Hmm network....
At this rate gpu mining gonna be shit in 3-4 days
At this rate gpu mining gonna be shit in 3-4 days
Buy more GPUs
lol I already have 31mh
I'm just saying
Topic: [ANN][DASH] Dash (dash.org) | First Self-Funding Self-Governing Crypto Currency - page 6826. (Read 9723814 times)
February 21, 2014, 03:31:46 PM
Buy more GPUs
lol I already have 31mh
I'm just saying
February 21, 2014, 03:29:02 PM
Hmm network....
At this rate gpu mining gonna be shit in 3-4 days
At this rate gpu mining gonna be shit in 3-4 days
Buy more GPUs
February 21, 2014, 03:28:56 PM
Hmm network....
At this rate gpu mining gonna be shit in 3-4 days
At this rate gpu mining gonna be shit in 3-4 days
but price will skyrocket!!!!
February 21, 2014, 03:27:47 PM
Hmm network....
At this rate gpu mining gonna be shit in 3-4 days
At this rate gpu mining gonna be shit in 3-4 days
February 21, 2014, 03:06:58 PM
Just curious as to what is going on with anonymity testing / bug fixing. I know there was the test Wednesday and it seemed to work well - what is the plan going forward?
Do you have any milestones scheduled?
Do you have any milestones scheduled?
February 21, 2014, 02:48:10 PM
Nice pool! Your Q2C pool is also the best!
February 21, 2014, 02:44:00 PM
wow i mine q2c on your pool. one of the best pools out there. when i got home i will try your pool for darkcoin. keep up a good work. cheers from Japan 
February 21, 2014, 02:38:42 PM
Can you explain what to do to install it on bamt/linux?
Oh screwballs, that's for the cpu miner, lOL, hold on, I'll get the right one...
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y build-essential m4 libssl-dev libdb++-dev libboost-all-dev libminiupnpc-dev git automake libcurl4-openssl-dev
sudo git clone https://github.com/elmad/darkcoin-cpuminer-1.3-avx-aes
cd darkcoin-cpuminer-1.3-avx-aes
sudo chmod +x autogen.sh
sudo ./autogen.sh
Lol, too late
I was thinking the name was strange but...
sudo ./configure CFLAGS="-O3 -march=native"
sudo make
And this is how I start it:
sudo ./minerd -a X11 -o stratum+tcp://drk.lotterymining.com:4444 -u Me.Worker -p Password
Too late
Anyway, I'll do it again if you have the gpu-miner and then do a fresh install:)
I got an error with the apt-get install command: a file not found
I always need to do it as sudo or root, that might be the problem, I left it out in case your system doesn't require it. Oh, and look again, I updated it.
I tryed to do something like that, even modified my gpumon to make screen-r point to sgminer, samething with tha common.pl file to link the "mine start" command to sgminer.
When I launch mine start: i got the Gpu(overclock line, then nothing more. the process crash. I don't know what the problem is. I'm very bad with that linux stuff. I was thinking may be it's because of my cgminer.conf file. I put kernel : darkcoin and darkcoin: true inside it. Is there some sort of log file to know what the problem is?
February 21, 2014, 02:37:04 PM
Darkcoin pool who wants to try with us :
http://172.245.36.10/darkcoin/public/index.php
http://172.245.36.10/darkcoin/public/index.php
February 21, 2014, 02:35:15 PM
Progressing nicely. The difficulty outpacing profitability shows support beyond the buy and dump folks and into those that will stick with it long term.
Folks that are just in it for the money are likely moving on.
Folks that are just in it for the money are likely moving on.
February 21, 2014, 02:31:26 PM
February 21, 2014, 02:09:41 PM
If you want more miner rigs or just dont have your own, you can rent some here: http://leaserig.net/index.jsp?t=5
Rigs in (DRKMix) are there just for mining DarkCoin...the prices are very good.
Happy mining!
Rigs in (DRKMix) are there just for mining DarkCoin...the prices are very good.
Happy mining!
February 21, 2014, 02:06:48 PM
yeah yeah !!! Miners, please go and mine some other coins !!!!
February 21, 2014, 02:00:15 PM
Profitability now in the toilet for DRK. At almost 400 difficulty, in terms of scrypt, mining DRK right now i should be averaging about 0.088 BTC for ~12 MH/day (35MH for DRK) of power, assuming .002 DRK/BTC rate holds. This is at least 50% worse than any auto-switching scrypt pool. Guess I'm pulling up stake here.
Great coin concept though, I enjoyed being part of it for a while! Good work Devs.
Great coin concept though, I enjoyed being part of it for a while! Good work Devs.
