and sadly the victim must not have noticed the lack of secured connection in his browser.
The malicious exit node has the IP 109.201.154.186.
Be safe: ALWAYS check within your browser that your connection is secure when you connect to XMR.TO. If it's just http, that's a phishing version and you're not talking to XMR.TO directly.
This should always look like this:
Once people are willing to scam for XMR and they go through the trouble to do so...it says XMR is valuable.
How valuable? The free-market will decide that.
February 09, 2016, 02:56:23 PM
WARNING: Always check you're using https when connecting to xmr.to, a malicious TOR exit node made a victim already.
Somebody was recently scammed of a significant amount of XMRs when he tried to use XMR.TO over TOR.
After a little investigation, we found out what happened: the TOR exit node was malicious, and created an order going to a different address than that requested by the victim. The victim payed the XMR, but never got the BTC, as they were sent by XMR.TO to the scammer address. XMR.TO had no way to know something wrong was going on.
This type of man-in-the-middle attack is not possible when you use https connection. What the exit node did is to downgrade the connection to a normal http, and sadly the victim must not have noticed the lack of secured connection in his browser.
The malicious exit node has the IP 109.201.154.186.
Be safe: ALWAYS check within your browser that your connection is secure when you connect to XMR.TO. If it's just http, that's a phishing version and you're not talking to XMR.TO directly.
Somebody was recently scammed of a significant amount of XMRs when he tried to use XMR.TO over TOR.
After a little investigation, we found out what happened: the TOR exit node was malicious, and created an order going to a different address than that requested by the victim. The victim payed the XMR, but never got the BTC, as they were sent by XMR.TO to the scammer address. XMR.TO had no way to know something wrong was going on.
This type of man-in-the-middle attack is not possible when you use https connection. What the exit node did is to downgrade the connection to a normal http, and sadly the victim must not have noticed the lack of secured connection in his browser.
The malicious exit node has the IP 109.201.154.186.
Be safe: ALWAYS check within your browser that your connection is secure when you connect to XMR.TO. If it's just http, that's a phishing version and you're not talking to XMR.TO directly.
This should always look like this:
February 08, 2016, 12:17:15 PM
Another "Monero Ask Anything" Monday, MAAM #2:
https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/44rrkv/maam2_same_as_last_week_time_to_ask_and_learn/
https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/44rrkv/maam2_same_as_last_week_time_to_ask_and_learn/
February 08, 2016, 11:06:06 AM
Hey I was just wondering... can ring-signature works on proof-of-stake ?
For normal transactions yes, this is independent from how you validate blocks. For the coinbase transactions, from the top of my head I don't see how it can work.
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