And you still haven't answered my question.
yes, i have thought it through.
Topic: Stefan Molyneux: Lymphoma - page 2. (Read 5070 times)
And you still haven't answered my question.
yes, i have thought it through.A lower chance of getting shot just increases the chances you will be assaulted with another weapon. Such as a knife. Or a bat.
proof please.Here you go.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Lott#Disputed_survey
just saying...
And you still haven't answered my question.
yes, i have thought it through. A lower chance of getting shot just increases the chances you will be assaulted with another weapon. Such as a knife. Or a bat.
proof please.Here you go.
And you still haven't answered my question.
yes, i have thought it through.you cant "take out" your competition in a free market. It will be instantly replaced by new competition. The only way you can "take out" the competition is if you can keep out new competition. There is no mechanism that i am aware of for doing this other than the state.
oh! i know a method that can achieve this! its called "a gun to the head"-method, and it work incredible when there is no one that restricts the usage of guns.Quote
And you still haven't answered my question.
yes, i have thought it through. you cant "take out" your competition in a free market. It will be instantly replaced by new competition. The only way you can "take out" the competition is if you can keep out new competition. There is no mechanism that i am aware of for doing this other than the state.
oh! i know a method that can achieve this! its called "a gun to the head"-method, and it work incredible when there is no one that restricts the usage of guns.And you still haven't answered my question.
oh! i know a method that can achieve this! its called "a gun to the head"-method, and it work incredible when there is no one that restricts the usage of guns.
you really dont think in the absence of government that people would purchase protection against this sort of thing? i mean people pay for cable tv and you dont think they would be willing to pay someone to protect them from being shot in the head?
you cant "take out" your competition in a free market. It will be instantly replaced by new competition. The only way you can "take out" the competition is if you can keep out new competition. There is no mechanism that i am aware of for doing this other than the state.
oh! i know a method that can achieve this! its called "a gun to the head"-method, and it work incredible when there is no one that restricts the usage of guns.you cant "take out" your competition in a free market. It will be instantly replaced by new competition. The only way you can "take out" the competition is if you can keep out new competition. There is no mechanism that i am aware of for doing this other than the state.
oh! i know a method that can achieve this! its called "a gun to the head"-method, and it work incredible when there is no one that restricts the usage of guns.
Disease and The Drive to Hide with Stefan Molyneux and Jeffrey Tucker
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nbkYg3saQSc
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nbkYg3saQSc
you cant "take out" your competition in a free market. It will be instantly replaced by new competition. The only way you can "take out" the competition is if you can keep out new competition. There is no mechanism that i am aware of for doing this other than the state.
[/quote
oh! i know a method that can achieve this! its called "a gun to the head"-method, and it work incredible when there is no one that restricts the usage of guns.
[/quote
oh! i know a method that can achieve this! its called "a gun to the head"-method, and it work incredible when there is no one that restricts the usage of guns.
i see that start of a war(take out the competition), or the collaboration between 'voluntary' security firms.
Quote from: Gustave de Molinari
Under the rule of free competition, war between the producers of security entirely loses its justification. Why would they make war? To conquer consumers? But the consumers would not allow themselves to be conquered. They would be careful not to allow themselves to be protected by men who would unscrupulously attack the persons and property of their rivals. If some audacious conqueror tried to become dictator, they would immediately call to their aid all the free consumers menaced by this aggression, and they would treat him as he deserved. Just as war is the natural consequence of monopoly, peace is the natural consequence of liberty.
but collaboration would be a much more likely way they would take, to push the prices and gain power.
you cant "take out" your competition in a free market. It will be instantly replaced by new competition. The only way you can "take out" the competition is if you can keep out new competition. There is no mechanism that i am aware of for doing this other than the state.
Quote
The greater the number of firms, the more probable it is that one of those firms is a maverick firm; that is, a firm known for pursuing aggressive and independent pricing strategy. Even in the case of a concentrated market, with few firms, the existence of such a firm may undermine the collusive behaviour of the cartel.
How likely do you think it will be that a maverick will pop up, in a market with no barriers to entry save overhead?
Except that when you "take out" a competitor, you:
Lose men, either directly through combat losses, or indirectly from quitting.
Lose customers to other defense firms who aren't going to waste money attacking when they should be defending.
Don't gain the customers of the defeated rival. They're much more likely to go to one of the other firms which don't waste their money.
So how is that going to make anyone rich?
Lose men, either directly through combat losses, or indirectly from quitting.
Lose customers to other defense firms who aren't going to waste money attacking when they should be defending.
Don't gain the customers of the defeated rival. They're much more likely to go to one of the other firms which don't waste their money.
So how is that going to make anyone rich?
Lose men, either directly through combat losses, or indirectly from quitting.
Lose customers to other defense firms who aren't going to waste money attacking when they should be defending.
Don't gain the customers of the defeated rival. They're much more likely to go to one of the other firms which don't waste their money.
Quote
The greater the number of firms, the more probable it is that one of those firms is a maverick firm; that is, a firm known for pursuing aggressive and independent pricing strategy. Even in the case of a concentrated market, with few firms, the existence of such a firm may undermine the collusive behaviour of the cartel.
How likely do you think it will be that a maverick will pop up, in a market with no barriers to entry save overhead?
Except that when you "take out" a competitor, you:
Lose men, either directly through combat losses, or indirectly from quitting.
Lose customers to other defense firms who aren't going to waste money attacking when they should be defending.
Don't gain the customers of the defeated rival. They're much more likely to go to one of the other firms which don't waste their money.
So how is that going to make anyone rich?