I just noticed this also. I went from 82 coins a day to 32 in just one day.
February 21, 2014, 01:55:35 PM
Profitability now in the toilet for DRK. At almost 400 difficulty, in terms of scrypt, mining DRK right now i should be averaging about 0.088 BTC for ~12 MH/day (35MH for DRK) of power, assuming .002 DRK/BTC rate holds. This is at least 50% worse than any auto-switching scrypt pool. Guess I'm pulling up stake here.
Great coin concept though, I enjoyed being part of it for a while! Good work Devs.
Great coin concept though, I enjoyed being part of it for a while! Good work Devs.
February 21, 2014, 01:46:24 PM
In reply to: http://www.reddit.com/r/DRKCoin/comments/1yit1a/using_coinjoin_for_anonymity_is_errorprone/
I'm posting this here, for everyone's benefit. Thanks!
First off, these are fantastic questions. The answer to implementing this in such a way where it is very difficulty to exploit is by adding cost and verification.
Here’s the gist of how I envision DarkSend to work in the long run. Some of what I’m going to mention is done, some of it I’m working on currently. I’d love some ideas on possible attack vectors on my implementation, so we can make it as bulletproof as possible.
Pools
DarkSend adds various extensions to the Bitcoin protocol for implementing transaction pooling. Like normal Coinjoin the pools take transactions in stages. The stages currently are:
POOL_STATUS_IDLE
POOL_STATUS_ACCEPTING_INPUTS
POOL_STATUS_ACCEPTING_OUTPUTS
POOL_STATUS_SIGNING
POOL_STATUS_TRANSMISSION
So the users relay these items throughout the network as the stages happen. After all items are gathered into the pool, the transactions are merged together into one, remotely signed and then broadcasted.
Masters
To defeat propagation problems, master nodes are elected each new block. They are responsible for being the authority of what goes into the joined transaction each session. This is done in a tamperproof way, but I think it’s not important to the discussion.
So what is the cost?
There must be a cost to using this anonymous network, otherwise like you say there will be issues with millions of accounts popping up. I’m not dead set on which solution(s) to implement, but here’s a couple ideas:
Burnt Identities
Higher difficulty shares to the current block would be mined and then stored in the blockchain permanently. Multiple of these would be used for each transaction and would be “burnt” when misused, causing the attacker to have to mine them again.
Verification?
To use the pools it will require unique unspend outputs, someone that wants to mess with the system would have to have a large pool of funds in many addresses. So to attack a pool with 100 slots, you would require funds dispersed to 99 addresses, on 99 nodes working in common.
Other possible fee-less solutions?
There is interesting research on protecting against sybil attacks that lends itself really well to a decentralized ledger, such as this paper:
http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/InformationSecurity/slides/gamesandreputation.pdf
The idea is to build a social graph of the inputs and outputs of each entry and they should all know different people. If 99 of them all have the same “friends” that they associate with, then they’ll have to enter a different pool. Which will ensure the pool is not full of the nodes belonging to the attacker.
An application for machine learning?
I’m been making models for trading equities for over 7 years now. I ran a financial firm that sold the signals for a few years and I have experience with natural language processing using classifiers. So, I could make a classifier and actually embed it into Darkcoin to determine which pool a node should use, to separate out nodes that seem to be in common.
Other ideas?
I’m open to ideas on how to provide the best security to the network. I would love to hear what people have in mind.
I’ve been working on DarkSend about a month and we’ve already fixed the decentralization and propagation issues, this is just another bridge to cross in the future.
Thanks!
I'm posting this here, for everyone's benefit. Thanks!
Quote
Hi, I am Gnosis, the Anoncoin developer working on implementing Zerocoin. First of all, I think it is excellent that there is so much interest in developing a fully anonymous currency. I am not just a developer but also a user, or I will be when an anonymous currency exists! When coin creators compete, the coin users win!
However, CoinJoin has been around for a while, and it has not seen much use for anonymity. There's a good reason for that: it's not very anonymous.
Quoting my bitcointalk post:
However, CoinJoin has been around for a while, and it has not seen much use for anonymity. There's a good reason for that: it's not very anonymous.
Quoting my bitcointalk post:
Quote
CoinJoin has questionable anonymity compared to Zerocoin. The reason is that with CoinJoin, two or more users must somehow partner up and forge a transaction together. They communicate over a secure channel to do this. The coins are only mixed among these "partners." Picking partners you can trust is a significant obstacle: how can you know that your partners will "forget" the mixing that happened? One may try to repeat this 10 times with randomly chosen partners, but how can you know that your partners are not all just sock puppets of one malicious entity (on an anonymous network, it is trivial to create as many fake users as you want )? If that is the case, then your efforts are in vain.
