Topic: Wasabi Wallet - Open Source, Noncustodial Coinjoin Software - page 23. (Read 8542 times)
The new release of Wasabi bundles cutting edge privacy technology with a smoother user experience. v2.0.7 boasts a completely updated interface that enhances the classic, easy-to-use design of the software. Compare the differences detailed in today's blog post: https://blog.wasabiwallet.io/ui-enhancements-in-v2-0-7/
Wasabi is 7 years old today! Nopara73 originally launched the project as "Hidden Wallet" in 2017 - https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/commit/062d4df2427f6b829c403a0e261e30e5c97d2a5f
The Trezor Safe 3 is now supported in Wasabi Wallet in v2.0.7. This new device from Satoshilabs includes a secure element to protect your keys against attackers who physically access the device. Learn more in today's blog post: https://blog.wasabiwallet.io/latest-hardware-wallet-integration-trezor-safe-3-on-wasabi/
So over FIFTY MILLION Dollars went through the Coin Join and your Blockchain Analysis partner did not bat a single eyelash about it? It circles straight back to my initial fears about Wasabi now becoming a great tool for politicians and wealthy people who are ACTUALLY criminals as a simple bribe can result in a bypass to further Anonymize illicit funds.
Being rich is not a crime. Only socialist propaganda claims otherwise.
I am more surprised by the amount freely bypassing the Blockchain Analysis company filter rather than the nonsensical arguments Kruw brings all the time anyway. You could get a better answer from the echo of a cave than what Kruw argues.
So over FIFTY MILLION Dollars went through the Coin Join and your Blockchain Analysis partner did not bat a single eyelash about it? It circles straight back to my initial fears about Wasabi now becoming a great tool for politicians and wealthy people who are ACTUALLY criminals as a simple bribe can result in a bypass to further Anonymize illicit funds.
Now I really wonder how this works. If I deposit 850 Bitcoin to ANY Centralized Exchange, I would most certainly be requested documentation immediately given the immense amount deposited. It is no ordinary deposit. Hell. Here in my country, even market cashiers check the legitimacy of Bank notes if you pay for groceries worth more than a few hundred Dollars.
So how does this filter works exactly? In fact. How about we get an answer straight from the Analysis firm themselves? Curiosity is now at an All Time High for me. Why did the Blockchain Analysis firm decide to close an eye to this amount?
So over FIFTY MILLION Dollars went through the Coin Join and your Blockchain Analysis partner did not bat a single eyelash about it? It circles straight back to my initial fears about Wasabi now becoming a great tool for politicians and wealthy people who are ACTUALLY criminals as a simple bribe can result in a bypass to further Anonymize illicit funds.
Now I really wonder how this works. If I deposit 850 Bitcoin to ANY Centralized Exchange, I would most certainly be requested documentation immediately given the immense amount deposited. It is no ordinary deposit. Hell. Here in my country, even market cashiers check the legitimacy of Bank notes if you pay for groceries worth more than a few hundred Dollars.
So how does this filter works exactly? In fact. How about we get an answer straight from the Analysis firm themselves? Curiosity is now at an All Time High for me. Why did the Blockchain Analysis firm decide to close an eye to this amount?
How would that user know they were banned because of bad chainalysis and not connectivity issues, which it’s common to have with Tor?
I guess, we will never find out. Perhaps the software might flag it as "naughty" and it might be verifiable in the client's debug log, but it doesn't matter much, because the coordinator could have blacklist it and blame it to connection issues. Samourai also bans coins, but when you try to ask them about it TDev will give a nonsense word salad reply or accuse you, without any evidence whatsoever, of being a malicious actor from Wasabi trying to attack their coinjoins.
I mean, I know. TDev is a jerk. I once tried to make a question in their Telegram, and the guy censored my messages simply because they had already been answered years ago, aka "use the search". And yes, in every coinjoin implementation there's "coin ban". If you start DDoSing, or provide invalid signatures, then the coordinator is programmed to ban you. That's entirely different and understandable. The problem comes when you censor based on ethics.
