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Topic: Do you think "iamnotback" really has the" Bitcoin killer"? - page 19. (Read 79971 times)

hero member
Activity: 1110
Merit: 534
Neither do I.

There were several forum user warning the developer that this
distribution may not work in long run and is not fair in regard to other users having alt coins
but the majority there was supportive of this type of distribution as they stated that
we are given tokens for free as only thing that we have to do is to link "our" BTC address
so why are "we" complaining about anyway.

The exchanges were exempt from the distribution but other (projects) ICOs like waves, komodo lisk etc..
were allowed to join the distribution.

But if a user does not own BTC that means that he has to buy or "borrow" or make someone to sign an address
on his behalf which I myself tried to do without any success :-/

Anyway developer decided in this way which he has full right to do
so we are where we are and I hope this won't be a burden
for the future development of the byteball system.
sr. member
Activity: 336
Merit: 265
I don't like the Byteball distribution method:

The fundamental reason that giving away tokens without proof-of-burn makes it impossible for that token to compete with Bitcoin:

And realize that the whales' can kill the fork because they already own tokens in both forks from the inception.

And that is what makes it different from launching an altcoin.

The whales of Bitcoin get free tokens to dump on your coin so they can buy Bitcoins.

However in Byteball's case looks like Tony could have made deals with the exchanges to kickback some of the tokens to him in exchange for his scheme. It certainly could be a scam, as @cryptohunter alleged. Who knows? Where there is honey, there are usually flies.
sr. member
Activity: 336
Merit: 265
No replies desired on this. This is just an update for those who are interested in the progress of the project.

I am feeling better on the 2 antibiotics, but I still go through a fair amount of pseudo-delirium (very difficult to explain, not quite delirious but not totally lucid). It is much improved and I am having some very lucid periods, but also I get very exhausted at the latter end of each work day and also I have this "hum" of brain fog that sort of hangs around nearly always.

So do expect lapses of logic and assimilation (even of things I had written before). Not that I wouldn't make errors if totally healthy, but that it is more likely now.

I expect this to continue to improve and especially so when I complete my TB medication in ~14 more weeks. I've completed ~10 weeks of TB medication thus far (first 8 weeks was the intensive 4 drug phase).

My energy level is much improved since I reduced from the 4 drug to 2 drug daily regimen 9 days ago. And my productivity is increasing as a result.

How does someone die from tuberculosis?

Best Answer:  They often died of blood loss ... the infection eroded a blood vessel and they bled to death, which could be spectacularly messy and gory if your plot needs it with blood pouring out of their mouth and nose OR or just a sudden fit of coughing and falling over dead with an internal bleeding.

Another way, less spectacular, was slow suffocation as the lungs became filled with the "tubercules"and the person slowly breathed less and less well and then died. The lack of oxygen was stressful to the heart, and it would just stop.
Source(s):
I'm a microbiologist ...we study this gory stuff.

full member
Activity: 322
Merit: 151
They're tactical
I dont think Nash equilibrium is the same things than byzantine general problem.

Nash equilibrium idea emerge from cold war and reaching stability in bipolar world.

Equilibrium = equi + liber , which describe a system remaining stable by itself without external force applied to it.

In term of newtonian physics a system is at equilibrium when the sum of forces is equal zero and the system remain stable by itself

Like a scale with equal weight on both side remain immobile.

The byzantine general problem is another thing, it's a system to be able to reach a decision between several party to go forward all together in the same plan.

The goal of blockchain is not to reach an equilibrium or point of immobility, it's goal is to constantly make new decision that all participant agree on without requiring a single point of authority.

To me it seems to be a different pb.

In a world in perfect equilibrium,  there is no trading or exchange at all.
legendary
Activity: 3038
Merit: 1660
lose: unfind ... loose: untight
What do you think?

I think the market is merely an aggregate of individuals. I think there is no requirement for each miner's fee vs orphan balance point to equal any others' for the market to create an aggregate equilibrium.