Lose men, either directly through combat losses, or indirectly from quitting.
Lose customers to other defense firms who aren't going to waste money attacking when they should be defending.
Don't gain the customers of the defeated rival. They're much more likely to go to one of the other firms which don't waste their money.
So how is that going to make anyone rich?
Quote
The greater the number of firms, the more probable it is that one of those firms is a maverick firm; that is, a firm known for pursuing aggressive and independent pricing strategy. Even in the case of a concentrated market, with few firms, the existence of such a firm may undermine the collusive behaviour of the cartel.
How likely do you think it will be that a maverick will pop up, in a market with no barriers to entry save overhead?
Except that when you "take out" a competitor, you:
Lose men, either directly through combat losses, or indirectly from quitting.
Lose customers to other defense firms who aren't going to waste money attacking when they should be defending.
Don't gain the customers of the defeated rival. They're much more likely to go to one of the other firms which don't waste their money.
So how is that going to make anyone rich?
Lose men, either directly through combat losses, or indirectly from quitting.
Lose customers to other defense firms who aren't going to waste money attacking when they should be defending.
Don't gain the customers of the defeated rival. They're much more likely to go to one of the other firms which don't waste their money.
So how is that going to make anyone rich?
Quote
The greater the number of firms, the more probable it is that one of those firms is a maverick firm; that is, a firm known for pursuing aggressive and independent pricing strategy. Even in the case of a concentrated market, with few firms, the existence of such a firm may undermine the collusive behaviour of the cartel.
How likely do you think it will be that a maverick will pop up, in a market with no barriers to entry save overhead?
Then answer his question. Why would they make war?
To gain market share. it is strategy 101: take out your competition, and be rich.Lose men, either directly through combat losses, or indirectly from quitting.
Lose customers to other defense firms who aren't going to waste money attacking when they should be defending.
Don't gain the customers of the defeated rival. They're much more likely to go to one of the other firms which don't waste their money.
So how is that going to make anyone rich?
but collaboration would be a much more likely way they would take, to push the prices and gain power.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartel#Long-term_unsustainability_of_cartelsQuote
Game theory suggests that cartels are inherently unstable, as the behaviour of members of a cartel is an example of a prisoner's dilemma. Each member of a cartel would be able to make more profit by breaking the agreement (producing a greater quantity or selling at a lower price than that agreed) than it could make by abiding by it.
Quote
The incentive to cheat explains why cartels are generally difficult to sustain in the long run. Empirical studies of 20th century cartels have determined that the mean duration of discovered cartels is from 5 to 8 years. However, one private cartel operated peacefully for 134 years before disbanding.[7] There is a danger that once a cartel is broken, the incentives to form the cartel return and the cartel may be re-formed.
Also from the article:
Quote
The greater the number of firms, the more probable it is that one of those firms is a maverick firm; that is, a firm known for pursuing aggressive and independent pricing strategy. Even in the case of a concentrated market, with few firms, the existence of such a firm may undermine the collusive behaviour of the cartel.
How likely do you think it will be that a maverick will pop up, in a market with no barriers to entry save overhead?
Then answer his question. Why would they make war?
To gain market share. it is strategy 101: take out your competition, and be rich.Lose men, either directly through combat losses, or indirectly from quitting.
Lose customers to other defense firms who aren't going to waste money attacking when they should be defending.
Don't gain the customers of the defeated rival. They're much more likely to go to one of the other firms which don't waste their money.
So how is that going to make anyone rich?
but collaboration would be a much more likely way they would take, to push the prices and gain power.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartel#Long-term_unsustainability_of_cartelsQuote
Game theory suggests that cartels are inherently unstable, as the behaviour of members of a cartel is an example of a prisoner's dilemma. Each member of a cartel would be able to make more profit by breaking the agreement (producing a greater quantity or selling at a lower price than that agreed) than it could make by abiding by it.
Quote
The incentive to cheat explains why cartels are generally difficult to sustain in the long run. Empirical studies of 20th century cartels have determined that the mean duration of discovered cartels is from 5 to 8 years. However, one private cartel operated peacefully for 134 years before disbanding.[7] There is a danger that once a cartel is broken, the incentives to form the cartel return and the cartel may be re-formed.
Then answer his question. Why would they make war?
To gain market share. it is strategy 101: take out your competition, and be rich.Lose men, either directly through combat losses, or indirectly from quitting.
Lose customers to other defense firms who aren't going to waste money attacking when they should be defending.
Don't gain the customers of the defeated rival. They're much more likely to go to one of the other firms which don't waste their money.
So how is that going to make anyone rich?
but collaboration would be a much more likely way they would take, to push the prices and gain power.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartel#Long-term_unsustainability_of_cartelsQuote
Game theory suggests that cartels are inherently unstable, as the behaviour of members of a cartel is an example of a prisoner's dilemma. Each member of a cartel would be able to make more profit by breaking the agreement (producing a greater quantity or selling at a lower price than that agreed) than it could make by abiding by it.
Could you imagine a society where everyone was talking to each other about what they stole from another person that day? No, because everyone knows stealing is wrong. And most people would not want to live in such a society, not to mention it would collapse pretty quick anyway if nobody's possessions were safe.
It's just when you have the state as a middleman, people get to ignore the stealing. There is no way in a free society, or any society, that most people would think stealing is OK. Some might but they would be in the minority and that's what you have security for.
It's just when you have the state as a middleman, people get to ignore the stealing. There is no way in a free society, or any society, that most people would think stealing is OK. Some might but they would be in the minority and that's what you have security for.
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