Again, nice to see that the management are paying themselves a $12,500 base salary a month each on top of huge stock options.... and yet can't pay their debts.
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On May 12, 2015, we agreed to convert accrued and unpaid salaries owed to Charles Allen, our Chief Executive Officer, and Michal Handerhan, our Chief Operating Officer, into shares of Common Stock pursuant to conversion agreements. Charles Allen converted $25,000 of accrued and unpaid salary for the months of March 2015 and April 2015 into 50,000 share of Common Stock at a per share price of $0.50. Michal Handerhan converted $25,000 of accrued and unpaid salary for the months of March 2015 and April 2015 into 50,000 share of Common Stock at a per share price of $0.50.
They also note that they've raised millions and millions and millions in fresh cash this year.... but not paying their debts. That is, apart from the debts and loans to their management which are promptly being paid back with interest.
I think this is the first time its been stated in plain English, Spondoolies is becoming a subsidiary of BTCS.
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... pursuant to which the Company shall purchase all the shares in Spondoolies ... from the Selling Shareholders so that Spondoolies will be a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company after the closing of the transactions contemplated by the Agreement ... .
So, "we'll go out of business if we can't raise $500k, but we can pay our management $100,000s".
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As of September 30, 2015, we had a cash position equal to $91,623 and expect that we need approximately $500,000 to fund our operations from October 1, 2015 through June 1, 2016. We may require additional funds for our anticipated operations and further expansion and if we are not successful in securing additional financing, we may be required to delay significantly, reduce the scope of or eliminate one or more of our business activities, downsize our general and administrative infrastructure, or seek alternative measures to avoid insolvency.
"We're going to keep draining the company for personal gain, creditors and shareholders will get little if we go under".
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Our independent auditors have indicated in their report on our December 31, 2014 financial statements that there is substantial doubt about our ability to continue as a going concern. A “going concern” opinion indicates that the financial statements have been prepared assuming we will continue as a going concern and do not include any adjustments to reflect the possible future effects on the recoverability and classification of assets, or the amounts and classification of liabilities that may result if we do not continue as a going concern. Therefore, you should not rely on our consolidated balance sheet as an indication of the amount of proceeds that would be available to satisfy claims of creditors, and potentially be available for distribution to stockholders, in the event of liquidation.
Not sure they understand that 50% attacks don't magically become possible at the 50.00000001% threshold, just more likely.
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If a malicious actor or botnet obtains control in excess of 50 percent of the processing power active on the Bitcoin Network, it is possible that such actor or botnet could manipulate the Blockchain in a manner that adversely affects an investment in us.
If a malicious actor or botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) obtains a majority of the processing power dedicated to mining on the Bitcoin Network, it may be able to alter the Blockchain on which the Bitcoin Network and all bitcoin transactions rely by constructing alternate blocks if it is able to solve for such blocks faster than the remainder of the miners on the Bitcoin Network can add valid blocks. In such alternate blocks, the malicious actor or botnet could control, exclude or modify the ordering of transactions, though it could not generate new bitcoins or transactions using such control. Using alternate blocks, the malicious actor could “double-spend” its own bitcoins (i.e., spend the same bitcoins in more than one transaction) and prevent the confirmation of other users’ transactions for so long as it maintains control. To the extent that such malicious actor or botnet does not yield its majority control of the processing power on the Bitcoin Network or the bitcoin community does not reject the fraudulent blocks as malicious, reversing any changes made to the Blockchain may not be possible. Such changes could adversely affect an investment in the.
In late May and early June 2014, a mining pool known as GHash.io approached and, during a 24- to 48-hour period in early June may have exceeded, the threshold of 50 percent of the processing power on the Bitcoin Network. To the extent that GHash.io did exceed 50 percent of the processing power on the network, reports indicate that such threshold was surpassed for only a short period, and there are no reports of any malicious activity or control of the Blockchain performed by GHash.io. Furthermore, the processing power in the mining pool appears to have been redirected to other pools on a voluntary basis by participants in the GHash.io pool, as had been done in prior instances when a mining pool exceeded 40 percent of the processing power on the Bitcoin Network.The approach to and possible crossing of the 50 percent threshold indicate a greater risk that a single mining pool could exert authority over the validation of bitcoin transactions. To the extent that the bitcoin ecosystem, including the Core Developers and the administrators of mining pools, do not act to ensure greater decentralization of bitcoin mining processing power, the feasibility of a malicious actor obtaining in excess of 50 percent of the processing power on the Bitcoin Network (e.g., through control of a large mining pool or through hacking such a mining pool) will increase, which may adversely impact an investment in us.
If a malicious actor or botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) obtains a majority of the processing power dedicated to mining on the Bitcoin Network, it may be able to alter the Blockchain on which the Bitcoin Network and all bitcoin transactions rely by constructing alternate blocks if it is able to solve for such blocks faster than the remainder of the miners on the Bitcoin Network can add valid blocks. In such alternate blocks, the malicious actor or botnet could control, exclude or modify the ordering of transactions, though it could not generate new bitcoins or transactions using such control. Using alternate blocks, the malicious actor could “double-spend” its own bitcoins (i.e., spend the same bitcoins in more than one transaction) and prevent the confirmation of other users’ transactions for so long as it maintains control. To the extent that such malicious actor or botnet does not yield its majority control of the processing power on the Bitcoin Network or the bitcoin community does not reject the fraudulent blocks as malicious, reversing any changes made to the Blockchain may not be possible. Such changes could adversely affect an investment in the.
In late May and early June 2014, a mining pool known as GHash.io approached and, during a 24- to 48-hour period in early June may have exceeded, the threshold of 50 percent of the processing power on the Bitcoin Network. To the extent that GHash.io did exceed 50 percent of the processing power on the network, reports indicate that such threshold was surpassed for only a short period, and there are no reports of any malicious activity or control of the Blockchain performed by GHash.io. Furthermore, the processing power in the mining pool appears to have been redirected to other pools on a voluntary basis by participants in the GHash.io pool, as had been done in prior instances when a mining pool exceeded 40 percent of the processing power on the Bitcoin Network.The approach to and possible crossing of the 50 percent threshold indicate a greater risk that a single mining pool could exert authority over the validation of bitcoin transactions. To the extent that the bitcoin ecosystem, including the Core Developers and the administrators of mining pools, do not act to ensure greater decentralization of bitcoin mining processing power, the feasibility of a malicious actor obtaining in excess of 50 percent of the processing power on the Bitcoin Network (e.g., through control of a large mining pool or through hacking such a mining pool) will increase, which may adversely impact an investment in us.
"As long as we line our own pockets", just one of the management stock option grants:
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General and administrative expenses for the year ended December 31, 2014 primarily consisted of compensation and benefits of $239,248, accounting and legal fees of $361,428, impairment loss on website development of $144,796, impairment loss on investment of $400,004 and stock based compensation of $13,126,445 related to the grant of 6,201,472 stock options to management on February 5, 2014 and 12,450,000 stock options on November 7, 2014.
No shit.
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We have not yet adopted a code of ethics that applies to our principal executive officers, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer or controller, or persons performing similar functions, since we have been focusing our efforts on growing our business and obtaining financing for our Company. We expect to adopt a code as we further develop our business.
Ah ha, here we go, buried on page 63. In 2014 the company had $38k of revenue, $31k of gross profit and posted a net loss of $14.7m. And yet the management paid themselves $8.9m.
At least they didn't do pre-orders with us (lower class,broke,whiney folk) 
