Zoidberg replied to you, telling you that it only used the less predictable parts of blocks for the scratchpad. You're still going on about how it may be predictable... so tell us why.
You apparently have no comprehension of what has been said.
"less predictable parts of blocks" makes no quantitative sense. That they were generated from prior PoW is not sufficient to quantify them as "less predictable". For one thing, they are already known by the time they are used. It is not even necessarily true that the PoW hashes couldn't contain planted patterns (remember any value less than the required difficulty is acceptable)!
The Cryptonote PoW algorithm runs the current value through a hash, and uses the output to as the index to lookup the next random memory location containing the next value.
If that hash is not uniformly distributed and or not perfectly random, then the memory locations visited may not comprise all locations in the scratchpad or can be gamed in other ways.
For example birthdays are uniformly distributed but if the sampling size is too small, then the test of duplicate birthdays
probabilities are not uniform! So seemingly random and uniformly distributed data is not in another context. The size of the sample (the entropy) matters.
That is just one possible weakness. There may be others.
Using naked (unenveloped) AES rounds as a hash function can be incorrect. I cited a reference on that already.
I haven't studied the Boolberry PoW algorithm but I am aware it is using data from the block chain to modulate the choice of the next index in the scratchpad. The potential problem is that data may not have the degree of uniform distribution and randomness required. Your notion of "less predictable" is mathematical nonsense. It is the period of cyclic structure and extent of entropy that matter in Birthday attacks. The Boolberry PoW algorithm may be replacing the pseudorandom generator in Cryptonote entirely with data from the block chain. Since that data is known a priori, it might be possible to precompute certain lookup tables or other cryptanalysis strategies.
I believe it is possible to fix both if they have weaknesses (well at least Cryptonote but the Boolberry PoW might be doomed if I am correct that planted patterns can be put into block solution hashes). For example for Boolberry, he could probably add a hash computation every so many lookups in the scratchpad (within the loop inside the over PoW hash), to sufficiently randomize and disperse any accumulative effects from the block chain data. Ditto Cryptonote can probably replace the AES circuit with a known secure hash has every N lookups in the scratchpad. But I would prefer cryptanalysis to tell us with more certainty.
WHY ARE YOU WASTING MY TIME? Hire a cryptographer to do some study.