Wasabi Wallet 2.0.7 has just been released! Learn about all the new changes made in this version in our announcement blog post - https://blog.wasabiwallet.io/intro-release-2-0-7/
Download at the official website wasabiwallet.io or get the open source code from GitHub - Key features in this release:
🫥 New user interface
🔒 Trezor Safe 3 support
🚀 Full RBF detection
⚠️ Better privacy warnings
🥷🏼 Password is now called passphrase
🎛️ New sorting option
🐛 Bug fixes and security improvements
Check out the release notes here - https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/releases/tag/v2.0.7.1
Download at the official website wasabiwallet.io or get the open source code from GitHub - Key features in this release:
🫥 New user interface
🔒 Trezor Safe 3 support
🚀 Full RBF detection
⚠️ Better privacy warnings
🥷🏼 Password is now called passphrase
🎛️ New sorting option
🐛 Bug fixes and security improvements
Check out the release notes here - https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/releases/tag/v2.0.7.1
In other news, Wasabi's default coordinator refuses to mix a "clean" coinbase tx0, because it flags their chain analysis filters. 
https://talkimg.com/images/2024/04/07/Vi8BD.png
(from: https://t.me/SamouraiWallet, in March 25)
https://talkimg.com/images/2024/04/07/Vi8BD.png
(from: https://t.me/SamouraiWallet, in March 25)
How would that user know they were banned because of bad chainalysis and not connectivity issues, which it’s common to have with Tor? Samourai also bans coins, but when you try to ask them about it TDev will give a nonsense word salad reply or accuse you, without any evidence whatsoever, of being a malicious actor from Wasabi trying to attack their coinjoins.
https://www.talkimg.com/images/2024/04/15/jzbxP.jpeg
https://www.talkimg.com/images/2024/04/15/jzKoc.jpeg
The new release of Wasabi is ready for testing! 2.0.7 RC3 is available here - https://github.com/molnard/WalletWasabi/releases/tag/v207rc3
Okay, so you're going to deliberately ignore your own post. Got it. 
It was your post I referenced, not mine:
How do you know there is a whale of 850 BTC? I see four separate inputs of 200, 200, 200 and 249 BTC. Couldn't there be four people with the respective inputs separately instead of one?
You correctly argued that there could be 4 people with these respective inputs since the 171 BTC sized outputs are small enough to be created by any of these single inputs by themselves. The information that indicates otherwise comes from tracing the non-coinjoin transactions he did from his non-Wasabi wallet.
The coins are private for everyone with blockchain access, you pointed this out at the beginning of our conversation
Okay, so you're going to deliberately ignore your own post. Got it. To a naive outside observer, the anonymity score of the 171.79 outputs is 4. It's only possible to determine the 200+ BTC inputs have a common owner due to the change merged before the coinjoin took place, but the whale's client knows it owns all those UTXOs regardless.
If the client displays an anonymity score of 1, then it means the coinjoined coins are not private for anyone with blockchain access.
The coins are private for everyone with blockchain access, you pointed this out at the beginning of our conversation:
How do you know there is a whale of 850 BTC? I see four separate inputs of 200, 200, 200 and 249 BTC. Couldn't there be four people with the respective inputs separately instead of one?
The reason the client displays an anonymity score of 1 is because it knows it owns all of the outputs of a specific size in the transaction. No other peers of the same size means no score increase.
I think my conclusions are rather valid, and you're just trying to move the goalposts.
- If the client displays an anonymity score of 1, then it means the coinjoined coins are not private for anyone with blockchain access.
- If the client can work out the anonymity score, it means it knows the history of the inputs.
- If it knows the history of the inputs, then it's the client's fault to waste block space for creating four 171 BTC outputs that are provably owned by one user.
- If it doesn't know the history of the inputs, then you're lying and the anonymity score displayed is not 1.
You don't want to hide from yourself, you want to hide from other people.
That's exactly why the client keeps the score as 1 for those outputs instead of giving them a score of 4. This makes sense because anyone attempting to guess would be correct 100% of the time due to no other actual participants of that size to incorrectly guess.
Which is simply not true. Everyone with access to the blockchain can tell that the real anonymity score is 1. It is 4 if you didn't have knowledge prior the coinjoin.
Exactly, I pointed out how it would have been more efficient for the whale to simply create a single 850 BTC input instead:
It would have been more block space efficient if the whale had just created a single 850 BTC UTXO.
However, the whale's client is aware it owns all 4 of these outputs, so it doesn't increase the score past 1.
