I am not even sure that the current transactions being pushed to the network is even part of the so-called stress test:
There are a large number of no/low fee transactions in the current mempool. As of recently, there were only around .2 BTC worth of tx fees in the mempool, but still thousands of unconfirmed transactions (over 10k) and a mempool size of well over 10 MegaBites.
It also appears that the brainwallet for cat has been flooded with no fee transactions; the private key with "cat" is 5JiznUZskJpwodP3SR85vx5JKeopA3QpTK63BuziW8RmGGyJg81 which translates to a public key of 04a45ebc40f95cc06ef93a5f5e9daa22774a5c9a120ac14d87c328b44c1158f81cddd109246a4d8 bff5f93cbba79a17f2dc6e7c73da8d6bd0d98615d1bf353f8be which translates to an address of 162TRPRZvdgLVNksMoMyGJsYBfYtB4Q8tM)
Topic: Next level Bitcoin stress test -- June 29-30 13:00 GMT 2015 - page 7. (Read 16077 times)
Wow this is a very cool initiative, I heard it worked very good, even better as planned. 
It's planned good, but i just wonder when will this finished. It makes delay in tx.
Wow this is a very cool initiative, I heard it worked very good, even better as planned.
Still an unanswered question is: Who is behind it. Cui bono.
coinwallet.eu wants to store and trade Bitcoins. Well. They have set up a virtual office. The company Coinwallet does not exist in GB. They promote their services and claim that they don't need to know their customers identity. So it is obviously not a British firm, otherwise, they would implement KYC, AML and CTF-policies.
So who would entrust an entity his coins without knowing anything about them? This sounds like a total scam.
Interesting, thoug, that coinwallet claims to be partnering with Multibit. Maybe they can shed some light on it?
I, as a miner, consider this "stress test" being a ddos-attack. Never mind what "results" they may present. And what they have presented until now isn't really useful.
coinwallet.eu wants to store and trade Bitcoins. Well. They have set up a virtual office. The company Coinwallet does not exist in GB. They promote their services and claim that they don't need to know their customers identity. So it is obviously not a British firm, otherwise, they would implement KYC, AML and CTF-policies.
So who would entrust an entity his coins without knowing anything about them? This sounds like a total scam.
Interesting, thoug, that coinwallet claims to be partnering with Multibit. Maybe they can shed some light on it?
I, as a miner, consider this "stress test" being a ddos-attack. Never mind what "results" they may present. And what they have presented until now isn't really useful.
Few people are having issue about blockchain tx. confirming, how long will this take?
How about all other miners refuse to include transactions from Eligius' payout address. Since addresses are not people that should really not be an issue, right?
First, there is no "from" address on a transaction. This is a pretty big misconception that is spread around. So no one, including Eligius, refuses to include transactions based on it being "from" an address.
Second, Eligius's payouts are generated payouts in the coinbase transaction, which is mined when a block is mined. No node even sees this transaction until it appears in an Eligius block (except the miners who are mining for Eligius).
*sigh* The amount of misinformation in this thread is staggering.
How about all other miners refuse to include transactions from Eligius' payout address. Since addresses are not people that should really not be an issue, right?
I've been keeping an eye on Eligius's memory pool (which doesn't contain the attacker's transactions) as other pools find blocks and for the most part it is cleared each time, which means that most legitimate transactions are being mined regardless of this DoS attack. Good for bitcoin. 
It appears BTC China is filtering the spam, also, as it doesn't appear to be showing up in their recent few blocks. Good for them.
As for Eligius, I feel the need to point out that Eligius's normal spam filtering is public for the most part, with the exception of the portions added recently that combat this specific attack (which would be silly to release during the attack and let the attackers work around it). Suffice it to say, as I mentioned before, the attacker's transactions are very easy to spot and thus very easy to filter. Admittedly, I'm kind of surprised that the attack is so simple to filter out. Leads to questions about the attacker's actual knowledge about bitcoin, or more specifically the lack thereof...
Thanks for this.
