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Topic: [350 GH/s] "Eligius" (experimental) pool: almost feeless PPS, hoppers welcome - page 8. (Read 116988 times)

full member
Activity: 123
Merit: 100
If you know of a better way, feel free to suggest it. Every other way I've seen is unfair to some normal miners.

The score-based method is not better, but it definitely is easier for miners to understand (and it seems to work well on Slush's pool), and is less confusing. It is also way easier to implement.

Also, a few general ideas :

* You wanted to put a fee ? Do it.
* If you do so, consider adding the tx fees in the rewards. We would be the first pool to do this at the moment !
* If you keep MaxPPS, please, please, write a clear explanation and/or a FAQ in the wiki. And announce when you'll deploy it.
newbie
Activity: 70
Merit: 0
legendary
Activity: 2576
Merit: 1186
Your examples at http://eligius.st/wiki/index.php/Maximum_PPS always show miners with leftover 'value' balances, even with no intent to pool-hop.
The error is in assuming either 'value' or 'earnings' are owed to the miner. Until the miner does the actual work (collected in 'value') and earned the pool enough funds (collected in 'earnings'), nothing is due under MaxPPS. For an ordinary miner, in an ordinary scenario, doing the work should also earn the funds required. There are two scenarios where this is not the case:
  • someone withholding valid blocks -- in this case, under MaxPPS, he harms the overall pool income, and inevitably everyone is hit with a loss in 'earnings' -- with straight PPS, the pool operator takes 100% of the risk for this, even if he charges a large fee (both DeepBit and BitPenny charged 10%, and the latter had to close because it was losing too much money even still)
  • pool hoppers -- in this case, under MaxPPS, pool hoppers might continue to work only on short blocks, and always participate in earning the pool the appropriate funds to pay for the work they do, but they are never paid more than the work they do, so there is no incentive to hop -- under straight Proportional, these miners would only participate when there was a chance at getting paid more than the work they put into the pool, and inevitably the pool would be left empty if everyone did it

Disregarding the independent question of fees, it seems MaxPPS pays out less than PPS for any fixed time period. It approaches PPS over an infinite timeframe.
You can't fairly disregard fees here. Straight PPS is impractical even with a 10% fee. MaxPPS should pay out more than that remaining 90% in theory.

Depending on the number of independent miners with small unclaimed 'value' balances, the operator might wind up holding an arbitrarily large balance in the 'value' reserve.
The mistake here is in assuming the pool actually has funds to pay everyone's "value"; if that is the case, it also means everyone has the "earnings" too. The only time these are different are in excessive periods of bad luck (possibly induced artificially by a cheater) when everyone shares the "hit", or excessive periods of luck where everyone is paid in full for the work they do (and all build a reserve to cover the risk of future bad luck).

Hard to see why that would be preferred by miners when there are other ways to disincentivize hopping.
If you know of a better way, feel free to suggest it. Every other way I've seen is unfair to some normal miners.
newbie
Activity: 70
Merit: 0
Is anybody else seeing really ridiculously low hash rates today on Eligius?  I mean on the stats page for your username-my hash rate looks fine locally on the machines but the site is telling me I have almost nothing.

This is the US server, I couldn't even get the hashrate over 0 on the euro server.

I was on the US server for several hours last night, and while my graphs showed activity, the reported "submitted shares" was 0, which was absolutely wrong. So I switched to EU overnight and this morning it looks fine. I will stay away from the US server until this "upgrade" is completed.
hero member
Activity: 608
Merit: 500
Is anybody else seeing really ridiculously low hash rates today on Eligius?  I mean on the stats page for your username-my hash rate looks fine locally on the machines but the site is telling me I have almost nothing.

This is the US server, I couldn't even get the hashrate over 0 on the euro server.
newbie
Activity: 59
Merit: 0
Only making the expected return per next-share-contributed be totally independent of the pool history/round-lengths can strategic entry/exit be made profitless. One way to do this is to pay a fixed amount per share no matter what the relation to successful blocks.. but that requires the pool to have a reserve and insure the long dry spells.
MaxPPS is like this, but makes the "reserve" per-user so they can't cheat the pool by withholding blocks.
So it shows as earnings, but they're on hold indefinitely until you work some more? An amount held hostage to ensure loyalty?
No, and I'm tired of refuting these ridiculous misexplanations that seem to assume some few elite should pool hop while everyone else shouldn't.

Your examples at http://eligius.st/wiki/index.php/Maximum_PPS always show miners with leftover 'value' balances, even with no intent to pool-hop.

The only way they seem to get these is by continuing to mine, right?

Disregarding the independent question of fees, it seems MaxPPS pays out less than PPS for any fixed time period. It approaches PPS over an infinite timeframe. Depending on the number of independent miners with small unclaimed 'value' balances, the operator might wind up holding an arbitrarily large balance in the 'value' reserve.

Hard to see why that would be preferred by miners when there are other ways to disincentivize hopping.

