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Topic: XMR vs DRK - page 54. (Read 69755 times)

member
Activity: 112
Merit: 10
March 25, 2015, 01:30:37 PM
You're not factoring in denominated units (and subsequent rounding at send) and "dead change" being sent to the network to remove linkages in future tx's.

It was a simplified example explaining transactions in general. Remember: the issue we're discussing is the average user deanonymising themselves through inadvertently. Dead change and denominated units do not solve the problem when the user has 50 DRK in their account, they send 20.72368 DRK to pay for some dodgy item, and then because they have some crisis they empty their wallet and deposit the entire remaining 29.27632 DRK on an exchange. Normal actions resulting in unavoidable and unwitting deanonymisation.

Yes this is a problem when the wallet can have "standard coins" and "anonymous coins", you can accidentally send wrong coins.

There should be two wallets imo, the other one can allow only "Darksending" and the other wouldn't have mixing at all.

Good point....or the wallet needs to develop to more clearly show how funds are mixed and associated with transactions. I guess the argument is that better anon, e.g. XMR doesn't have such issues, which is fair enough...
hero member
Activity: 532
Merit: 500
March 25, 2015, 01:28:43 PM
You should be glad with what you can read, no one (much less Monero devs) owns you explanation to anything. troll.

^ second proposition today from Fluffy proved to be total BS meaning again he has no idea what he is talking about.

still waiting on response to the 3rd Fluffy proposition: P2P network nodes need failovers or the P2P network becomes insecure.  

This is the transaction from the screnshot i posted earlier: https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/tx.dws?1622007.htm

You see the guy paid 268DRK https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/address.dws?XbMaEcBqEcsCiyrTy2sAnwiQfmYK3SG1y9.htm (Lets say this is a Druglord)

This is my change https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/address.dws?XfRgC2e35SpjaKX7p6YxbhzEVqZN223BGe.htm (my change)

If i spend that now on StarFucks i am basically fucked, my pirvacy is Zero.

TL;DR Dangerous pseudo anonymity.

The wallet won't let you "Darksend" funds that have not been through the mixing process.

Wut?

Mixing started here: http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/a8703c9911b84af403be436cad8bc9f3b85424e825b54ace01eaaec9ebb0d965

took 14 hours - and it's damn easy to find where i started mixing as there was only 1 address with nearly the same amount of coins in that timeframe.

Now imagine someones who earns his money with statistical analysis wastes resources to find such "evidences" ....
hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 502
March 25, 2015, 01:28:23 PM
Darksend. What a joke.

IlluminatedForAllToSeeSend is more like it.
hero member
Activity: 966
Merit: 1003
March 25, 2015, 01:27:45 PM
You're not factoring in denominated units (and subsequent rounding at send) and "dead change" being sent to the network to remove linkages in future tx's.

It was a simplified example explaining transactions in general. Remember: the issue we're discussing is the average user deanonymising themselves through inadvertently. Dead change and denominated units do not solve the problem when the user has 50 DRK in their account, they send 20.72368 DRK to pay for some dodgy item, and then because they have some crisis they empty their wallet and deposit the entire remaining 29.27632 DRK on an exchange. Normal actions resulting in unavoidable and unwitting deanonymisation.

Yes this is a problem when the wallet can have "standard coins" and "anonymous coins", you can accidentally send wrong coins.

There should be two wallets imo, the other one can allow only "Darksending" and the other wouldn't have mixing at all.
legendary
Activity: 984
Merit: 1000
March 25, 2015, 01:27:24 PM
@BlockaFett:
Could you please be a little less confrontational? I actually enjoy the discussion and how fluffpony takes the time to explain everything.
I am an investor and potential end-user, I don`t understand coding and IT stuff and I am interested wether Darksend actually is sophisticated enough to deal with darkmarkets or not (not that I engage in darkmarket trades, as I don`t even know how to access the TOR networt, but as an investor, I`m interested wether Dash is actually safe to use there, without having to worry to much about "opsec").
hero member
Activity: 966
Merit: 1003
March 25, 2015, 01:26:09 PM
You should be glad with what you can read, no one (much less Monero devs) owns you explanation to anything. troll.

^ second proposition today from Fluffy proved to be total BS meaning again he has no idea what he is talking about.

still waiting on response to the 3rd Fluffy proposition: P2P network nodes need failovers or the P2P network becomes insecure.  

This is the transaction from the screnshot i posted earlier: https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/tx.dws?1622007.htm

You see the guy paid 268DRK https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/address.dws?XbMaEcBqEcsCiyrTy2sAnwiQfmYK3SG1y9.htm (Lets say this is a Druglord)

This is my change https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/address.dws?XfRgC2e35SpjaKX7p6YxbhzEVqZN223BGe.htm (my change)

If i spend that now on StarFucks i am basically fucked, my pirvacy is Zero.

