Topic: Do you think "iamnotback" really has the" Bitcoin killer"? - page 43. (Read 79971 times)

OP I would very much appreciate if you'd lock the thread.

Okay I will try to get out of here. Have fun with this.

Well they banned me because they don't want to hear the truth that bonded validators can't ever work (not in Casper, Tendermint, Cosmos, or any other).

Any way, here is what I was going to post there next:


P.S. What is this with open source projects banning those who want to report fatal flaws? Censorship is the antithesis of open source.

Yes I can. It is a fundamental taxonomy of possible workarounds to the FLP impossibility result. Read my whitepaper when it is released (although I don't think you will understand it but it is written to be comprehensible for those with reasonable analytical skills).

What @jaekwon (Cosmos/Tendermint) and others may not realize is that the fundamental limitations of Byzantine agreement can't be structured around with protocol. It is a fundamental limitation (due to physics of asynchrony). So they can obfuscate as much as they want with heapings of protocol complexity, so as to hide the fundamentals from themselves. But I understand the essence of genius.

So Casper is hiding the bonding collateral in the notion of betting from collateral, but they won't escape from the fundamental limitation which is that blame can't be objective (it is always ambiguous) in Byzantine agreement. The only alternative to Byzantine agreement is probabilitistic, asymptotic (e.g. PoW and my design which is not PoW but something new). But probabilitistic, asymptotic can't assign blame to malfeasance either (for example you can't prove that Bitcoin miners are censoring transactions from blockchain data objectively, you need external social information which is not objective).

I will double-check my logic on this again when I do the comprehensive re-read of my paper. Will report back here, if I find any flaw in my analysis.

I engage others in debate as I did with @jaekwon but he just banned me and shut down the Github issue when he decided he didn't want to let me explain further how his project is broken and can't be fixed. He expect me to unravel the obfuscation they have done with protocol and that is not my job. I already understand the fundamental reason blame is impossible. It is their job to find out how they obfuscated this fundamental in their understanding of their design. Or later I can take the time to write or hire someone to write a formal refutation of their Proof of Accountability. Why should I encourage them to stop working on their project and wasting their time? Much better for me to have one less potential competitor and not to lose my precious time doing their work for them. At the right time, we can make it 100% proven that their projects are a total failure. And that will best done when my project is already released. Don't wake up a sleeping dog prematurely.

Proof of Fork Accountability

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As a corollary, when there is a fork, an external process can determine the blame by requiring each validator to justify all of its round votes. Either we will find 1/3+ who cannot justify at least one of their votes, and/or, we will find 1/3+ who had double-signed.

1.2 Byzantine Agreement

The proof of the non-asymptotic form of BFT is intuitive in the example scenario where every node is a voter and each candidate blockchain block is an election epoch. If every vote is correct, BFT only applies to faults which are unresponsive nodes; thus a quorum of only a majority of votes is required to obtain an unambiguous result because any ordering of blocks is always non-conflicting (or equivalently if the coordination of voting is synchronized such that conflicting order can’t exist, but then BFT isn’t applicable per the ^* footnote of prior section). For example, if validators of transactions never vote for a conflicting transaction such as a double-spend, then given two attempted elections for a pair of consecutive blocks of transactions, the minimum number of voters which commit to both elections is fₛ = 2T - N - 1, where T is the minimum quorum size for each election. Thus T ≥ (N + 1)/2 where 2T - N - 1 ≥ 0 because 0 safety is required given every vote is non-conflicting. But in the Byzantine agreement case wherein malevolent^† and/or asynchronous (i.e. caused by random, ambiguous propagation ordering) validators can vote for blocks that contain conflicting transactions, the minimum number of voters which commit to both elections fₛ = 2T - N - 1 must be greater than the number of excess voters not needed to form a quorum fₗ = N - T, so that a quorum for a conflicting pair of blocks can’t exist because there aren’t enough uncommitted voters to vote for it, i.e. T ≥ N - fₛ.^{[^Tendermint-safety]}  Thus T ≥ (2N + 1)/3 where 2T - N - 1 ≥ N - T, fₛ is the safety margin, and fₗ is liveness.^{[^BFT-derivation]} This result which is mathematically equivalent to N = 3f + 1 where f = fₛ = fₗ, is analogous to the N = 3m + 1 generals for m traitors result for the Byzantine Generals Problem (aka “BGP”).^{[^BGP]}

Liveness fₗ in this context is the maximum number of unresponsive and/or malevolent nodes allowed for the system to not stall all quorums and/or censor for which blocks quorums are allowed. Safety margin fₛ is the minimum number of voters which must commit to a pair of blocks to prevent ambiguous ordering of blocks. Even if only a single election would ever be held for a set of signing keys which represent the voters,  applies in any nonsynchronous (aka “asynchronous”) case when there isn’t trust of a designated centralized tally, because voters can irrefutably claim that an epoch expired and they signed a new vote for a new epoch. It is even irrefutable that a trusted centralized tally did not receive a vote.^{[^he-said-she-said] [^ambiguous-fault]}

Some systems may opt for more safety margin at the detriment of reduced liveness by choosing a larger minimum quorum size T.^{[^BFT-derivation]}

Marbles in Jars Example

The proof in the Byzantine agreement case is easy to visualize with 3 voters who can each vote with marbles of one color representing their signing key: red, white, and blue. Given 3 jars representing ballot boxes for 3 elections on the consensus ordering of any two of them (wherein the jars could represent blockchain blocks), two marbles can be placed in each jar without any color voting more than twice― i.e. no voter has cheated yet the consensus is ambiguous. Declaring any of the jars as the first, results in two choices (aka “forks”) for which jar is the next. One jar has red and white, another red and blue, and another white and blue. This is why the proof requires that the excess of the quorum be less than ¹/₃ (aka “-¹/₃”). So by adding a voter with green marbles so that smallest minority reduces from ¹/₃ to ¹/₄ which is thus -¹/₃, the ambiguity is resolved because the green marble can only be placed in 2 of the 3 jars― again presuming no voter cheated to vote more than twice. Thus +²/₃ instead of ¹/₂+ is required for quorums in the presence of possible malevolence (and/or honest ambiguity due to random propagation delays) given an asynchronous network, otherwise the ordering of the quorums can’t be proven.

