This doesn't prove that your "Reality" is either deterministic or random (let alone a "synthesis" of both)...
I wasn't trying to prove that reality is "either deterministic or random." Furthermore, asserting that Reality is instead "self-determinate," and that self-determination is an explanatory model synthesizing both determinism and indeterminism, does not amount to saying that Reality is both determinate and indeterminate. Rather, I'm asserting it is self-determinate, of which determinism and indeterminism are constituents.
...since there is nothing that would forbid the "causes" for both determinacy and indeterminacy (whichever you choose to stick with) to be this Reality's attributes, i.e. inherent properties...
Correct, but this doesn't necessarily lead to an infinite regression. Where is the infinite regression, for example, in A --> B --> C --> A --> ...?
And, I guess, what is meant by "self-guidance" has nothing to do with that synthesis, which is not possible per se (since as soon as you allow some randomness, the world ultimately becomes indeterministic)
Incorrect, except at a topological level of understanding. Determinism and indeterminism are concepts formulated out of relevance to each other, similar to causality and randomness. Randomness is a product of a causal probability function of randomness.
http://individual.utoronto.ca/lpgerson/Plato_On_Identity_Sameness_And_Difference.pdfThe answer to the objection that we could specify identity and have nothing left
over for sameness is this. The attempt to identify, let alone re-identify, an existent with
divisible identity requires the inclusion of its divisible essence. That is, it is by using
divisible essence as a criterion that we identify something. For example, we determine
that this man has the same height today that he had yesterday. The divisible essence
cannot itself be constitutive of the existential identity. In the above frames (2) and (3), to
identify A1 or A2, we have to cognize it as something, as having some structure or other.
We have to cognize its divisible essence, regardless of our theory of what essence is
exactly or how we cognize it. The only way that the sameness of A1 and A2 could be
made impossible is by claiming that the identity of each is utterly uncognizable. Since
we do cognize divisible essence, the impossibility of sameness among different selfidentical
things is refuted, which is all Plato really needs to do. For the nominalist
objections do not amount to a quibble about this or that case of sameness; they typically
rest on the denial of the very possibility of sameness among self-identical things.36
What we are saying in all these cases is,
basically, that two or more things that appear to be different in some way or another
really are identical or one.39 In Platonic terms, we are saying that a diversity of essence
rests upon an identity.
Determinism and indeterminism, or causality and randomness, arise from a diversity of essence resting upon a common identity. Any event we deem to be "random" is variant with respect to external causality (e.g. a random result "x" from a RNG is caused by a chance probability function), and any event we deem to be "causal" is invariant with respect to internal acausality (e.g. an RNG is not dependent upon its mutually-exclusive products).
Self-determinism (in this case, of logic, which both describes and is described by itself), synthesizes these perspectives to unify our understanding of them, relatively in terms of each other, and absolutely in terms of self-determinism.
