Lie about what? Anonymint said in the XMR thread, that CN transactions can be Sybil attacked, so that you'd be mixing mostly with adversary's own generated transactions. And now you are saying that's not true. Where is the lie?
This is not accurate for a successful platform that is used for a high volume of transactions in commerce. Since there will likely be substantial transaction fees in line with the processing cost of private transactions (higher than bitcoin's non-private transactions), such a Sybil attack would be prohibitively expensive.
It would not be enough to spend as much on transaction fees as everyone else combined, you would need to spend far, far more to dominate the output set on the network, because you need
all of the mix outputs chosen for a transaction (other than the real one) to be yours.
If I use a mix factor of 3, then you need all 3 of the outputs I choose to mix to be yours. If you are 50% of the transactions on the network, your chance of success here is only 12.5%. To get even a 50% chance of success you need to be 80% of the transactions on the network (you are spending 4x the total everyone else is spending on transaction fees). To get to a 90% success rate, you need to control 96% of the outputs. At this point you are now spending 24 times as much as everyone else combined.
Since you can't control which outputs I pick, you need to do this constantly to maintain your share of the network outputs. You can't turn on and off the attack when needed.
This is already unlikely. However, it gets (much) worse for the attacker.
I've previously explained how extremely high mix factors for high risk transactions are readily achievable at modest cost using sequential transactions. For example, if I use a mix factor 3 five times sequentially (I need to be careful to avoid traffic analysis, but that is feasible), the ambiguity set is 1024 (with an increase in aggregate transactions size of only 20). Even a mix factor of 3 applied twice yields an ambiguity set of 16 with transaction size increase of only 8x.
To reach a 90% chance of success on your attack with an ambiguity set of 16 you need to control 99.3% of the outputs on the network (spending 141x as much as everyone else combined).
This is becoming implausible even for a state-level actor, and certainly for anyone else. Visa's revenues (almost entirely transaction fees) are about $10 billion. 141 times that is $1.41 trillion. (For comparison world GDP is something like $85 trillion.)
With an ambiguity set of 1024 (used for my hypothetical "high risk" transaction), you'd need 99.9897% of the network for 90% success, which means spending almost 10,000 times as much as everyone else. If you can't tolerate a 10% chance of failure for your attack, then your costs explode further. These numbers easily exceed world GDP.
The Sybil attack as described is not feasible.