It appears BTC China is filtering the spam, also, as it doesn't appear to be showing up in their recent few blocks. Good for them.
As for Eligius, I feel the need to point out that Eligius's normal spam filtering is public for the most part, with the exception of the portions added recently that combat this specific attack (which would be silly to release during the attack and let the attackers work around it). Suffice it to say, as I mentioned before, the attacker's transactions are very easy to spot and thus very easy to filter. Admittedly, I'm kind of surprised that the attack is so simple to filter out. Leads to questions about the attacker's actual knowledge about bitcoin, or more specifically the lack thereof...
Thankfully Eligius pool is working against the DOS attack and that fact is encouraging, that at least some miners are willing to prioritize transactions based on something other then pure fee---in this case, the Eligius miners are standing up for the small guy and regular users who are being disrupted by this "experiment".
I moved my C1 to Eligius, and will keep it there until the DoS attack is over. Mining to their donation address, because I think their anti DoS measures should be rewarded.Thanks for this.
Thankfully Eligius pool is working against the DOS attack and that fact is encouraging, that at least some miners are willing to prioritize transactions based on something other then pure fee---in this case, the Eligius miners are standing up for the small guy and regular users who are being disrupted by this "experiment".
I moved my C1 to Eligius, and will keep it there until the DoS attack is over. Mining to their donation address, because I think their anti DoS measures should be rewarded. 
1 BTC transaction from OKCoin to Bitfinex with a fee of 0.0001 got through in the block that took ~48 minutes to be found, I made the transfer ~10 minutes before it was found.
Are you saying that all miners are blacklisting addresses? That's news to me and I'm sure other bitcoiners as well.
Blacklisting is by definition about people, and no miner has ever attempted that to my knowledge.Addresses are not people, and do not even exist in the Bitcoin protocol. Instead, they are converted into scripts.
Bitcoin Core has filtered what scripts it will relay or mine since Satoshi Nakamoto himself added filtering in 0.3.18 (2010 Dec 8th).
To disable this, you must use (or rewrite) patches that I have maintained almost as long as I have been involved in Bitcoin.
As far as I know, however, not a single miner is currently mining without any script filtering whatsoever.
Eligius is treating certain inputs differently then other inputs. Plain and simple. They are saying that Bitcoin owned by one entity is not allowed to have their transactions confirmed by their found blocks.
This is not the first time that eligius (via Luke-jr) has done something similar to harm Bitcoin. Gambling sites were previously blacklisted by default by mining software when this was pretty clearly not a wanted "feature" of such software. In other words the software did things that its users did not want. This is how a lot of people describe malware.
This is 100% false/FUD/lies. This is not the first time that eligius (via Luke-jr) has done something similar to harm Bitcoin. Gambling sites were previously blacklisted by default by mining software when this was pretty clearly not a wanted "feature" of such software. In other words the software did things that its users did not want. This is how a lot of people describe malware.
So what you are saying is you don't actually know how they are filtering, but have decided to comment that it is correct, fine, and easy to do.
If I knew, I wouldn't tell. For obvious reasons.Quote
All that I was saying is that they should not filter coins, addresses, servers, nodes,ip and etc, IMO.
Spam filters can have many configurations. Filtering IP addresses would be pointless in this case. Filtering addresses is generally pointless as well. You can have an unlimited number of addresses.Quote
BTW, the attacker, if wanting to take down the network, would keep increasing transaction amount and fees to circumvent the "filtering".
The intention is not to harm, in theory. This isn't an attacker, but most likely a tester or spammer. IMO.
The attacker obviously doesn't have the funds to circumvent the filtering. Of course the intention is to harm. You don't wage a DoS attack if you don't intend to harm. The intention is not to harm, in theory. This isn't an attacker, but most likely a tester or spammer. IMO.
Mempool at 21Mb. Has it ever been this high?
Meanwhile transactions per second have sharply decreased again
Meanwhile transactions per second have sharply decreased again
(snip)
(TLDR) Long amount of bullshit claiming to be "testing" things which anybody with a functional brain could tell you about without having to do anything.