That's not how it's supposed to work, then. You don't want anonymity score based on your knowledge. Obviously, no matter how many coinjoins, of what size, the anonymity score would always be 1 for you, because you know what you own. The anonymity score that is displayed (if any) should pinpoint the knowledge of other people based on the transaction and blockchain history. You don't want to hide from yourself, you want to hide from other people. That's why the score is 1 in the client, but the score is 4 for outsiders looking directly at the coinjoin.
Which is simply not true. Everyone with access to the blockchain can tell that the real anonymity score is 1. It is 4 if you didn't have knowledge prior the coinjoin. It just doesn't make sense. It is argued that when the user joins their 200/200/200/249 inputs, they do not get the impression that their 171 outputs are private. This means that the Wasabi client can tell that there is no privacy improvement (e.g., will display anonymity score 1).
Correct. There is a privacy improvement from the perspective of outside users since they have to consider the 171 outputs as having an anonymity score of 4. However, the whale's client is aware it owns all 4 of these outputs, so it doesn't increase the score past 1.
I don't have a Wasabi wallet, my conclusions are drawn bu forum discussions only. Please someone tell me how it's possible for the client to have no idea about the history of the coins (which reveals that these inputs belong to the same user) and simultaneously display an anonymity score of 1 (such that it wouldn't give the user the impression that the 171 outputs are private).
The client has more information than outside observers because it knows its own outputs. That's why the score is 1 in the client, but the score is 4 for outsiders looking directly at the coinjoin.
It just doesn't make sense. It is argued that when the user joins their 200/200/200/249 inputs, they do not get the impression that their 171 outputs are private. This means that the Wasabi client can tell that there is no privacy improvement (e.g., will display anonymity score 1). On the other hand, I'm getting told that the client cannot or should not know the history of the coins before the user sent them to the client.
I don't have a Wasabi wallet, my conclusions are drawn by forum discussions only. Please someone tell me how it's possible for the client to have no idea about the history of the coins (which reveals that these inputs belong to the same user) and simultaneously display an anonymity score of 1 (such that it wouldn't give the user the impression that the 171 outputs are private).
I don't have a Wasabi wallet, my conclusions are drawn by forum discussions only. Please someone tell me how it's possible for the client to have no idea about the history of the coins (which reveals that these inputs belong to the same user) and simultaneously display an anonymity score of 1 (such that it wouldn't give the user the impression that the 171 outputs are private).
Or, you know, the client software is problematic and chooses to waste block space because it can't tell before joining, that the 171 outputs are seemed as provably owned by one entity.
The client didn’t choose to waste block space. The user created these coins in a different wallet and sent them to Wasabi. The user’s settings allowed them to register 4 inputs in this round, where they gained privacy on a portion on their 850 BTC. The 171 BTC outputs are a rare case of non-private change being created because one participant had a much larger amount of BTC than everybody else. The client is aware these are non-private coins and would’ve registered their BTC in future rounds until the full amount was private.
Any method of trying to make it more block space efficient seems like it would be impractical, doesn’t give any privacy, and wouldn’t save a meaningful amount of block space in this user’s mixing process as a whole.
Same soundbites. Continuously engaging in strawman arguments. Over, and over, and over again, 'til the end of time. Deliberately ignoring my points.
Why are you so frustrated? I'm answering your questions directly, what point are you claiming I've ignored? Provide a direct quote.
You yourself have said that it's possible for a careful observer to tell that the 200/200/200/249 inputs are certainly connected with the 171 outputs.
Yes, I mentioned this is a particular case where non coinjoin transactions the user made in other wallets allow a careful observer (not the coordinator specifically, anyone with a copy of a the blockchain can observe this) to find out these inputs are owned by the same user:
In this particular case, a careful observer is able to determine the 200/200/200/249 inputs all belong to the same user because the change output from each of the 200 BTC coins were consolidated when creating the 249 BTC coin.
If the coordinator does not have this information, then you either lied about the input output connection (which you didn't as anyone can verify with basic blockchain heuristics), or the coordinator is not configured to be a careful observer.
I already explained to you that the coordinator does not choose the output amounts:
The coordinator does not dictate the output amounts, clients choose their own outputs.
Or, you know, the client software is problematic and chooses to waste block space because it can't tell before joining, that the 171 outputs are seemed as provably owned by one entity.
Why do you consider it problematic that the client is not aware of the transactions you did before you started using the client?
Jump to: