it sounds like just a currency turned into a payment processing type structure....
Just like PayPal
How will coins be distributed without mining?
Topic: DagCoin: a cryptocurrency without blocks - page 14. (Read 70882 times)
I wasn't going to discuss that algorithm at all, but you were asking about it 
It isn't clear what you were talking about from the thread; it was ambiguous.
What signing algorithm? I feel this is so far off topic now, that you really should start your own thread about your own design.
I wasn't going to discuss that algorithm at all, but you were asking about it
This signing algorithm is supposed to be used in a PoW cryptocoin only. Every key can be used only once (every output can be spent only once).
What signing algorithm? I feel this is so far off topic now, that you really should start your own thread about your own design.
If I sign a msg with my private key, the signature is a record that I signed the msg. If you can forge my signature, then you can send fake msgs from me.
This signing algorithm is supposed to be used in a PoW cryptocoin only. Every key can be used only once (every output can be spent only once).
you should never be able to forge a signature.
Why?
If I sign a msg with my private key, the signature is a record that I signed the msg. If you can forge my signature, then you can send fake msgs from me.
you should never be able to forge a signature.
Why?
I'm talking about weaker cryptographic security. More PoW done -> stronger the signature is (harder to find another message to sign).
More POW = stronger block hash, but you should never be able to forge a signature.
To clarify, you're talking about being a lower part of a chain which gets orphaned here, not weak cryptographic security?
I'm talking about weaker cryptographic security. More PoW done -> stronger the signature is (harder to find another message to sign).
Those who generate little PoW may see their coins double-spent by others.
To clarify, you're talking about being a lower part of a chain which gets orphaned here, not weak cryptographic security?
i must admit i dont understand how this TxNet may work in detail but it sounds interesting.
i have one question though (this also assumes no further tx-obfuscation):
if tx's are mined like blocks with multiple ancestors is it possible to blacklist certain transactions in different jurisdictions and still have the rest working?
only transactions which uses that outputs would be unusable in that country.
any thoughts?
i have one question though (this also assumes no further tx-obfuscation):
if tx's are mined like blocks with multiple ancestors is it possible to blacklist certain transactions in different jurisdictions and still have the rest working?
only transactions which uses that outputs would be unusable in that country.
any thoughts?
A discriminatory protocol is worse than mining centralisation IMO because you exclude use in countries which would stand to gain the most.
Agree, luckily for us our design solves this issue in a sidechain-like manner.
Low security transactions are secured once they are included into the graph, doublespending becomes hard after that point. It's a CPU vs bandwidth tradeoff. Users with very slow computers and very slow Internet will indeed be unable to use the platform unless they cooperate with each other (via multisignatures).
A discriminatory protocol is worse than mining centralisation IMO because you exclude use in countries which would stand to gain the most.
And so users with slow computers will simply stop using the platform, creating a centralisation of its own form - this is especially bad if difficulty is out of the control of the users, which in this paper it appears to be.
Low security transactions are secured once they are included into the graph, doublespending becomes hard after that point. It's a CPU vs bandwidth tradeoff. Users with very slow computers and very slow Internet will indeed be unable to use the platform unless they cooperate with each other (via multisignatures).
If miners == users then I suggest to use a digital signature algorithm which security depends on PoW tied to the transaction. Those who generate little PoW may see their coins double-spent by others.
And so users with slow computers will simply stop using the platform, creating a centralisation of its own form - this is especially bad if difficulty is out of the control of the users, which in this paper it appears to be.
Competition would atrophy hashpower on the network in order to drive up transaction speeds, which is the product that the miner provides, users enjoy, and the only method of remuneration. Mining is just a cost that the miner wants to minimize.
If miners == users then I suggest to use a digital signature algorithm which security depends on PoW tied to the transaction. Those who generate little PoW may see their coins double-spent by others.
You're not going to be able to "effectively" propagate that transaction in 1 second to 7000 nodes with 3 neighbors. You would never have distributed consensus among those nodes. If user's can't get distributed consensus, then they will gravitate toward the subset of node(s) which has(have) the closest thing to it.
Why 1 sec, not 1 min?
Consensus among nodes is not required, it's perpendicular to consensus about ledger state.
I can't comment on the gravitation thing without knowing what reference strategy is being used in your scenario, I know at least one strategy that doesn't lead to fragmentation.
Quote from: Sergio Demian Lerner
As there are no free-rides for transactions, the transaction/rate is limited by existent deployed computing power and electricity cost.
He then goes on to talk about the problems with increasing difficulty on transactions in this system;
Quote from: Sergio Demian Lerner
By time-stamping every transaction, one could dynamically adapt the difficulty of the proof-of-work to achieve more fixed rate. But if the difficulty of a transactions depends on the difficulty of the parent transactions, then there may be incentives to choose old parent transactions instead of new ones to reduce the PoW required, if the current rate is over the fixed rate. Just to be sure Moore's law does [sic] permit spamming in the future, one could embed a re-targeting rule such that every 18 months the difficulty is doubled. It seems preferable that the last M transactions (such as M=10K) of a certain transaction vote on an increase or decrease of the difficulty of the following transactions (with small step changes). Then users could vote more freely on how the network should work without having any immediate benefit to bias voting. This is a similar problem as the current Bitcoin block-chain increase problem: only miners can vote, because user votes are prone to Sybil attacks. In DagCoin, every user can vote, as long as it transact.
I'd like to point out that in DagCoin, it is still only miners that vote. If you're a user that applies work on a transaction and broadcasts it, then you're a miner.
Work is a waste from the perspective of the miners. There is no incentive, or even a method to incentivize miners to do work on transactions in DagCoin. Competition would atrophy hashpower on the network in order to drive up transaction speeds, which is the product that the miner provides, users enjoy, and the only method of remuneration. Mining is just a cost that the miner wants to minimize.
This is just like if we removed the block size limit from Bitcoin and removed the subsidy.
That problem, the lack of funding for difficulty increases in order to slow down transaction speeds, isn't referenced in the white paper unless I missed it. So ultimately to get back to answering your original question "Why 1 sec, not 1 min?" the answer is I don't see any decentralized throttling mechanism that could actually work in DagCoin.
You're not going to be able to "effectively" propagate that transaction in 1 second to 7000 nodes with 3 neighbors. You would never have distributed consensus among those nodes. If user's can't get distributed consensus, then they will gravitate toward the subset of node(s) which has(have) the closest thing to it.
Why 1 sec, not 1 min?
Consensus among nodes is not required, it's perpendicular to consensus about ledger state.
I can't comment on the gravitation thing without knowing what reference strategy is being used in your scenario, I know at least one strategy that doesn't lead to fragmentation.
Looks like we are talking about different DAG-coins. My version of DAG doesn't care about network topology.
We're definitely on different pages here. I don't know anything about this thing of yours.Small world topology with 3 neighbors (this is enough to effectively propagate data) requires to send 3 times of that...
You're not going to be able to "effectively" propagate that transaction in 1 second to 7000 nodes with 3 neighbors. You would never have distributed consensus among those nodes. If user's can't get distributed consensus, then they will gravitate toward the subset of node(s) which has(have) the closest thing to it.I don't see how DagCoin avoids this issue, and I stress that I'm talking about the DagCoin in this thread and not "a DAG coin" in general. Though I'm skeptical of the latter as well..
Looks like we are talking about different DAG-coins. My version of DAG doesn't care about network topology.
Start a different thread, this is for DagCoin the whitepaper.
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