Does Anoncoin not view high-latency for I2P as critically urgent as I do?
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.2950363
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.2955966
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.2950849
I2P doesn't plan on implementing until version 3.0? When is that ETA?
Bitcoin doesn't require all winning blocks to be sent over I2P, thus in a high-latency setup, those miners who want their awarded coins to be anonymous, would be at a timing disadvantage.
I assume anoncoin requires all winning blocks to be sent over I2P?
the main idea about i2p in anoncoin is to eliminate attacks to find your location and making listening on others connections impossible. (from a technical view)
Don't we want miners to be anonymous when they are awarded coins for PoW of the winning block?
So then if they use the high-latency setting to be confidently anonymous, they are at a speed disadvantage to those miners who don't want to be anonymous (e.g. the corporations, etc).
Also does anyone understand and agree that without high-latency, the NSA knows who you are? (due to timing attacks are possible on low-latency mix-nets)
Timing attacks work regardless of end-to-end encryption.
My understanding is that all low-latency mix-nets are subject to timing attacks. Perhaps you should read up on the research before making a claim? Or am I missing something?
Note Tor and I2P are both Chaum mix-nets (so what applies to low-latency attacks of Tor applies also to I2P):
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/oakland05torta.pdf
i2p user (A) finds blocks, broadcasts to all users in i2p (UI), now some of the UI are connected to clearnet, some user (B) broadcast it over clearnet to the other nodes, so with a timing attack you could find user B but not user A