Compare this with Zerocoin, where you put your coins in an accumulator, and they are mixed with the coins of all users who have put coins into that accumulator, since the beginning of Zerocoin. There would be a different accumulator for different denominations of Anoncoins (1, 5, 10, 50 ANC, etc.).
To put it simply, the more users' coins your coins are mixed with, the more anonymity you have.
I cannot speak to Darkcoin's implementation (or planned implementation) of CoinJoin since I cannot seem to find any specs or code on their Github or their site. If anyone knows, please point me to them.
I look forward to a practical and secure solution for anonymity from the DarkCoin devs! Compare this with Zerocoin, where you put your coins in an accumulator, and they are mixed with the coins of all users who have put coins into that accumulator, since the beginning of Zerocoin. There would be a different accumulator for different denominations of Anoncoins (1, 5, 10, 50 ANC, etc.).
To put it simply, the more users' coins your coins are mixed with, the more anonymity you have.
I cannot speak to Darkcoin's implementation (or planned implementation) of CoinJoin since I cannot seem to find any specs or code on their Github or their site. If anyone knows, please point me to them.
First off, these are fantastic questions. The answer to implementing this in such a way where it is very difficulty to exploit is by adding cost and verification.
Here’s the gist of how I envision DarkSend to work in the long run. Some of what I’m going to mention is done, some of it I’m working on currently. I’d love some ideas on possible attack vectors on my implementation, so we can make it as bulletproof as possible.
Pools
DarkSend adds various extensions to the Bitcoin protocol for implementing transaction pooling. Like normal Coinjoin the pools take transactions in stages. The stages currently are:
POOL_STATUS_IDLE
POOL_STATUS_ACCEPTING_INPUTS
POOL_STATUS_ACCEPTING_OUTPUTS
POOL_STATUS_SIGNING
POOL_STATUS_TRANSMISSION
So the users relay these items throughout the network as the stages happen. After all items are gathered into the pool, the transactions are merged together into one, remotely signed and then broadcasted.
Masters
To defeat propagation problems, master nodes are elected each new block. They are responsible for being the authority of what goes into the joined transaction each session. This is done in a tamperproof way, but I think it’s not important to the discussion.
So what is the cost?
There must be a cost to using this anonymous network, otherwise like you say there will be issues with millions of accounts popping up. I’m not dead set on which solution(s) to implement, but here’s a couple ideas:
Burnt Identities
Higher difficulty shares to the current block would be mined and then stored in the blockchain permanently. Multiple of these would be used for each transaction and would be “burnt” when misused, causing the attacker to have to mine them again.
Verification?
To use the pools it will require unique unspend outputs, someone that wants to mess with the system would have to have a large pool of funds in many addresses. So to attack a pool with 100 slots, you would require funds dispersed to 99 addresses, on 99 nodes working in common.
Other possible fee-less solutions?
There is interesting research on protecting against sybil attacks that lends itself really well to a decentralized ledger, such as this paper:
http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/InformationSecurity/slides/gamesandreputation.pdf
The idea is to build a social graph of the inputs and outputs of each entry and they should all know different people. If 99 of them all have the same “friends” that they associate with, then they’ll have to enter a different pool. Which will ensure the pool is not full of the nodes belonging to the attacker.
An application for machine learning?
I’m been making models for trading equities for over 7 years now. I ran a financial firm that sold the signals for a few years and I have experience with natural language processing using classifiers. So, I could make a classifier and actually embed it into Darkcoin to determine which pool a node should use, to separate out nodes that seem to be in common.
Other ideas?
I’m open to ideas on how to provide the best security to the network. I would love to hear what people have in mind.
I’ve been working on DarkSend about a month and we’ve already fixed the decentralization and propagation issues, this is just another bridge to cross in the future.
Thanks!
Is it possible to implement 3 solutions to work side by side? Or would that conflict or slow things down too much?? I like repetition
I think that's what the end result will be and it shouldn't slow down anything
February 21, 2014, 01:37:53 PM
That's peculiar behavior. Can you use display-debug mode to see the debug messages of the hardware errors? Maybe they can give us a clue.
Yeah, tell me about it. I don't know what the problem is. How do you enable debug mode? I'll try it once I get back home.
From inside the program... you press D, and again D(ebug mode on). Then copy paste the HW errors... there's is possibly a log function as well but I've never used it.
February 21, 2014, 01:36:37 PM
That's peculiar behavior. Can you use display-debug mode to see the debug messages of the hardware errors? Maybe they can give us a clue.
