@foundationdvcs, Passport uses Avalanche diode as a source for its TRNG.
In this regard, I'm curious to know if this diode is in continuous operation so that SEED is generated exclusively from entropy it provided or Avalanche's noise is used to generate initial entropy that subsequently feeds BRNG with relevant SEED being generated?
Here is a quote from our CTO, Ken, on the question you raised here:
Will get back to you ASAP, just getting caught up on this thread after a crazy week for the company!
Could you also share with us how was this week for you? If I were to guess this surely has to be one of the best periods of Foundation ever since the creation of the company, or am I wrong saying this? The price reduction just in time to reap the burning house that was/is Ledger has had to be a wombo-combo for your company (and rightfully so).
Oh my, by far the craziest week in the history of the company! Not only did we have the biggest firmware and software releases yet planned (Envoy full mobile wallet and Passport v2.1.0 with Key Manager and much more), but the price drop perfectly coincided with Ledger's fiasco and made for a powerful duo. We sold 6wks worth of units in 36h, if that tells you anything, and the rush has barely slowed down even after going out of stock due to the craziness.
Fantastic to see people rushing to safety in truly open-source software and hardware and finally understanding the risks inherent with introducing trust back into the system with closed-source code.
Hey @foundationdvcs I just realized your last professional security audit was in [1] Q2 2021. Are there any plans for a fresh one any time soon? Maybe you could also try to get the WalletScrutiny guys to re-run their script which checks the latest firmware version for reproducibility.
I also believe that the audit you got was purely a software review and didn't actually attempt to execute the attacks they describe. That's especially evident from your response where you were able to refute many of the 'potential risks' that they had claimed existed.
Nevertheless, the audit also seems to only have covered the FE branch of the Passport firmware, and I know how much code changed from FE to Batch 2. So I do believe a new audit would be good, maybe this time from someone who also actually tries to exploit what he believes could be vulnerabilities.
[1]
https://foundationdevices.com/security/As of now there are no plans to do another security audit on the current code-base, but we will absolutely be having an audit done on the next device we're working on now, as that will be a complete rewrite from the ground up. I will, however, prompt the Wallet Scrutiny guys again to try and get them to update their tests as our code is absolutely still reproducible so I'd love to have their tests inline with our current codebase/version.
I'll re-raise the idea of an audit on the current code-base internally, though, and report back here if that changes at all.