Topic: Transactions Withholding Attack - page 5. (Read 27544 times)

It has none

Smart people know how to read. I can't refute every person who has misconceptions in their head. The thread stands on its merits.

Hahahahaha! Oh mo god! Sorry I missed this thread earlier, and it was such a slog to read through it all, but it's frikin hilarious! AnonyMint just misses point after point after point with this easily refutable non-issue (which, by the way, I understand perfectly, including the parts MoonShadow misunderstood), and then nearly made me lose it with the wall of scripture on page 9. I mean, I knew he was all "I have a high IQ and am more intelligent than you, you should be thankful that I give you the fruits of my mind" type, or whatever, but a christian fundie too? Haaaaaaa!  

God, I hope you are actually seriously this broken and not a troll, otherwise I'd feel bad for falling for this level of smug idiocy. Jesus, AnonyMint, did you get your high IQ score from an internet quiz?


EDIT: Aaahahahaaa! And then you of the "I am smarter than you, and understand this new Bitcoin thing I just found better than you, because I am so smart!" bring up Dunning-Krueger, in a rather blatant display of suffering from that effect yourself. Seriously, are you sure you're not just trolling? I can't stop laughing!

P.S. MoonShadow commands a lot of trust and respect on this forum, because even if he says something wrong, he can admit it and change his mind. On the other hand, your "Ignore” button is getting browner every day.

Not coherent for you. Very coherent for me. Cheers.

You've mentioned lots of things.
Noone seems to have found a coherent, logical threat in what you have said though.

And you still haven't answered my question from above, why would the cartel go through all the hassle of creating on-chain transactions simply to withhold them from the rest of the network, when they could accomplish the same things with off-chain transactions?

Yup. I had mentioned both of these upthread. What took so long. Well thanks for joining the party.

I agree that one of us is confused, but I'm not sure it is me.

In your original post, you said:

ie. The cartel would withhold their transactions from other miners' blocks.
Now you are saying that they would withhold other peoples' transactions from their blocks.
That is a completely different issue.

Taking a a break from reading MoonShadow's substantive domination and rebuttal to go eat lunch at one of the 150 restaurants nearby, ruthlessly competing on price for my business, and all of whom have apparently ignored the OP's conclusion that monopoly is the natural order of things.

Using say 2030...Here is a calc that could be used http://www.coinish.com/calc/ to model (BTC reward is ?) add in the proposed difficulty and assume hardware is $X cost in X year and determine a hashrate. 

This is an open question being discussed at my other thread.

I am still trying to formulate a coherent theory of how the variables of voluntary transactions fees, mandatory diminishing coin rewards, asymmetry of motivations, and difficulty scaling will behave.

Does anyone know of any research modeling this?

The OP started with "Once Bitcoin's coin rewards decline to less than can pay for the miner's costs"

As this needs to be fact before a "TWA" could be considered, could you please explain to me the background as to why bitcoin's miner rewards get to a point of reward less than miner costs?

Thanks in advance.   

True.

I should have left this in this thread days ago....

https://yourlogicalfallacyis.com/burden-of-proof

In a cartel attack, the 50+% derives from having a majority of the customers, so they retain 50+% of the value, even if the 50-% decides to make a fork. Then they can attack that fork too.


This was already refuted by me upthread. Amazon would only need to delay transactions which are paying to their vendors. And sends to destinations outside the cartel, could be shared normally.


You can fill up the butt hurt report form to air your grievances.



Still much higher than the value of the minority fork. They will likely blame the minority fork for it and avoid it like the plague.

[snip]

The rest of the technologically ignorant blabber was not worth responding to.

You are confusing the cartel's transactions with the non-cartel transactions. The later are the ones that get delay. The cartel's miner excludes them when adding a block solution to the block chain.

Why?
You think they will create transactions that don't need to exist, just so that they can not send them out to the rest of the network?
From the network point of view that is the same as the transactions not existing in the first place.
Why bother with all the hassle, just to pay yourselves transactions fees that could be totally avoided by doing offchain transactions in the first place?

They need to gain hashrate in order to withhold transactions.
They need to withhold transactions in order to gain hashrate.
Phase 3: Profit?

I'm amused you assumed any of those words were my own.

Credit: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chewbacca_defense

Incidentally, there's a simple diagnostic test for Dunning-Kruger effect. If you understand it mainly as a reminder you don't know everything, you probably aren't affected. If, on the other hand you use it primarily to call other people out for having it, well, I have some bad news for you...

Not similar, and I will not discuss it with you further. Please stop filibustering me with noise.

No, it's similar in nature, but not quite the same, I think.

However, after reading the whitepaper for it, I can see how the 'selfish mining pool' can gain a profit advantage.  I don't agree that the end result is that all miners choose to join said cartel pool, because it would become rather obvious that one pool is doing this when they win block races too often for chance, and the rate of orphaned blocks increase.  Also, I can think of a number of counter-stragedies other pools could use to negate the selfish pool's outsized advantages, not the least of which is to simply do the same thing.  If all mining pools act in a similar manner, no pools can gain a profit advantage; but then orphaned blocks become much more common.  Much better would be to simply identify pools that don't play by the rules and take counter-measures until they quit acting badly.

More research is required....

Selfish-mining as published by those from Cornell is based on withholding block solutions until another peer generates a block solution then using a high gamma of propagation advantage to cheat the network.

That is entirely different than the attack that this thread describes. And yes I described this attack in the bitcointalk discussion of my Bitcoin : The Digital Kill Switch article earlier this year, which was widely syndicated. Google can find it for you.