Topic: Why do Atheists Hate Religion? - page 407. (Read 901367 times)

1) I really don't understand the "let's not shoot the messenger comment."  I'm guessing it's non-essential, though I don't know who I shot lol.

2)  I agree that we can make sensical and non-sensical statements with plain English, and that the non-sensical statements do not render English inoperable or useless.  The syntax and rules of operation for English determine what is sensical and what isn't.  Statements are relayed back to the syntax and processed according thereto to determine if it is meaningful in a way consistent with it.  Thus, at the syntactic level there is indeed a "reasoning" process by which statements are evaluated, but the syntax itself is structural, i.e. it imposes constraints upon what can be considered meaningful.

3)  Yes, I recall your mention of the Liar's paradox.

4)  If you run software with code that does not conform to the syntax of its programming language, it will be evaluated as an invalid input. If valid, how those statements are expressed is a product of both their relation to their governing syntax, and also in relation to other object-level statements governed by the same syntax that may affect them (e.g. if-then or "conditional" statements).  I'm not sure if I fully responded to what you were saying, here.  I'm at lunch on an iPhone.

Edit: Linking this to subjectivity and objectivity, consider a governing syntax of Reality in total as it relates to its internal components.  As we perceive real content and subsequently process and model that content, we can either model that content in a way that is consistent with the syntax of Reality in total, or in a way that is inconsistent.  Because the structural syntax of Reality in total necessarily distributes to all of its content, if our model is consistent, then it is objectively valid, else we have an inconsistent, invalid model that provides us with no objective value.  In this way, we can consider this process in terms of a fundamental utility function, where utility is defined upon consistency and congruency with Universal syntax.  

Now, as you previously pointed out to some extent, real content isn't static, and this is because it is expressed through conditional changes according to the unconditional syntax of Reality.  This implies that Reality's syntax embodies rules for self-configuration via relational feedback between syntax and content, essentially a mechanism of self-evolution.  It is no different for us in an isomorphic sense.  We, too, embody this same mechanism for self-configuration, and this self-configuration can be defined in terms of the utility it generates.  If we self-configure in a way that is consistent with our own structural syntax, then bueno.  Else, no bueno.  I think this can serve as an objective basis for concepts like "good" and "bad," lending itself as a means of objective ethical mapping.

Edit 2: This may be getting a little bit ahead of ourselves, but consider for the sake of argument that what I have said so far in this post is true.  Relating to the computer analogy in which code that does not conform to the syntax of its program language would be considered invalid and thus incapable of being expressed, what would happen then if we do not conform to the syntax of Reality?  Might we, too, be deemed "invalid" and incapable of being expressed?  If so, might this be the basis of seemingly-religious concepts such as Heaven (i.e. something akin to "living with God forever, or in congruence with him), and Hell (i.e. being incongruent with God, and potentially facing interdiction from the system)?

Let's not shoot the messenger... Plain English would be a superb example where it's possible to construct nonsensical statements, but that doesn't render the entire language useless and we continue to use it. Returning to your "absolute truth" argument,


I later pointed out that in some cases it could result in the Liar Paradox, for which you quoted Langan about metalanguages:


Except, rereading, it seems to make more sense to think of metalanguage in computing terms. We can think of a statement as a series of instructions for running a program. Rather than a noun, the metalanguage would be an action: a reasoning process by which we somehow evaluate statements. Except that that still doesn't explain what we do when we run them. Or how we somehow seem able to overcome the limitations of computers.

There's no good reason why a Christian should ever be "threatened" by atheism's rise. Saddened maybe, feeling bad for them, yes. But threatened? There's no good reason for that. Christians believe God will be with them forever and they'll go to Heaven, and God will shine His light on them, and bless them. There's nothing to be threatened with when God is with you, who can be against you?

Romans 8:31 What shall we then say to these things? If God be for us, who can be against us?

