PoS can not be decentralized and can not be secure. You will never know if an opponent has taken control of all or part of the nodes, all nodes can be compromised or hacked.
There will be no greater security than just the PoW, there will actually be less.
I believe its easier
to hack 2 or 3 pools in order to control a network over PoW (and often 1 pool has more than 50% of it, so a single target to hit) than hacking all the nodes of a network. Pools also run more code than a node so attack surface is greater.
Network can not be controlled "over PoW" by hacking pools, because hashing power is in hands of miners not pools itself. I don't know how a PoS network can be secure and how a PoS based coin can guarantee privacy, because PoS is inherently centralized.
Maybe privacy is not intended for zano?
From our whitepaper:
You can download the full whitepaper here:
https://zano.org/1.2 Zano’s PoS Implementation
Ring signatures allow the transaction creator to provide a set of possible public keys for signature verification, thus keeping their identity indistinguishable from other users. The concept of an anonymous, secure PoS mechanism seemed to be unachievable.
The basis of PoS is a so-called kernel, which is a data structure that depends on the transaction output and includes:
• Current timestamp with 15-second granularity.
• Key Image, which corresponds to each transaction output. A keyimage is comprised of 32 pseudorandom bytes derived from the key in such a way that it is impossible to reconstruct the key, given only its image.
• Stake Modifier. An additional 64 pseudo-random bytes derived from the last PoS and PoW blocks, which disallows any predictability of the stakemodifier in the blocks ahead.
During mining, a user is allowed to sign a block, if Hash(kernel) < CoinAmount ∗ PosTarget, where CoinAmount is the amount of coins in a particular output, and PosTarget is an adaptive parameter that works to keep the block creation rate constant.
The PoS miner iterates the timestamp (within the allowed boundaries) for each of their unspent outputs (UTXO) and checks to see if they possess a UTXO that’s keyimage satisfies the PoSTarget formula above. In the event of a ”winning” result, they spend this particular output, anonymously, with a ring-signature.
Note: The signature includes the keyimage (used in the kernel), but not the key itself, which is why it does not compromise anonymity. The miner signs both the transaction and the block and broadcasts the new block to the network.