So the cartel doesn't have to worry about case #1, because they can ban the customer if the customer issues a double-spend.
1) Cases where the cartel cares about double spends, in which case it must get transactions into the block chain as soon as possible.
Cartel doesn't need to get the transactions into the Bitcoin block chain asap, for the reason I explained in my prior post.
Any cartel large enough to successfully make this attack work would have to handle a large enough fraction of Bitcoin transactions that it would just do them off the block chain. All the cartel would do is keep for itself transaction fees it wouldn't need to pay anyway.
You appear to be ignoring the game theory of a cartel. A cartel grows because it hurts competitors who don't join the cartel.
I explained the game theory upthread, and I will repeat a summary again.
As the cartel gains more and more of the Bitcoin network hashrate, it can delay non-cartel transactions by an ever increasing delay, i.e. asymptotically infinite delay.
This forces non-cartel entities to join the cartel else lose their businesses.
Thanks. Fundamentals are a genre of peer review that has high utility IMO.
I am not entirely following your logic here. Are you referring to mining them on the Bitcoin chain?
I will say this which might cause you to conclude that your line-of-thinking could be irrelevant. The cartel's incentive is the value of all the business that is not already in the cartel.
Could you clarify your logic further? I think I may understand, but I don't want to try respond until I am sure I understand your point.