Some Christians are threatened by atheism's rise on the pop charts. Some say atheists "hate God." But of course, a philosophical atheist cannot hate something he does not believe exists. Many atheists, though, do hate religion...

Paradoxes are fun, no doubt.  But, as Langan further notes:


This is really the crux of it all.  Presenting a consistent model that provides a means of resolving said paradoxes automatically grants the model explanatory precedence.  Consequently, what thus determines a given, consistent model to be superior to another is generality.  By identifying a limit of theorization and evoking categorical relationships between the limit itself and reality, the result is a consistent model of reality at the epitome of generality, precluding the existence of a consistent model more general than itself.  In other words, it is the best we can ever do, and all that remains is to use such a model as a context within which to frame all sub-theories/models, resolving the paradoxes contained therein and providing us with objective insight which may give us clues as to how we can gain additional, practical utility from them (and perhaps even objectifying practical utility itself, giving us a concrete path to follow with regards to ethics and other considerations).


The "higher-level paradoxes as side-effects" would again be precluded by the reintroduction of yet another metalanguage to resolve paradoxes in an object-oriented metalanguage.  Isomorphic regression is not the same as infinite regression in the traditional sense because falsifying isomorphic regression would require introducing a metalanguage to attempt to falsify it, making it impossible to falsify it without actually adhering to it.  Thus, the falsification attempt renders itself inconsistent and therefore invalid.

Edit:  A way to visualize how isomorphic regression does not equate to infinite regression is to consider a 'prime' metalanguage as an algebraic construct which serves as a primordial archetype which distributes its structure isomorphically to all linguistic subsystems.  This means the archetype is a static, unchanging structure distributed among both reality in total and in part, objectively relating the latter to the former.


On a lower level, it isn't static, but at the highest level it would be totally static and unchanging...complete and self-consistent with respect to its non-static constituents.  A presumption of the kind you're making would suggest there would be something external to reality itself that would be capable of determining it incomplete and/or inconsistent (claiming its either or both is itself an objective determination, and this would reintroduce the problematic infinite regression).

I'm not sure what you're trying to say there. For the most part I actually agree with you, except for your confidence in earlier posts that you've got it all figured out. I suspect Gödel spent a lot of time breaking his way out of "linguistic Mamushka dolls", and what he tried to show was that the limitation could apply to any language.
Btw, I'm not sure what some people have against paradoxes - I think they're great! And I think the whole point of using a paradox was because of its ridiculousness, not in spite of it. It's just a symbol to represent any statement that's "true but unprovable" within its system of thought.

Another paradox would be our ability to define metalanguages -- creating higher levels of thought -- to isolate and explain things when we hit some limit at a lower level. If we were previously operating within the confines of a lower-level object language, who could have predicted that we were about to break out of that intellectual prison and create something different? If we can do that, then inductive reasoning suggests there's no known upper limit to the meta-metalanguages we might create. And we don't even know whether there's infinite regression because it's an open-ended proposition. We simply don't know if there will be more higher-level paradoxes as side-effects or not. But if we call it infinite regression and say we're operating at the highest possible level, the continued existence of paradoxes makes our system internally inconsistent.

Therefore, in response to metalanguages, Gödel's "incompleteness or inconsistency" dilemma could be a kind of "meta paradox" that persists in defiance of any attempt to contain it. Back to reality, it seems intuitively obvious that reality is incomplete (or inconsistent?) because it just keeps changing. It's not a static system.

Quoting from the same source as previous post:


Edit:  I'm a big fan of Langan's work, as you can see my beliefs closely reflect his -- and I've spent literally hundreds of hours dissecting it.

But one thing about putting "it's the absolute truth that..." in front of statements is that some statements will take the form of the Liar Paradox (It's the absolute truth that this sentence is false.) , which Gödel used to great effect, upsetting lots of people with his incompleteness theorems. Others have also expounded upon it, saying that the incompleteness is not only relevant to vague ideas of arithmetical language, but it applies to "real world" theories as well. The take-home message being that there will always be some true truths that cannot proven within the theory.

Interestingly, I'm not sure about your use of the word 'theory' earlier. For one thing, I didn't immediately click that you were using theory as a synonym for similar words like perception, experience, or the senses. And I'm wondering how a "practice" of reality might differ, or whether it's a coherent idea for there to even be a practice of reality.

I can test these thoughts by applying them to a concrete example to see if it makes sense in a smaller context. E.g.: Weather forecasting. Forecasters would have a theory about how the weather ought to work, which they implement as a simulation running on some computers. However, the actual weather does not care what someone else thinks about it. What it actually does, would be the practice.  This reminds me of the quote "in theory, there is no difference between theory and practice, but in practice there is."

Theory would be the subjective reality, and practice would be objective reality. However, since we're "stuck in our minds", maybe we just have to keep adjusting our theory in a learning process?

Correct, absence of proof is not proof of absence, but in this case that only applies directly to Empiricism, which necessarily omits comprehensive explanation and thereby not only leaves unfalsifiable assumptions on the table, but also leaves a necessary cause of which it can never model.  In a self-deterministic model where objective content is fundamentally inseparable from the mental constructs that model them, the necessary cause is modeled, and in such a way that it also explains the cause of the model itself (i.e. through theoretical self-reference).  

A self-deterministic model is not in any way threatened by such unfalsifiable assumptions in the same way that an Empirical worldview is because it precludes any instance in which such unverifiable content is actually relevant to Reality.  Accordingly, these unfalsifable assumptions are a priori unreal.  This distinction is especially highlighted by the fact that Empirical models cannot account for themselves (because they are abstract and therefore beyond the scope of Empiricism altogether), and can't even account for their own assumptions (e.g. that we live in a Positivistic Universe, a purely philosophical assumption that also falls outside of their scope).  

My claims are falsifiable, as I have already explained how there is a theoretical way to falsify them.  Again, what you will find is that any attempt to falsify them will only reinforce the general idea in the same way that any attempt to falsify the existence of absolute truth only serves to reinforce it, since any claim must necessarily assume its own absolute, objective weight in order to be objectively relevant to the argument.

...Objectively relevant.  These are the types of relationships you need to become aware of.  What is objective is only so in relation to something else.  For example, the syntax of a system is objective relative to its contents, while its contents are only relative to its syntax and not in any way absolute to it.  However, the same, objective syntax of the original system is merely relative to the syntax of an even greater system containing it.  Objective does NOT mean something like "it is what it is all by itself."  Objectivity is a relation.  You avoid infinite regression by modeling objectivity self-relationally (in the same way that sound logic is logical because sound logic says so).

And of course you're inclined to think subjectivity and objectivity aren't connected in the way I propose because the notion apparently runs contrary to what you've been assuming (i.e. your inclination) this entire time.

Strictly speaking, I agree with that. Absence of proof is not proof of absence (and all that shit about falsifiability). Thereby it is a moot point really, since the same principle is applicable to your reasoning as well. Ancient people knew nothing of cancer, but there is overwhelming evidence that it existed back then, so something might exist today that we know nothing of. Actually, that's what I was trying to convey right from the start. That is, in the absence of strong evidence we can only believe (until new evidence is found, of course), or just refrain from drawing definitive conclusions...

And yes, I am more inclined to think that the subjective is not connected with the objective in the way you are trying to push it

You have absolutely no basis to say that it "by no means affects the objective existence of a thing."  This is your fundamental error.  How can you possibly know that without making a (as I noted before) "totally unnecessary and wholly unfalsifiable assumption?"  How can you possibility know what the objective existence of something is without being aware of it?  To falsify your assumption requires that you would need to be aware of its objective existence independent of your awareness of its objective existence.  Your assumption negates its own possibility.

Whereas you make an assumption that impossible to falsify empirically or logically, I make exactly zero assumptions.