Yeah, tell me about it. I don't know what the problem is. How do you enable debug mode? I'll try it once I get back home.
February 21, 2014, 01:32:37 PM
Anyone can help with mining on 7950s?
My 7850 in my desktop can mine no problem using it's standard values used for scrypt mining, but the 7950s only return HW errors. I've been trying for two days. I've tried no parameters at all in the BAT file, multiple TCs and multiple values of every other variable imaginable. I've also tried underclocking, limiting it to just one GPU to see if I could get something working, upgrading drivers, downgrading drivers, etc. etc. Am I missing something? If someone can help, I'll tip you something. Probably in LTC since I don't have any DRK. Feel free to PM me if you'd like.
My 7850 in my desktop can mine no problem using it's standard values used for scrypt mining, but the 7950s only return HW errors. I've been trying for two days. I've tried no parameters at all in the BAT file, multiple TCs and multiple values of every other variable imaginable. I've also tried underclocking, limiting it to just one GPU to see if I could get something working, upgrading drivers, downgrading drivers, etc. etc. Am I missing something? If someone can help, I'll tip you something. Probably in LTC since I don't have any DRK. Feel free to PM me if you'd like.
That's peculiar behavior. Can you use display-debug mode to see the debug messages of the hardware errors? Maybe they can give us a clue.
February 21, 2014, 01:31:39 PM
In reply to: http://www.reddit.com/r/DRKCoin/comments/1yit1a/using_coinjoin_for_anonymity_is_errorprone/
I'm posting this here, for everyone's benefit. Thanks!
First off, these are fantastic questions. The answer to implementing this in such a way where it is very difficulty to exploit is by adding cost and verification.
Here’s the gist of how I envision DarkSend to work in the long run. Some of what I’m going to mention is done, some of it I’m working on currently. I’d love some ideas on possible attack vectors on my implementation, so we can make it as bulletproof as possible.
Pools
DarkSend adds various extensions to the Bitcoin protocol for implementing transaction pooling. Like normal Coinjoin the pools take transactions in stages. The stages currently are:
POOL_STATUS_IDLE
POOL_STATUS_ACCEPTING_INPUTS
POOL_STATUS_ACCEPTING_OUTPUTS
POOL_STATUS_SIGNING
POOL_STATUS_TRANSMISSION
So the users relay these items throughout the network as the stages happen. After all items are gathered into the pool, the transactions are merged together into one, remotely signed and then broadcasted.
Masters
To defeat propagation problems, master nodes are elected each new block. They are responsible for being the authority of what goes into the joined transaction each session. This is done in a tamperproof way, but I think it’s not important to the discussion.
So what is the cost?
There must be a cost to using this anonymous network, otherwise like you say there will be issues with millions of accounts popping up. I’m not dead set on which solution(s) to implement, but here’s a couple ideas:
Burnt Identities
Higher difficulty shares to the current block would be mined and then stored in the blockchain permanently. Multiple of these would be used for each transaction and would be “burnt” when misused, causing the attacker to have to mine them again.
Verification?
To use the pools it will require unique unspend outputs, someone that wants to mess with the system would have to have a large pool of funds in many addresses. So to attack a pool with 100 slots, you would require funds dispersed to 99 addresses, on 99 nodes working in common.
Other possible fee-less solutions?
There is interesting research on protecting against sybil attacks that lends itself really well to a decentralized ledger, such as this paper:
http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/InformationSecurity/slides/gamesandreputation.pdf
The idea is to build a social graph of the inputs and outputs of each entry and they should all know different people. If 99 of them all have the same “friends” that they associate with, then they’ll have to enter a different pool. Which will ensure the pool is not full of the nodes belonging to the attacker.
An application for machine learning?
I’m been making models for trading equities for over 7 years now. I ran a financial firm that sold the signals for a few years and I have experience with natural language processing using classifiers. So, I could make a classifier and actually embed it into Darkcoin to determine which pool a node should use, to separate out nodes that seem to be in common.
Other ideas?
I’m open to ideas on how to provide the best security to the network. I would love to hear what people have in mind.
I’ve been working on DarkSend about a month and we’ve already fixed the decentralization and propagation issues, this is just another bridge to cross in the future.
Thanks!
I'm posting this here, for everyone's benefit. Thanks!
Quote
Hi, I am Gnosis, the Anoncoin developer working on implementing Zerocoin. First of all, I think it is excellent that there is so much interest in developing a fully anonymous currency. I am not just a developer but also a user, or I will be when an anonymous currency exists! When coin creators compete, the coin users win!
However, CoinJoin has been around for a while, and it has not seen much use for anonymity. There's a good reason for that: it's not very anonymous.