(TLDR) Long amount of bullshit claiming to be "testing" things which anybody with a functional brain could tell you about without having to do anything.
Mempool at 20.5Mb. Is this the highest it has ever been?
This test is getting exciting again!
This test is getting exciting again!
Maybe you can answer my question and stop tap dancing around.
Is your "filter" filtering based on transaction sizes and not miner fees?
And if so, are all transactions at or around that chosen number being excluded, including non-attacker txs?
I don't have a filter, but I can easily see the malicious DoS transactions are all of two different forms, making them very easy to filter. No need to check transactions sizes or fees. Don't expect Eligius to reveal the exact filter, since this will enable the attacker to circumvent it.Is your "filter" filtering based on transaction sizes and not miner fees?
And if so, are all transactions at or around that chosen number being excluded, including non-attacker txs?
So what you are saying is you don't actually know how they are filtering, but have decided to comment that it is correct, fine, and easy to do.
All that I was saying is that they should not filter coins, addresses, servers, nodes,ip and etc, IMO.
BTW, the attacker, if wanting to take down the network, would keep increasing transaction amount and fees to circumvent the "filtering".
The intention is not to harm, in theory. This isn't an attacker, but most likely a tester or spammer. IMO.
The mempool is at 19.5Mb! Has it ever been that high?
Maybe you can answer my question and stop tap dancing around.
Is your "filter" filtering based on transaction sizes and not miner fees?
And if so, are all transactions at or around that chosen number being excluded, including non-attacker txs?
I don't have a filter, but I can easily see the malicious DoS transactions are all of two different forms, making them very easy to filter. No need to check transactions sizes or fees. Don't expect Eligius to reveal the exact filter, since this will enable the attacker to circumvent it. Is your "filter" filtering based on transaction sizes and not miner fees?
And if so, are all transactions at or around that chosen number being excluded, including non-attacker txs?
Well I don't see how it could determine who the attacker is without some reference point, such as address, ip, node, or etc.
You can't spot the spam transactions yourself? Get … eyes. No, you don't need to know who it is to block the transactions.Here is my original quote, that you then took part of, and responded to.
Well I don't see how it could determine who the attacker is without some reference point, such as address, ip, node, or etc.
If you are just rejecting all transactions below a certain miner fee and not including in a block, then I have no problem, in theory.
I'm only against outright blacklisting/whitelisting of addresses/coins/etc that will ultimately lead to Bitcoin/bitcoin's destruction.
If you are just rejecting all transactions below a certain miner fee and not including in a block, then I have no problem, in theory.
I'm only against outright blacklisting/whitelisting of addresses/coins/etc that will ultimately lead to Bitcoin/bitcoin's destruction.
Maybe you can answer my question and stop tap dancing around.
Is your "filter" filtering based on transaction sizes and not miner fees?
And if so, are all transactions at or around that chosen number being excluded, including non-attacker txs?
Because my understanding was that the attacker's txs are being excluded, not all below a chosen limit.
I just registered to tell you that my bitstamp withdrawal has been stuck for 8 hours because of these "stress tests"
I have now missed making my mortgage payment because of this. Thanks... I'm already completely broke and struggling to feed my family. Now I have more bank charges and lost value from today's peak.
Way to hit the small guys.
My last 4 BTC.
I have now missed making my mortgage payment because of this. Thanks... I'm already completely broke and struggling to feed my family. Now I have more bank charges and lost value from today's peak.
Way to hit the small guys.
My last 4 BTC.
This is the biggest consequence to my mind of these stress-tests. Average guys who didn't hear about it beforehand having to wait days for transactions to confirm. I know that the dudes who are "stress-testing" say they're proving some important point, but the collateral damage, in my opinion, is too great just to confirm conclusions that we already knew.
Thankfully Eligius pool is working against the DOS attack and that fact is encouraging, that at least some miners are willing to prioritize transactions based on something other then pure fee---in this case, the Eligius miners are standing up for the small guy and regular users who are being disrupted by this "experiment".
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