Do you have to be a top delegate to forge/mine like the first page implies? In other words, can holders of LISK stake them for rewards and to strengthen the network?
If you have to be a delegate to forge/mine then that means the delegates are sort of marked as far as taking down the network goes.
If you have to be a delegate to forge/mine then that means the delegates are sort of marked as far as taking down the network goes.
top 101 delegates are able to forge (Mine)
Wow, that is a bit dangerous and makes for a very insecure network, doesn't it? I mean are there 101 nodes running and staking things and no more?
Thanks for the reply.
Not really. all delegates are voted on by the people and shady ones will be weeded out. If a node is doing shady stuff? let the people know to unvote for them. Keep the good workers who are making lisk better and drop those who are not.
I didn't mean I'm worried about shady delegates, I meant that the network is 101 nodes and the delegates are a sort of known entity (talking regarding governments here).
There must be something more to secure the network that 101 nodes. thx again
I'm not an expert. All I can say is I think you should read how bitshares does it as it is similar.
Appreciated. I found this quite quickly and it is a great great read. Some strong points and weak points regarding dpos.
http://tpbit.blogspot.de/2014/08/thoughts-on-delegated-proof-of-stake.html
Nice excerpt and btw, I am involved in the ICO. I am bringing this up as a concerned stake holder.
Quote
DDOS on delegates
As it was explained during the presentation, DPOS operates by the network electing a pool of delegates to secure the network. For BitShares, that pool is 101 delegates. If a delegate does not perform their duties (mining blocks when it's their turn), they are kicked out of the pool of delegates and a new delegate is chosen to replace them.
This leaves a lot of room for attack on a small number of nodes. Since most delegates probably won't have a state of the art computing centre to protect themselves, they will be vulnerable to DDOS attacks, among other things. If someone was determined to disrupt the confidence in the network, they would only need to go after the delegates once by one and take their machines out of the network. Of course the delegate pool would reshuffle each time with new delegates, but if good agents are taken out on a regular basis and bad agents have a chance to replace them, it would be possible to have a disproportionate amount of bad agents disrupting the network.
Since the delegates are also supposed to be transparent public figures in the space, they would be vulnerable to a lot more attacks like the rubber-hose cryptoanalysis.
Margin delegate coercion
BitShares has a pool of 101 delegates. Delegate number 101 earns 1/101 of all fees from the network. Delegate number 102 earns nothing. Such steep drop off can be a dangerous thing.
The situation is similar to the problem of match fixing in professional sumo, as described by Steven Levitt in Freakonomics.
Essentially, the issue boils down to this - if you are at a borderline between winning and getting everything, or losing and getting nothing, you are more likely to cut a deal with someone and secure your winnings through generally frowned upon measures, such as match fixing.
Now lets say I owned a few percent of BitShares, say, 5%, and the delegate 101 has 80% approval. I can approach anyone with 75% approval, or in some cases even 70%, and cut them a deal - you pay me 50% of your earnings, and I will give you that mining spot. I remove the votes from delegate 101 and lower, add my votes to my chosen delegates 102 and up, and I control them, at least as much as they are willing to give up for the slice of the mining pie.
I don't even need votes to bring some people down. Spreading rumours is easy on the Internet, and since most people don't fact check and act impulsively, it wouldn't be too hard to remove some marginal delegates from their ranks.
As it was explained during the presentation, DPOS operates by the network electing a pool of delegates to secure the network. For BitShares, that pool is 101 delegates. If a delegate does not perform their duties (mining blocks when it's their turn), they are kicked out of the pool of delegates and a new delegate is chosen to replace them.
This leaves a lot of room for attack on a small number of nodes. Since most delegates probably won't have a state of the art computing centre to protect themselves, they will be vulnerable to DDOS attacks, among other things. If someone was determined to disrupt the confidence in the network, they would only need to go after the delegates once by one and take their machines out of the network. Of course the delegate pool would reshuffle each time with new delegates, but if good agents are taken out on a regular basis and bad agents have a chance to replace them, it would be possible to have a disproportionate amount of bad agents disrupting the network.
Since the delegates are also supposed to be transparent public figures in the space, they would be vulnerable to a lot more attacks like the rubber-hose cryptoanalysis.
Margin delegate coercion
BitShares has a pool of 101 delegates. Delegate number 101 earns 1/101 of all fees from the network. Delegate number 102 earns nothing. Such steep drop off can be a dangerous thing.
The situation is similar to the problem of match fixing in professional sumo, as described by Steven Levitt in Freakonomics.
Essentially, the issue boils down to this - if you are at a borderline between winning and getting everything, or losing and getting nothing, you are more likely to cut a deal with someone and secure your winnings through generally frowned upon measures, such as match fixing.
Now lets say I owned a few percent of BitShares, say, 5%, and the delegate 101 has 80% approval. I can approach anyone with 75% approval, or in some cases even 70%, and cut them a deal - you pay me 50% of your earnings, and I will give you that mining spot. I remove the votes from delegate 101 and lower, add my votes to my chosen delegates 102 and up, and I control them, at least as much as they are willing to give up for the slice of the mining pie.
I don't even need votes to bring some people down. Spreading rumours is easy on the Internet, and since most people don't fact check and act impulsively, it wouldn't be too hard to remove some marginal delegates from their ranks.