Quoting my bitcointalk post:
However, CoinJoin has been around for a while, and it has not seen much use for anonymity. There's a good reason for that: it's not very anonymous.
Quoting my bitcointalk post:
Quote
CoinJoin has questionable anonymity compared to Zerocoin. The reason is that with CoinJoin, two or more users must somehow partner up and forge a transaction together. They communicate over a secure channel to do this. The coins are only mixed among these "partners." Picking partners you can trust is a significant obstacle: how can you know that your partners will "forget" the mixing that happened? One may try to repeat this 10 times with randomly chosen partners, but how can you know that your partners are not all just sock puppets of one malicious entity (on an anonymous network, it is trivial to create as many fake users as you want )? If that is the case, then your efforts are in vain.
Compare this with Zerocoin, where you put your coins in an accumulator, and they are mixed with the coins of all users who have put coins into that accumulator, since the beginning of Zerocoin. There would be a different accumulator for different denominations of Anoncoins (1, 5, 10, 50 ANC, etc.).
To put it simply, the more users' coins your coins are mixed with, the more anonymity you have.
I cannot speak to Darkcoin's implementation (or planned implementation) of CoinJoin since I cannot seem to find any specs or code on their Github or their site. If anyone knows, please point me to them.
I look forward to a practical and secure solution for anonymity from the DarkCoin devs! Compare this with Zerocoin, where you put your coins in an accumulator, and they are mixed with the coins of all users who have put coins into that accumulator, since the beginning of Zerocoin. There would be a different accumulator for different denominations of Anoncoins (1, 5, 10, 50 ANC, etc.).
To put it simply, the more users' coins your coins are mixed with, the more anonymity you have.
I cannot speak to Darkcoin's implementation (or planned implementation) of CoinJoin since I cannot seem to find any specs or code on their Github or their site. If anyone knows, please point me to them.
First off, these are fantastic questions. The answer to implementing this in such a way where it is very difficulty to exploit is by adding cost and verification.
Here’s the gist of how I envision DarkSend to work in the long run. Some of what I’m going to mention is done, some of it I’m working on currently. I’d love some ideas on possible attack vectors on my implementation, so we can make it as bulletproof as possible.
Pools
DarkSend adds various extensions to the Bitcoin protocol for implementing transaction pooling. Like normal Coinjoin the pools take transactions in stages. The stages currently are:
POOL_STATUS_IDLE
POOL_STATUS_ACCEPTING_INPUTS
POOL_STATUS_ACCEPTING_OUTPUTS
POOL_STATUS_SIGNING
POOL_STATUS_TRANSMISSION
So the users relay these items throughout the network as the stages happen. After all items are gathered into the pool, the transactions are merged together into one, remotely signed and then broadcasted.
Masters
To defeat propagation problems, master nodes are elected each new block. They are responsible for being the authority of what goes into the joined transaction each session. This is done in a tamperproof way, but I think it’s not important to the discussion.
So what is the cost?
There must be a cost to using this anonymous network, otherwise like you say there will be issues with millions of accounts popping up. I’m not dead set on which solution(s) to implement, but here’s a couple ideas:
Burnt Identities
Higher difficulty shares to the current block would be mined and then stored in the blockchain permanently. Multiple of these would be used for each transaction and would be “burnt” when misused, causing the attacker to have to mine them again.
Verification?
To use the pools it will require unique unspend outputs, someone that wants to mess with the system would have to have a large pool of funds in many addresses. So to attack a pool with 100 slots, you would require funds dispersed to 99 addresses, on 99 nodes working in common.
Other possible fee-less solutions?
There is interesting research on protecting against sybil attacks that lends itself really well to a decentralized ledger, such as this paper:
http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/InformationSecurity/slides/gamesandreputation.pdf
The idea is to build a social graph of the inputs and outputs of each entry and they should all know different people. If 99 of them all have the same “friends” that they associate with, then they’ll have to enter a different pool. Which will ensure the pool is not full of the nodes belonging to the attacker.
An application for machine learning?
I’m been making models for trading equities for over 7 years now. I ran a financial firm that sold the signals for a few years and I have experience with natural language processing using classifiers. So, I could make a classifier and actually embed it into Darkcoin to determine which pool a node should use, to separate out nodes that seem to be in common.
Other ideas?
I’m open to ideas on how to provide the best security to the network. I would love to hear what people have in mind.
I’ve been working on DarkSend about a month and we’ve already fixed the decentralization and propagation issues, this is just another bridge to cross in the future.
Thanks!
Is it possible to implement 3 solutions to work side by side? Or would that conflict or slow things down too much?? I like repetition
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