TL;DR Dangerous pseudo anonymity.

The wallet won't let you "Darksend" funds that have not been through the mixing process.
donator
Activity: 1274
Merit: 1060
GetMonero.org / MyMonero.com
March 25, 2015, 01:25:57 PM
You're not factoring in denominated units (and subsequent rounding at send) and "dead change" being sent to the network to remove linkages in future tx's.

It was a simplified example explaining transactions in general. Remember: the issue we're discussing is the average user deanonymising themselves through inadvertently. Dead change and denominated units do not solve the problem when the user has 50 DRK in their account, they send 20.72368 DRK to pay for some dodgy item, and then because they have some crisis they empty their wallet and deposit the entire remaining 29.27632 DRK on an exchange. Normal actions resulting in unavoidable and unwitting deanonymisation.
member
Activity: 112
Merit: 10
March 25, 2015, 01:25:35 PM
Quote
The problem with the question is that the answer is meaningless. Let's say, for instance, that we determine that 50% of the MasterNode network has to be ultra-secure.


but if you need to take out (arbitrary figure) 75% of the network to kill it, you don't need to ultra-secure any of it if you assess that taking out 75% is impractical...


Quote
Maybe a research project you can do in your own spare time, to understand how to design systems that assume malice, is to research the answer to this question: if a Bitcoin node is connected to 8 peers, how many of those peers need to be honest for the node to figure out the honest peers from the malicious peers? You'll find the answer is completely different to what you may instinctively think if you aren't familiar with anti-fragile design.

thanks, interesting comment...
hero member
Activity: 966
Merit: 1003
March 25, 2015, 01:24:47 PM
I'm talking about a game theoretic prisoner's dilemma that exists with highly incentivised MasterNodes. Expressed theoretically: the only ways I can see for the MasterNode structure to achieve Nash equilibrium is to either lower the payout to such a point where any hope of ROI is measured in decades (thus the primary incentive to run a MasterNode is to own a long-term asset and assist the network, not to earn profit) or to have the MN reward decrease if the number of MNs drops below a certain magic threshold (this latter approach suffers from various drawbacks I can think of off the top of my head, but it's at least an attempt).

Drawback being miners will start to take down masternodes in hopes of higher mining rewards as the masternode reward decreases? Another drawback, it's hard to calculate the number so that the whole network agrees?

Setting the challenge of trustlessly counting the nodes aside, what if, miners get always 50% of the reward no matter what. The rest 50% goes to masternodes if there are > supply / 2000 masternodes. And masternodes get 0% if there are < supply / 5000 masternodes (numbers pulled out of the ass).

Assuming 5,000,000 supply:
0...999 masternodes => 0% rewards
1000...2500 masternodes => interpolated from 0% to 50%
2500+ masternodes => 50%
hero member
Activity: 532
Merit: 500
March 25, 2015, 01:24:30 PM
You should be glad with what you can read, no one (much less Monero devs) owns you explanation to anything. troll.

^ second proposition today from Fluffy proved to be total BS meaning again he has no idea what he is talking about.

still waiting on response to the 3rd Fluffy proposition: P2P network nodes need failovers or the P2P network becomes insecure.  

This is the transaction from the screnshot i posted earlier: https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/tx.dws?1622007.htm

You see the guy paid 268DRK https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/address.dws?XbMaEcBqEcsCiyrTy2sAnwiQfmYK3SG1y9.htm (Lets say this is a Druglord)

This is my change https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/address.dws?XfRgC2e35SpjaKX7p6YxbhzEVqZN223BGe.htm (my change)

If i spend that now on StarFucks i am basically fucked, my pirvacy is Zero.

TL;DR Dangerous pseudo anonymity.
hero member
Activity: 966
Merit: 1003
March 25, 2015, 01:23:39 PM
it's implementation of gmaxwell's coinjoin is snotty at best

Can you explain the differences between gmaxwell's coinjoin and Darkcoin's mixing, thanks.
hero member
Activity: 966
Merit: 1003
March 25, 2015, 01:21:28 PM
Thats not how darksend is intended to work (or work) ... after mixing the denominations stay in the mixed address, so after you darksend 100 DRK you got for example 100 addresses with 1 DRK i each ... the correlation between these addresses is not there, thats what darksend is made for.