I think several parties would be well served by re-reading 'I, Pencil': https://fee.org/resources/i-pencil-audio-pdf-and-html/?gclid=Cj0KEQjwzd3GBRDks7SYuNHi3JEBEiQAIm6EIwYR2Fs9fOqpwy_2NVN1xOT4S8hBws9q6EnTWxCLAn4aAn8B8P8HAQ
sr. member
Activity: 336
Merit: 265
It's the same pb with plato and athenian liberal democracy vs republic. The former always lead to collusion of interest and the second lead to ethics and putting wisedom and competency at the center of the game. The two are always in opposition.

Interesting analogy. Bitcoin is a republic where knowledge is power and the whale MP took control early on by establishing the MPEx stock and options exchange so that all the speculation in the system was feeding back to him and he was able to aggregate a million "Butts". He also become familiar with all the whales via that business. Heck maybe MPEx is Satoshi or knows who Satoshi is.

Bitcoin isn't a democracy because there is no need to fool the n00bs to buy their vote. The whales (aka economic majority) have the only vote in Satoshi's PoW.

What I try to do in my design is balance the power between the democracy and the republic, so that they keep each other in a stalemate. That doesn't prevent the power-law distribution, nor should it. It hopefully makes the system anti-fragile, thus (hopefully) superior to Satoshi's design. And then I make it (I think) implausible to buy the vote of the n00bs, because there is no voting. The result (hopefully) is the nobody controls it and it obeys its protocol in a Nash equilibrium. My design I think quite clever, but we'll have to see what peer review thinks (hopefully it doesn't stink).
full member
Activity: 149
Merit: 103
But the point was that is not a stable equilibrium because the profits are not accruing proportional to hashrate due to unequal propagation or orphan rates (i.e. wasting more hashrate). Thus over time the hashrate concentrates until there is a 33 - 50% attack and then eventually the cartel can set any block size it wants with a 50% attack.

While it's true that bigger hashrates and better network connectivity might result in centralization (eventually leading to a 33% or 50% concentration), the problem of proportionality isn't specific to the question of unlimited block size or the fee market in general. It also occurs for block rewards (https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/07/11/toward-a-12-second-block-time).

In the short run, I don't see how this problem would affect the equilibrium. It's an expected behaviour of markets that the suppliers don't have the same conditions and cost structure, which is why their individual supply curves all look different. Together they build the market supply, so that an equilibrium can finally be reached.
What makes the present case (unlimited block size vs. tx fees) really different from other markets is not the centralization aspect (economies-of-scale exists in a lot of markets), but the fact that the supply curves are interdependent.

It's a bit like a group of professional fishers who are all fishing in the same lake and selling their fish to the same consumers. The amount of fish produced by any single fisher can contribute to overfishing and diminish the supply of the other fishers as well.
sr. member
Activity: 336
Merit: 265
except for burning seigniorage where it is brilliant

Again, PoW is great for coin creation.  But that's it.

Burning seigniorage (i.e. sending the capital to the electricity costs instead of to any entity involved with the token) doesn't prevent whales from taking a power-law distribution of the money supply. So I fail to see the advantage of having one set of whales or another set of whales.

If the people who take the seigniorage are evangelists and developers of the ecosystem, and if they are sufficient in number, then at least some of your whales are hopefully ardent supporters and not some venomous snakes that appear from the dark shadows of high finance.

OTOH, if the venomous snakes don't want to share the stage with whales who they think are undeserving, they make take their capital else where. So once again whales are back to competing for the other 50% of the wealth which isn't concentrated.

I think it is true though that if the money supply can be distributed competitively then more whales and talented will see it as a level playing field to compete in.

So I think any competitive distribution which doesn't give privilege to any group is acceptable. But even with PoW, it isn't truly competitive because so many people do not know how to mine. So in effect your distribution paradigm is filtering the type of people you want in your ecosystem.

So if you want only geeks, then do a PoW distribution. Maybe geeks are all that matters now and the rest of the world are fodder?

https://urbit.org/docs/about/objections/#-urbit-is-a-total-scamcoin-it-s-100-premined
sr. member
Activity: 336
Merit: 265
I really like the comparison with the n-body problem and now even think that the block size could in fact stabilize around an equilibrium point. It seems that there must be a block size (the central mass) where no individual miner has an incentive to deviate by building smaller or larger blocks.