Note if any 3 of the 4 marbles are colluding, i.e. ²/₃ or more (aka “+²/₃”) of the voters are malevolent, they can vote for as many conflicting quorums (forks) as they wish and it will be ambiguous which of the 4 marbles is cheating, because given 3 sets of 3 jars, a different one of the 3 cheaters can vote in each set. And the honest voter has to vote on the fork which the quorum is extending, because otherwise not voting is indistinguishable from unresponsive. It can’t be irrefutably proven that the 3 malevolent marbles were cheating and colluding because they can each claim that other one became unresponsive; thus voting for more than two quorums became necessary. And the honest marble voted more than twice also. Propagation order and responsiveness can’t be proven nor disproven in an asynchronous network.

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† _{The adjectives “malevolent” or “attacking” applied to nodes means a colluding or centralized controlled group of nodes.}

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[^Tendermint-safety]  _{Jae Kwon, Ethan Buchman. Tendermint Wiki, Tendermint Github project, §Byzantine Consensus Algorithm: Proof of Safety, Jun 18, 2014.}

[^BFT-derivation] _{David Mazieres. The Stellar Consensus Protocol: A Federated Model for Internet-level Consensus. Stellar Development Foundation, §5.4.3. Comparison to centralized voting, Feb 25, 2016.}

[^BGP] _{Leslie Lamport, Robert Shostak, and Marshall Pease. The Byzantine Generals Problem. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, Vol. 4, No. 3, , pp. 382–401, July 1982. Mark Nelson. The Byzantine Generals Problem. Dr. Dobb’s (drdobbs.com), Mar 18, 2008.}

[^he-said-she-said] _{Andreas Haeberlen, Petr Kuznetsov, and Peter Druschel. Practical Accountability for Distributed Systems. Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on Future Directions in Distributed Computing (FuDiCo III), Bertinoro, Italy, §2.2 Proofs and verifiable evidence, p. 2, June 2007.}

[^ambiguous-fault] _{Shelby Moore III, Unprovable accountability for network communication, Bitcointalk.org, “Transactions as Proof of Stake White Paper” thread, post #19, Dec 4, 2013.}

That said, in a rigid set of rules, *whatever they are*, centralisation will happen, no matter what system of rules is used, because of economies of scale, and because of divergence of any formula which has something at stake.

The only solution to avoid centralisation, is regular "rule revolutions".

We need to be a little realistic here.  How long did it take Ethereum to go from concept to release? A couple years? That was with a shitload of help. Even now, eth is still flawed.

So, one man alone has a monumental task ahead to deliver something truly revolutionary.  iamnotback might be bat shit crazy enough to pull it off.

Because you said what I wrote was "stupid"― which is hostile and quick judgement. That is a strong word to use against someone who is not stupid. What you do you think Satoshi would have done had you said he wrote something stupid? He would have roasted you, the same as he did to Daniel Larimer (the developer of Bitshares and Steem).

Discussion can be cordial or violent. You decide. I have no problem with cordial debate.

It doesn't mean I am infallible. I even have made some careless decisions in my life in my youth which can be characterized as stupid. But I don't think I often (if ever) have written stupid comments on serious topics on this forum. Some may totally disagree with my position (and that can often be to lack of understanding of each sides' views), but that doesn't mean it is proven that I wrote something stupid.

No idea who is this person.

But I know dev of WBB/1EX will be bringing the best option for btc killer in 2017  

The problem with proposing centralization as a solution, is it simply doesn't scale in terms of ecosystems, for the same reason that closed source doesn't scale but open source does.

I don't think so : an altcoin, whatever his technology may be will never defeat Bitcoin, because to elect the best crypto-currency, we look at how many people use it. No altcoin will ever surpass Bitcoin because the average people absolutely don't care about the internal problems, and I do not see any internal problem as of today. The branding is whatever matters the most, and good luck defeating Bitcoin's branding ! Most of the people that know some economical things knew about Bitcoin, but absolutely none about things like Ethereum or Litecoin. Good luck releasing something that beats Bitcoin on all the points, which is basically impossible if you conduct an IPO or an ICO.

So your coin will use PoS?

I was referring to Jim Rickards' prediction that the elite will shut down the financial system for a period of time. I am saying that if that period of time is of sufficient duration that BTC can't be exchanged for fiat to pay for electricity, then mining farms have to shut down.

If the world is in such a chaos that the entire world financial system can be shut down and no one can move any fiat for some period of time, then proof-of-work miners can also be affected because they have bills to pay.

Whereas, a proof-of-stake system would not be so affected because it doesn't require consumption of an external resource. We might argue that such chaos would also shut down the entire Internet, but I tend to think the Internet is much more global, resilient and diverse than a few mining farms in China.

So please enlighten us as to which of us is stupid?

bathrobehero, are you challenging me to an intellectual contest? Do you really think you can challenge me intellectually?

so potential prostate problems in the future then......