Anoncoin - Tor - Enclave's ?
P2P via Tor is far from perfect and in fact isn't really recommended as the Tor software is not really designed for such usage and is also known to leak certain identifiers. Furthermore, Tor hidden services are known to provide much better anonymity for users than for their operators.
I've been giving thought as to how it might be possible to increase Anoncoin connectivity with Tor whilst actually helping the Tor network, instead of slightly hindering it.
This concept is for an enclave of Anoncoin nodes running hidden services as relays / exit nodes with custom settings to potentially increase the privacy of Anoncoin Tor users. An Anoncoin mesh network within the Tor Network if you like.
Howto: Tor config. - dedicated Relay options (See:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en - Tor Manual):
ORPort 9377 - Optional - identifiable as Anoncoin.
LongLivedPorts 9377 - port addition to help connectivity.
"A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node will go down before the stream is finished. Note that the list is also honored for circuits (both client and service side) involving hidden services whose virtual port is in this list. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6523, 6667, 6697, 8300)"
AllowSingleHopCircuits 1
"When this option is set, the attached Tor controller can use relays that have the AllowSingleHopExits option turned on to build one-hop Tor connections. (Default: 0)"
ExcludeSingleHopRelays 0
"This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option, so using these relays might make your client stand out. (Default: 1)"
EnforceDistinctSubnets 0
"If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in the same /16 range. (Default: 1)"
As per.
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.3324942 -
How to run Anoncoin as a Tor hidden service?Anoncoin hidden service relays could now have improved connectivity with one another (and with Anoncoin Tor clients) utilizing reciprocal one-hop connections.
Some collaboration on the part of Anoncoin hidden service operators and/or batches of hidden services nodes running 'my family' or groups of .onion addnodes is required with each node incorporating lists of known / shared / published addnode .onion addresses.
When a full list of running hidden service .onion addresses has been established - client only Tor users can connect more easily with onlynet=tor tor=127.0.0.1:9050 (as per. What/Howto Tor) in the Anoncoin .conf also using maxconnections=8 (example) to help prevent unecessary traffic errors through Tor.
Tor Exit Relays should also use:
AllowSingleHopExits 1
This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is the only hop in the circuit. Note that most clients will refuse to use servers that set this option, since most clients have ExcludeSingleHopRelays set. (Default: 0)
Furthermore, relay's and clients could use a publicly updated custom Tor nodes config. for targeted Anoncoin enclave connectivity:
ExcludeNodes node,node,…
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit. (Example: ExcludeNodes SlowServer, ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, {cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed to override in order to keep working. For example, if you try to connect to a hidden service, but you have excluded all of the hidden service’s introduction points, Tor will connect to one of them anyway. If you do not want this behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below).
Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you. Clients can still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers can tell Tor to build circuits through any node.
Country codes are case-insensitive. The code "{??}" refers to nodes whose country can’t be identified. No country code, including {??}, works if no GeoIPFile can be loaded. See also the GeoIPExcludeUnknown option below.
EntryNodes node,node,…
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, and country codes of nodes to use for the first hop in your normal circuits. Normal circuits include all circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes.
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded.
Anyway, lots of variations and ways to go about this - hint hint. Could make for an interesting P2P experiment using Tor.
Start looking for published lists or Tor nodes with
ORPort 9377 in the
http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/ soon ?
. 