But the point was that is not a stable equilibrium because the profits are not accruing proportional to hashrate due to unequal propagation or orphan rates (i.e. wasting more hashrate). Thus over time the hashrate concentrates until there is a 33 - 50% attack and then eventually the cartel can set any block size it wants with a 50% attack.

That is why Monero's design also will end up centralized.
hero member
Activity: 770
Merit: 629
The solution to scaling & decentralisation to me would go with making independent subnetwork with good characteristic to assure fair topography on the network,it would probably result a loss of fongibility, but all big world wide network works like this.

That sounds a lot like the (rough) concept I have of a "web of small coins connected by distributed exchanges".


full member
Activity: 322
Merit: 151
They're tactical
The solution to scaling & decentralisation to me would go with making independent subnetwork with good characteristic to assure fair topography on the network,it would probably result a loss of fongibility, but all big world wide network works like this. I dont have detailed design like this, but I think i have most brick for it. The adverse pb of total fongibility is that ironically it cant detect and deal with large number of colluding nodes, and enforce fair network.

Well I would more go that way but maybe it's not good solution.

Wild Block size increase is not viable solution to me, and it doesnt solve decentralisation and scalability.
sr. member
Activity: 336
Merit: 265
Quote from: anonymous

It doesn't really verify their technology in any way (but I listened to the audio with the core dev of Raiden and he sounded competent to me), yet it is the sort of demo that raise confidence of speculators.

It exemplifies why microtransactions are needed.

I would compare what they are doing in that video to the concept of paying for a VPS or Amazon EC instances on a hourly basis. Flexibility comes from being able to scale up supply of resources dynamically rather than paying for everything monthly.
full member
Activity: 149
Merit: 103
As far as I can see, no stable market equilibrium can be reached by all miners at the same time[/b]. For mining market has the peculiarity that whenever a miner increases its own supply, the supply of all the other will decrease. In contrast to regular markets where the players only compete to meet the demand, Bitcoin miners also compete to increase their own supply at the cost of their competitors since total block production remains capped even with unlimited block size.

I posted the problem of unlimited block sizes in another forum and got an interesting response from CubicEarth:

Quote
@alkan You make some good points about how a change in one miner's orphan rate necessarily changes the orphan rates of their competitors. I don't agree, however, with your conclusion that "It will all end up in a doom loop.".

First, regarding the lack of a static equilibrium, it's true that miners will need to continually optimize their blocks in response to ever changing real-world conditions if they are to maximize their profit. This is expected though, and as much is true of any entity involved in production of just about any product. Second, even as a theoretical exercise, if it is fact not a solvable equation, that still doesn't mean there will be a run-away effect. To my reasoning the optimal block size for any given miner may oscillate back and forth around some mean, or collectively it could look something like an n-body orbital simulation, which despite the appearance of some occasional chaos, as a system remains symmetrically anchored around a center of mass, and adheres to the conservation of energy.

In your examples, you make no mention of the mempool demand curve, which is how much each successive unconfirmed transaction is will to pay as a fee per byte. The fees are what the miners are after, and the orphan rate is a concession they make in pursuit of those fees, and is otherwise just something to be minimize. It's simple to think about: why wouldn't A, B and C all produce giant blocks? Well, potentially if there were enough transactions that paid high fees, the blocks could be large, but in the absence of that, any miner could stand to gain an advantage by making their blocks smaller, and having a lower orphan rate.

I really like the comparison with the n-body problem and now even think that the block size could in fact stabilize around an equilibrium point. It seems that there must be a block size (the central mass) where no individual miner has an incentive to deviate by building smaller or larger blocks. This equilibrium wouldn't lie at the intersection of the market demand and supply curves (which cannot be just summed up as in regular economics since they are mutually dependent). Thus the block size chosen by the miners wouldn't directly maximize their revenue as a group but minimize the risk that any individual miner could gain an additional profit by deviating from the block size. I may be wrong on this though.

What do you think?
legendary
Activity: 1316
Merit: 1005
Although reputation can be gamed

Not a WoT. I posit that we can build a (more automated form of a) WoT into OpenShare by default.

