Topic: Bitcoin XT - Officially #REKT (also goes for BIP101 fraud) - page 14. (Read 378991 times)

Miners can only decide so long their blocks are smaller than what bulk of the nodes will accept.  Neither miner nor node has final say--the limit emerges from a "bottom up" decentralized process instead. 

Consensus is an emergent property which flows from the will of the economic majority. Proof of work is the best way to measure this consensus. The pools act as proxy for the miners, pools behave in a similar way to representatives within a representative democracy. Then in turn the miners act as a proxy for the economic majority. Since the miners are incentivized to follow the economic majority. In effect the economic majority rules Bitcoin, in other words the market rules Bitcoin. Bitcoin relies on the economic self-interest of the masses to govern consensus.

this is how really works something that known can undrestand.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AikLs1P4_PA

every simple person in bitcoin ecosystem is very important. Many say that developers or miners has the power for changes that is not true. In ecosystem like bitcoin everyone must agree for a change and that is the real power of bitcoin because none can control it.

It's not. It's up to the miners.

Stop promoting this misleading idea.

I do not think that the miners having a lot of power in this decision making process is a bad thing, after all they are the only group that have a direct and lasting incentive mechanism acting upon them to do what is best for Bitcoin. Furthermore this would not just be up to the miners, they would still need to move with the economic majority, this is where the negotiation would take place. I also do not see a better alternative then that since otherwise we would still be dependent on alternative implementations and their development teams in order to give us a range of choice. In that case however the power would still lie with the economic majority and the miners so it would not actually in effect be any different in that regard, it just turns what was a representative democracy into a more direct form of democracy in regards to the blocksize. BU is not even about increasing the blocksize, it is about giving everyone the freedom of choice. After all the miners and the economic majority could decrease the blocksize under BU if they deem this to be necessary, BU just takes this power away from the development teams and returns it to where it belongs.

BU can even be configured to mimic the behavior of BIP100, BIP101, BIP102, BIP103 or BIP202. Or it can be setup to behave exactly the same as a Core node as well, the choice is yours, in different words it is up to the free market. Considering all of the possible options of who decides I would argue that this is the best solution.

*facepalms*

So in other words miners make the ultimate decision? If this is the case, then Bitcoin Unlimited is even worse than I initially thought. Otherwise, elaborate what you mean exactly (since everyone can vote via software and miners create blocks).

haha coindesk.. lmao you fuck-mainstream-wit wannabe.

i sir, pen my article for the only relevant bitcoin news site: http://qntra.net/author/hdbuck/

fucking unbelievable those redditards and their couple satoshis, fork off already would ya?

yup, blocksize aint about to change as far as the drama goes.

forkers need to fork off once and for all.

the fuckwits are getting redundant with their sens0r ships and unlimiturd whatnot.


edit: and now roger ver is making out with more scammers: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1303147.0;topicseen

derps gotta derp.

That is indeed an interesting paper and looks correct at the first glance. I must note that IBLT looks quite different, so it likely requires another paper

I think that it is unlikely that Bitcoin would split because of this, however I do think that we should also accept this as a possibility and a feature of the the freedom of choice. This is what solves the problem of tyranny of the majority and guarantees our right to self determination. I think that you are wrong in seeing this as a form of inflation however, in the same sense that the existence of the Zimbabwe dollar does not make the US dollar more inflationary, or another example might be the existence of alternative cryptocurrencies, altcoins do not make Bitcoin more inflationary.

I also think that you are wrong in thinking that we are not free to fork because of economic incentive, quite the opposite actually, it is this economic incentive which will actually incentivize a fork, since increasing the throughput of the Bitcoin blockchain increases its utility and therefore also its value.

Forks produce quickly a Bitcoin chain and an alternative chain. Relative to the pre-fork world, the end result of a fork is just one more altcoin.

You don't need to worry about the inflationary nature of forks more than you are worried about the inflationary nature of altcoins.

Right, so it is very unlikely that two chains will co-exist.  Instead, the free-market will crown a winner.  I don't think BldSwtTrs disagrees. 

You can trust the free market and fork to whatever chain you like, but then it is exactly the inflation that you are against, do you see the contradiction here?

In fact, the day you fork your coin and set up your exchange, you will face millions of pre-fork coins dumped on your exchanges, then your coin on that fork will worth basically nothing. This is the result of free market forking, and exactly because of this result, you are not free to fork as you wish, that's why I say that your freedom here are heavily limited by your economic incentive

Yes, it is incomplete.  It is a chart for a particular miner with particular electricity costs and propagation impedance (network connection). Each miner will have his own version of those charts.

I think this picture is incomplete, it lacks some of the other variables: cost of mining rig deployment, cost of operational cost, cost of electricity, and the network speed. When you add those variables in the calculation, the whole picture become more complex

I would like to establish my mining operation in China because of all those costs are much lower there, although their network speed is lower, but I get much higher profit mining every block there. And then if majority of the mining power is in china, then the propagation speed is really decided by the network speed into and out of China, no matter how fast a network a western miner have, you do not benefit from a small block since your block can not reach china thus will be orphaned by their higher hash power. However Chinese miners can use a large block inside their mainland due to faster network there

Economists who think money supply must be inflated are not trusting the free market as do the small blockists regarding the blocksize.

So it's you who shouldn't be here, if you don't trust the free market and love when the settings of the monetary system lie on the decisions of few people you can already use fiat.

Glad to hear that!  So then all of the assumptions are presently satisfied for the fee market described here to hold, right?


It sounds like your argument then is that the conditions may change such that they no longer hold.  I agree that no one has shown that to be impossible yet.  


We've recently been able to show that weak blocks will not affect the existence of a fee market.  This is describe in detail in my recent "subchains" manuscript (Sections 4 and 5).  




In fact, weak blocks improve the fee market by diverting a greater fraction of the fees to pay for proof-of-work instead of paying for orphaned blocks:




I suspect this result will hold for IBLT and any other propagation technique so long as miners can build blocks according to their own volition.  

I actually meant something like IBLT and weak blocks. To be honest, my current understanding of them is not as deep as I'd like it to be. From what I know, IBLT allows for a tx list to be 'packed' in a fixed-size structure. It's probabilistic (as bloom filters are) and does have failure rate, so, not really constant-time (but can be under certain circumstances?). But I wonder what natural level of fees will be with them.

Miners can also communicate all the necessary information about a block they're working on in advance. In the fact of such deep cooperation, I guess that miners can be considered a single miner, as in Peter's assumptions.