So if you send a darksend with 20 coins, there is no changeaddress used fpr the remaining 80 drk in your wallet, because they are all in other addresses (dominated for 1 drk each) ...

your approach sounds more like the coinjoin method, but thats not how darksend uses, it uses a portion from coinjoin with various additions, like denomination, to get around that problem what you are talking about

Yes, the wallet takes care of this by denominating the outputs to 100, 10, 1, 0.1 (not sure if even down to 0.01) and when you're "darksending" there won't be change. If the amount you're sending isn't divisible by the smallest denominator the leftovers will go to miners.
donator
Activity: 1274
Merit: 1060
GetMonero.org / MyMonero.com
March 25, 2015, 01:20:53 PM
The Masternodes are a part of your fucking consensus system if u still don't see how you should secure them the best way possible is beyond anyone with a brain and basic knowledge of it security.

which conversation are you talking about?

Fluffy is now saying that every MN owner needs a failover or it's easier to compromise the MN Network

majamina then asked ergo how many MN need to be compromised to backup that proposition?

it's a fair question but instead of getting an answer he is being called 'mentally challenged' for asking someone to prove what they are saying?

The problem with the question is that the answer is meaningless. Let's say, for instance, that we determine that 50% of the MasterNode network has to be ultra-secure. How do you enforce that in practicality? Why should MN operator Bob run on a $10/month DigitalOcean VPS, and MN operator Alice runs on $500/month collocated hardware in a DC in Panama with failover in a DC in the Netherlands...but they both earn the same reward? That's why I mean it's all or nothing - if you can't guarantee they are all practicing perfect opsec and massively securing their MN you have to assume that nobody is, in which case our hypothetical attacker can compromise most of the MN infrastructure.

I know that this sounds like I'm being evasive or complicated, but this is at the very root of an "assumed maliciousness" type of design instead of an "assumed honesty" design. It's at the heart of anti-fragile design as well, which Nassim Nicholas Taleb's seminal book covers in great detail (and is an excellent read).

Maybe a research project you can do in your own spare time, to understand how to design systems that assume malice, is to research the answer to this question: if a Bitcoin node is connected to 8 peers, how many of those peers need to be honest for the node to figure out the honest peers from the malicious peers? You'll find the answer is completely different to what you may instinctively think if you aren't familiar with anti-fragile design.
member
Activity: 112
Merit: 10
March 25, 2015, 01:19:05 PM
You guys refuse to comprehend. That doesn't mean what is stated isn't sound and fact-based.

No matter what is stated, you just keep saying "Explain it more."

no, it hasn't been explained...we need to know how many MNs should be compromised before the shit hits the fan....without this info we don't know where the fan is, or the shit trajectory...
hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 502
March 25, 2015, 01:18:34 PM
Yep. A frothing nutjob who understands more than you do about something you are devoted to in a cult-like fashion.
sr. member
Activity: 392
Merit: 255
March 25, 2015, 01:17:55 PM
lot of words not much content

You're not factoring in denominated units and "dead change" being sent to the network to remove linkages in future tx's.

^ second proposition today from Fluffy proved to be total BS meaning again he has no idea what he is talking about.

still waiting on response to the 3rd Fluffy proposition: P2P network nodes need failovers or the P2P network becomes insecure.  
sr. member
Activity: 371
Merit: 250
March 25, 2015, 01:17:37 PM
Thats not how darksend is intended to work (or work) ... after mixing the denominations stay in the mixed address, so after you darksend 100 DRK you got for example 100 addresses with 1 DRK i each ... the correlation between these addresses is not there, thats what darksend is made for.

So if you send a darksend with 20 coins, there is no changeaddress used fpr the remaining 80 drk in your wallet, because they are all in other addresses ...

I understand that, but you will get change the minute you pay for something with a decimal place.

Unless you're saying merchants have to price things in multiples of $5.18 (at this moment) and can't deviate from that?

nope, please just try it to see its not that way ... thats also why the darksend tx cost is rounded to the next 0.1 so even the txfee is not coming back to any change address.

also some arguments about mixing is taking days, i read a few pages back, thats not right, i mix 1000 drk with 15 rounds easily in one day!

It looks like much statments in here are based on an old version of darkcoin, or on ideas how coinjoin works, thats not what darkcoin does right now!
member
Activity: 112
Merit: 10
March 25, 2015, 01:17:32 PM
hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 502
March 25, 2015, 01:16:30 PM
A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, is it not?

You want a number? 15 is a number. 0FBCDE is a number. 671189.119973 is a number. 001111001111110000001010011010011 is a number.
sr. member
Activity: 392
Merit: 255
March 25, 2015, 01:15:47 PM
You guys refuse to comprehend. That doesn't mean what is stated isn't sound and fact-based.

No matter what is stated, you just keep saying "Explain it more."

just more diversions, nothing was stated in response to the question, each of your posts is just more like some frothing nutjob trying to divert away from any normal conversation?

^ MN question still unanswered
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