The Masternodes are a part of your fucking consensus system if u still don't see how you should secure them the best way possible is beyond anyone with a brain and basic knowledge of it security.
which conversation are you talking about?
Fluffy is now saying that
every MN owner needs a failover or it's easier to compromise the MN Networkmajamina then asked ergo
how many MN need to be compromised to backup that proposition?it's a fair question but instead of getting an answer he is being called 'mentally challenged' for asking someone to prove what they are saying?
The problem with the question is that the answer is meaningless. Let's say, for instance, that we determine that 50% of the MasterNode network has to be ultra-secure. How do you enforce that in practicality? Why should MN operator Bob run on a $10/month DigitalOcean VPS, and MN operator Alice runs on $500/month collocated hardware in a DC in Panama with failover in a DC in the Netherlands...but they both earn the same reward? That's why I mean it's all or nothing - if you can't guarantee they are all practicing perfect opsec and massively securing their MN you have to assume that nobody is, in which case our hypothetical attacker can compromise most of the MN infrastructure.
I know that this sounds like I'm being evasive or complicated, but this is at the very root of an "assumed maliciousness" type of design instead of an "assumed honesty" design. It's at the heart of anti-fragile design as well, which Nassim Nicholas Taleb's seminal book covers in great detail (and is an excellent read).
Maybe a research project you can do in your own spare time, to understand how to design systems that assume malice, is to research the answer to this question: if a Bitcoin node is connected to 8 peers, how many of those peers need to be honest for the node to figure out the honest peers from the malicious peers? You'll find the answer is completely different to what you may instinctively think if you aren't familiar with anti-fragile design.