You are confusing the cartel's transactions with the non-cartel transactions. The later are the ones that get delay. The cartel's miner excludes them when adding a block solution to the block chain.
So basically you say the cartel will for bigger future profits, now not reap the profits of non-cartel transactions. (that do give transaction fees, transaction without fees I now disregard, as i find it normal nobody wants to work for free...)
So analogy in the ´real´world in the sense that a cartel of shops somewhere lower their prices substancially, running losses, to outdo other shops to bankrupcy, and after that raise prices and earn a lot of money ?
Also I noticed you talk about 2 things: firstly a cartel not forwarding transactions to other miners, secondly a cartel not accepting transactions from non-cartel members.
And realize that because of those 2 things, this is horrific case where the cartel can both continue to profit on the transaction fees, i.e. it doesn't have to sacrifice by offering lower prices, and depriving the non-cartel miners of (increasingly greater share of) income while also depriving the non-cartel merchants and their customers of fast transactions.
The first thing I find completely OK, as they are running risks here for double spends I guess (if somebody double spends in other shop, and they find the block earlier), so up to them... The second not accepting transactions from non-cartel members (thinking about transactions that do pay fees, free transactions no need to be taken in blockchain anyway, as nothing is for free), then the cartel is refuting to earn money, and thus running less efficient than other miners / competing "cartels".
They are also depriving the non-cartel miners of transaction fees too, so on balance they are still earning just as much before because the proof-of-work difficulty will decline (relatively speaking) as non-cartel miners lose income too.
Risk of double-spends against a cartel is basically nil since most everyone is a repeat customer. Cartels have mass.
Basically another mini cartel (so not the big evil cartel being talked about) could mine its own transactions, and that cartel also accepting paying transactions from non cartel members will make more money, because they take up profitable transactions out of their own customerbase (out of their cartel).
But they can't gain mass by causing the non-cartel to have delayed transactions, which forces customers to switch to the cartel for faster transactions. And if they don't have mass, they can't be as safe from double-spends, since their repeat customers may be fewer.
Really this is about destroying the small merchants. Bringing everything into a few competing cartels. Then the cartels merge because they can raise prices.
I already wrote all of this upthread.
Thats the whole thing, I dont believe too much in cartels. Because as we see, the miner that would fake being part of the cartel, is gonna win.
(as the cartel is artificially lowering its turnover (not accepting certain offers on which they do make profit, read: not accepting transactions that do pay fees)
I don't understand. Please try to explain more clearly. I don't think so. But let me read your more lucid logic?
What I see as a real threat to bitcoin, is not an economical attack but a political attack. (as to say, some group who thinks to profit from hurting bitcoin, simply ordering 1 million asics, and take 90% of the network.) (how difficult is that gonna be if all fees earned by miners are transaction fees....transaction fees not to be huge, to make a ultra secure network that cannot be overtaken with some billions of dollars.) So basically for bitcoin its a race against the clock i guess.
Political is one threat.
There are many hypothetical attacks emerging on Bitcoin, not just political:
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.3716861