This point isn't even anything novel.  This is taught in classrooms globally.  I hate appealing to authority, but how many academic references would you need to convince you otherwise?  Though, the explanation contained in this very post is enough to prove the flaw in your assumption beyond all doubt.  You are making an assumption that is absolutely impossible to establish, provide reasonable grounds for, or falsify, and there is not a shred of evidence to support it.

A mind that worships imaginary gods is unlikely to recognize that Homo Sapiens are the only true gods of Earth. This is catastrophic, and part of the reason we are still such awful stewards for this place.

Now you go where you started at. I don't want to repeat what I have said earlier. If I assert that something exists, or otherwise ascribe some meaning to it (since that seems to be your point), this by no means affects the objective existence of a thing. In this way, asserting the existence of something is not the same as its objective existence, which is not dependent on someone assigning a meaning to it (or just stating that it exists)...

It seems that you got lost in purposeless verbiage

1)  The mere existence of something is meaningful.  That is, if you assert something exists, then it is imbued with meaning, and it is your awareness of its existant form that determines, in tandem with each other, that 1) it exists, and 2) to that extent (at the very least) it is meaningful.  Existence and meaning are a package deal.

2)
Yes it does.  See #1.  

If you meant to say that I, as a subject, determine the meaning of things (e.g. their usefulness in achieving my ends), then yes, I am. But I don't see how that goes against my favoritism toward indeterminism


That I cannot agree with. If I determine the meaning of things, it doesn't mean that I determine their existence since meaning is subjective (me), existence is objective (thing). In other words, existence is an intrinsic quality of things while meaning is not. Removing the former from a thing would be equal to destroying it, while changing the latter does nothing to it and its existence (since meaning is not an intrinsic characteristic of it)...

1) Correct, objects are not made meaningful or meaningless by themselves.  Information of any kind is utterly meaningless unless it is processed by some entity capable of processing and rendering that information in a meaningful way.  Thus...

2) ...I am not ascribing them any intrinsic meaning in and of themselves as you suggest.  Although, I would like to point out that you seem to be making some very definitive claims about the nature of objects in general, which goes against your favoritism towards indeterminism as an explanatory model (i.e. you are determining their meaning).

3) Again, meaning is derived from a subject-object relationship.  You seem to acknowledge this by claiming that objects are neither meaningful nor meaningless (see #1).

4) If you acknowledge #3, then you should also acknowledge that you cannot say objects (like cancer) can exist (imbuing them with your own meaning) outside of subjective awareness.

You think religion is despised only by those brainwashed (mentally abused) by it? How easily you forget all those who were/are physically abused on religious grounds.

Rape and torture by disciples of religion are not uncommon throughout the world, even now. Superstition is the enemy of reason, and therefore the ally of violence. Doubly true for women.

Go watch India's daughter and see the results of superstitious society.

i don't think people hate a specific religion
they just hate bad people that can be found any where

A lot of those kinds of atheists had been religious at one stage and had a reaction considerably the same as an event that causes people to be racist.

Anyway, they end up hating religion because of what religion did to them.

Personally I'm deist, I believing in God but I was never naive enough to be brainwashed into some pathetic religion and used and controlled like some atheists were, so I never grew up to resent the belief in God, yet I still remain rational in my beliefs.

It's not so much religion that I despise, it's the brainwashing of innocent children during formative years that I find ethically repugnant. All around the world they are ruining minds, warping and perverting critical thinking circuits with lies.

Religion would be dead and gone long ago if our civilization strictly forbid religious brainwashing, and only taught basic critical reasoning skills up through age 14. So too would the state, if we also forbid nationalist indoctrination in schools.

A compassionate society of the world is waiting for us, all we have to do is want it badly enough and it will be ours. I know this to be true, for this place already exists in the hearts of many alive today, we have visited it in our imaginations.



Yours in compassion and solidarity,

World Citizen Beliathon