Topic: [ESHOP launched] Trezor: Bitcoin hardware wallet - page 262. (Read 965789 times)

Yup
Actually I think even my XP machine does this (although I might have turned autorun off in the registry anyway).

Is autorun still on by default on some machines?

Since upgrading from XP to Win7 I notice that autorun is no longer on by default. Inserting a disk or drive with autorun will bring up the box that asks you what you want to do (browse files, run autorun, etc) but does not launch anything without your command.

Regards to my previous post, users should even refuse offers like "bitcoin token with USB mouse as a free gift" ;-).

It can be turned off, it can be bypassed by the Shift key (afaik), but tell me who is doing this. My mum even don't know there's autorun possibility :-/.

Although we're targeting to common users which are using potentially compromited machines, using hacked token definitely *is* a problem. Distributor can expect that somebody who's buying bitcoin wallet will handle significant bitcoin amounts on that machine. Using trusted distributor is definitely the only way to go.

I'm not a windows user, but can't one just turn this off completely?

Is it still the case that if you hold down the shift key whilst plugging in a USB that no autorun stuff will occur (in Windows)?

I've been thinking about such boxes after I've been hacked on Linode. It may be standard computer with minimal linux distro and custom software with extremely limited interface to the rest of the world and with possibility to define own rulesets will make attacks much harder. At this stage we're working on standard wallet which hopefully fit needs of the most users, but later we can think about other related projects as well...

Yes, this may be possible issue. Malicious distributor can buy few devices, make alternative PCB, use modified firmware and pack it with "official" casings. There's just a small chance that customers will notice the difference. Buying the device from trusted distributor would be better choice than ordering it from random guy on Silk Road.

Technically this is not a big problem as device itself cannot communicate with the world on its own. So as far as user will connect that hacked stick into official release of Bitcoin wallet (Electrum, Multibit), the chance of a theft is minimal (as far as official clients will cross check signed transaction if it has not been modified by the stick itself).

By the way, there has been successful hacks with modified USB mouses (given to company employees as a gift). Mouse acting as mass device with autorun file and 90% of Windows users are screwed. This is a problem of "universal serial bus", unfortunately using USB is the only reasonable choice if we target to common users.

That's also the reason why we're building Raspberry Pi shield for hardcore geeks; it is much easier to recompile everything from sources to be sure there isn't any malicious code.

Great project!
It doesn't matter much if it'll be ellet, bitcoincard or 'popsicle', but we surely can use a tiny, secure, easy [cheap? choose three out of four] Bitcoin wallet for the average user! At least as an alternative to smartphone wallets, which I won't fully trust ever.

I had similar plans, for a Bitcoin "vault". It was more aimed at companies, for automatic tx signing. With focus on hardware security (IDS, heartbeat, key purging etc). Heavy use of PKI. With a custom ruleset for automatic signing, manual approval and selfdestruction.
I didn't work on it lately, the current state is a concept on paper.

Interested in a "corporate version"? I bet a lot of the hardware and software could be used for both!

Ente

How can we be sure that some reseller isn't slipping us a modified version and what could he potentially do with that approach?

I understand that the hardware itself may be very useful for other applications as well. So for now I see this quite possible. However, as you said, the casing should be modified somehow, so it won't look like official product.

I'll buy quite a few if you sell a version in which the reprogramming fuse has not been blown out.  I need a device like this for GPG signing and other non-Bitcoin cryptography.

Feel free to charge more for the reprogrammable version and emblazon it with a "firmware not certified by manufacturer"; I'm sure those of us who want this don't mind.

This is the kind of attitude that really is great to see. 

Would have been nice if you made a post a few weeks ago.

I'm a few weeks away from having an actual PCB!
Do you have anyone working on a PCB?
Might as well group our efforts. Like you, it is meant to be open source.
We are all on the same team.

After reading this, I just thought of the name Popsicle

1) its slush (ice) on a stick
2) its a tiny device that connects to USB sticks
3) you get the cold storage connotation from the name

slush, stick: I think you got it exactly right

haha, well.. if one day bitcoin becomes as widely known as gold, you could certainly expect burglars to attempt to force people to give their bitcoins.
But yeah, there's quite some time until that happens.


Never mind, I hadn't yet read that it will not have a keyboard when I first wrote that.


Definitely. One step at a time.

Actually this solves (at least partially) the problem with wallet distribution. With easy option for reflashing the device, wallet distributor would modify the firmware and make there some backdoor quite easily... ...although the real attack would be still pretty difficult, as user would need to have also compromised machine which will misuse that modified token.


Both digital wallet and paper backup have different purpose. Having paper backup is the easiest way for disaster recovery for *all* people. More skilled people can choose how they store the "paper backup", if they store it just in envelope into their safe or if they underline these words in their favourite book in their home library, put it into encrypted file to Google docs, memorize it or so. Actually forcing people to do electronic backup is the limitation for many people. Having the easy possibility to export seed directly from the device and not over (potentially hacked) computer is bulletproof and far simplest to understand for everybody.


We're targeting to common users, not mafia.


As I said, displaying the seed on the device during the initialization is the most easier and flexible solution. Do whatever you want and whatever fits your needs with it. Actually "paper backup" or "mnemonic seed" is considered as the most safe way of storing bitcoins, so I'm a bit surprised that you're trying to said that it's not safe enough :-).


This is chicken and egg problem. If you already have secure machine, why do you need to export already encrypted backup to it? If this computer is not *so* secured, how you can put passphrase over it?


At this date, there have been many of successful hacker attacks (I personally lost 3100 BTC during that one), but not a single known issue of $5 wreck attack against bitcoin wallet owner. Let's do solve real issues and don't try to solve something what's not the real problem.


You cannot expect that other people are like you. No, young people don't backup more often than old people. I bet the exact oposite, from what I see around me.


This goes completely against the initial idea, to have simple, small and cheap device. And there's no major improvement while having physical keyboard on the device. Use it for encrypting the initial backup won't justify it...

IMHO, an impossible to re-flash hardware is much more "security freakishness" than password-protected files...

And, why making an impossible to re-flash or read keys hardware if the whole wallet will likely be stored unencrypted on paper in the same physical building than the device? Somebody with physical access to the device will likely have physical access to the paper backup.

Finally, if you don't consider encrypting the keys in the device, then you're not considering plausible deniability. Somebody willing to physically steal the device is much more likely to simply physically force the user to give him the money ($5 wrench attack). If you don't have multiple encrypted volumes, and you're not some sort of Rambo capable of counter-attack in meatspace, then you lose.


I know. I just think it'd be nice if everybody could easily have the option of having the same level of safety and security as well, including people who don't know what the heck a "live distro" is.


Pardon my ignorance, but why does it need to be initialized on an unsecured machine?


PS; Please don't take what I say here as bashing criticism. Even if this device is not "physically safe/secure" at all, it would still be awesome as a protection against hackers, which are the real danger most bitcoin users face today - and will remain the sole sensible danger for years. So, just want to make sure you understand I fully support your initiative either way. I'd just like it more if it had these encryption features, that's all.


EDIT: Sorry, I had not seen the previous message:


Again I respectfully disagree. Most young people at least would likely find it easier to store things on their google accounts than to physically store paper in an organized and safe manner. But anyway, that's now pointless, since...


If that's the case, then yeah, there's no way to encrypt things on the device.

Even small keybords like those in some cellphones are that expensive? I'm really ignorant on this.


If it's cheap enough, different people could have their different devices anyway. It's definitely not a showstopper not to be multiuser.

We're targeting to average users, for common usage. But security freaks are free to boot live distro from trusted source, write down the seed to text file, encrypt that and do with it whatever they want. Actually if you know what you're doing, you'll make encrypted backup of the seed in less than 10 minutes.

However, as I said, it is almost impossible to encrypt the seed while initializing the device on untrusted machine, so encrypting seed during this process would be false promise.