, it should still work well for smaller establishments. It would be interesting to find the threshold where a larger business could bury its negative reputation.

A WoT is not gameable by larger establishments either.

What metric(s) would be used increase WoT automation?
sr. member
Activity: 336
Merit: 265
Why the Bitcoin whales must have small blocks. This is very important. Note my solution mentioned at the very end, which is why it is relevant to this thread.
full member
Activity: 322
Merit: 151
They're tactical
I have been reading lot of your post on rust forum & git, I will try to issues some of them, it's so funny how no one thought the same concept I use to have all this things of collections and traits  Grin

I can say in my whole framework there is almost zero compiler defined type. Only for very basics structure, but no high level object is ever defined in the compiler, and modules can still exchange with each other, and they dont share any kind of compile time type déclaration Smiley

Saying this to answer a post I saw you made on rust saying program need to share data type definition, with my system it works without,only members/key name need to be know, and the native type can be determined at run-time, and converted automtically to a requested type without having to declare anything at compile time or knowing the native type.

Can allow to detect directly if a member is even present or not at run-time. Instead of having non initialized/undetermined variable.

It's similar to js with this, when json data is received,  there is no type declaration anywhere, and the program can still access the data based on key name, and the order of the keys doesnt matter, or if there any other key in any order, without having to have shared declaration anywhere.

All this is made with still relatively simple C code Smiley

It's funny reading those post I remember the different thing I tried to get this behavior in C/C++, either with pure virtual variant class, with some c++ template, funktors, tried everything but the ultimate solution in fact is much simpler, just need to forget about compile time order and verification, which are still often not that useful, and focus only on the runtime and runtime checking, which is imo much simpler and safer, and can allow for plenty of runtime check on everything, and can cop with dynamic typing and run time type definition.

The more it goes, the more i think all this trend with programming paradigm based on strict compile time defined type create more problem than it solve all together, and compiler are never able to deal with the true complex cases anyway. If you sum up the kind of situation compiler can solve with compile time type checking, to me it's mostly simple mistake, and I do think there is a whole generation of programmers traumatised from assembly programming and cheap cast trick in C that they obnubilated to conforming to high level language synthaxe , having often not that much clue of the real problematic involved, and just stick to synthaxe definition and compile time check, which in fact only solve minor mistake or trouble coming from assembler programming.



I already solved the shape collection issue with the raytracer Smiley it doesnt even need any compiler defined type Smiley

Now I think either there is a massive pb I dont get with my system, either i feel people are really looking elat the problem coming from wrong paradigm Smiley

Looking back at those threads, im remembering all the nightmare in compiled languages with dynamic typing, I really wonder why no one seem to have followed the same road than me lol

It just works so well for everything from usb drivers to blockchain rpc server, with simple standalone C code, I really wonder why such system hasnt Been tried before.

All a function need is a pointer as arg, and it can check all the type, and members, members of members, and test the presence of any without any prior declaration of the type for the compiler. The data can come from anywhere from hell to heaven, the function will never crash and be able to get the data from the member it need, and check the presence of the member, and return failure if the data is not what the function expect, in any case, there is very little chance of crash of access to wrong memory address, even if the function has no idea where the data come from and there is zero tacit coupling at all between the caller and callee.

I guess it's not silver bullet for everything, but normally it take very dumb programming to make a crash or memory leak with it, and it's only pure C89 code. With a layer on top of it, it would probably be even better, but in the same time I think also most complex part of the app are going to js and html5, so not sure it's really worthy to have another high level scripting language, or for having 100% standalone app who doesnt require a js browser or node.js.



sr. member
Activity: 336
Merit: 265
Well my understanding of the Bitcoin situation has changed significantly in the past couple of hours.
full member
Activity: 130
Merit: 109
He seems like a good guy to me, I Iamnotback does have it.  Though, you can never be sure in the crypto world.

sr. member
Activity: 336
Merit: 265

Are there any speculators gullible enough to believe that I really have clones of myself?  Undecided (not accusing @HCLivess of such)

Satoshi designed the system to be immutable (or die, i.e. a poison pill protection).

...

Appears to me that Satoshi wanted Bitcoin to either be replaced by something better or die.
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