And I'm not even sure MaxPPS does completely disincentivize hopping. Whenever a miner has a positive 'value' balance, it seems hopping is still worthwhile: it's the best possible way to push 'earnings' up to the 'value' without overshooting which would leave still more 'value' held as a security deposit (if that's a more respectful term than 'hostage') to the pool operator.
legendary
Activity: 2576
Merit: 1186
Only making the expected return per next-share-contributed be totally independent of the pool history/round-lengths can strategic entry/exit be made profitless. One way to do this is to pay a fixed amount per share no matter what the relation to successful blocks.. but that requires the pool to have a reserve and insure the long dry spells.
MaxPPS is like this, but makes the "reserve" per-user so they can't cheat the pool by withholding blocks.
So it shows as earnings, but they're on hold indefinitely until you work some more? An amount held hostage to ensure loyalty?
No, and I'm tired of refuting these ridiculous misexplanations that seem to assume some few elite should pool hop while everyone else shouldn't.
member
Activity: 112
Merit: 10
Firstbits: 1yetiax
To all of you who want a fee : there's nothing stopping you from donating a small percentage of your payouts back to the pool, really Tongue
True. That's why I just donated the "small change" to the pool. But I still like the "1% fee on the first x blocks of the day" concept if that would enable Luke-Jr to work on the pool part time and not on spare time.
newbie
Activity: 59
Merit: 0
Only making the expected return per next-share-contributed be totally independent of the pool history/round-lengths can strategic entry/exit be made profitless. One way to do this is to pay a fixed amount per share no matter what the relation to successful blocks.. but that requires the pool to have a reserve and insure the long dry spells.
MaxPPS is like this, but makes the "reserve" per-user so they can't cheat the pool by withholding blocks.

So it shows as earnings, but they're on hold indefinitely until you work some more? An amount held hostage to ensure loyalty?

Seems a lot like scrip you can only spend at the company store – an abusive practice from the old company/mining towns of yore.

Strongly, strongly dislike this MaxPPS as described. Seems against the transparency/instantness that was the initial appeal of Eligius.

I can see how for a miner that commits to Eligius for 'now and forever' it eventually evens out to about the same as pure PPS (or PPLNS). But my guess is miners as a group have a very large discount rate given all the levels of uncertainty in the bitcoin economy, so a system that requires an indefinite commitment to get full returns will have a small audience.
newbie
Activity: 59
Merit: 0
The only way I can see it being considered unfair is if there's a belief that every share needs to actually earn something, no matter how far removed it is from a success, rather than just earn a equal chance at something. But if that is a strong belief, just go with Deepbit-style pay-per-share. Other hard-to-understand improvised blended models create gaming opportunities for miners or the pool operator.
Straight PPS is vulnerable to withholding attack due to infinite risk for the pool operator.

Not straight PPS; the proposal I made. For distinction let's call it Pay-Per-Last-N-Shares (PPLNS).

There's no risk to the pool operator, they only pay when there's a hit, and they always pay exactly the last N shares received. Earlier shares get nothing.

There's no increased or decreased return to any miner based on time of entry or exit, because payouts have nothing to do with past history or the length of the current round or the pool operator's reserves or whatever.

My initial intuition was N could be any number up to the average number of shares expected to yield a hit, but on further thought, I think N can be anything so long as it is constant. Exercise left to the reader.
legendary
Activity: 2576
Merit: 1186
The only way I can see it being considered unfair is if there's a belief that every share needs to actually earn something, no matter how far removed it is from a success, rather than just earn a equal chance at something. But if that is a strong belief, just go with Deepbit-style pay-per-share. Other hard-to-understand improvised blended models create gaming opportunities for miners or the pool operator.
Straight PPS is vulnerable to withholding attack due to infinite risk for the pool operator.
newbie
Activity: 59
Merit: 0
Base payouts on exactly the last N shares submitted, where N < the expected number of shares that will yield one block.

Yes, that means on a long round that takes for example 3N shares to reach, there's no credit at all for the first 2N shares submitted. Tough cookies. They had as much a chance as any other to be rewarded, there was no way to know in advance they wouldn't, and there's no incentive to leave after contributing them because the future is unknown and has as much positive expectation as ever. Ignore Sunk Costs.

What if a round takes less than N shares, say N/2 shares? Reach back to the previous N/2 shares – those that already paid out once – and pay them again. This situation too was just as unpredictable as the chance the next N shares will yield no blocks, so people can't gain any advantage by timing their entry or departure.
Already thought of this. Someone pointed out it's even less fair than the score-based approaches.


How is it unfair? Can you explain or provide a link or query that would find prior discussion?

I think it's like a score system but with a hard cliff for shares over a certain age (in share ticks), rather than slow decay.

Another benefit would be that less state is required to calculate payouts, because you only need a fixed-size rolling window of the last N shares to calculate payout on the next hit. Fewer disk space problems!

For people who believe that a long round means a pool is 'due' (a fallacy but popular), it might even encourage participation in long rounds.

The only way I can see it being considered unfair is if there's a belief that every share needs to actually earn something, no matter how far removed it is from a success, rather than just earn a equal chance at something. But if that is a strong belief, just go with Deepbit-style pay-per-share. Other hard-to-understand improvised blended models create gaming opportunities for miners or the pool operator.
newbie
Activity: 14
Merit: 0
Thanks for the replies Luke, I'm glad to see the big upgrade will solve those issues.  I'll try to find the IRC channel so I can follow the discussions live.
legendary
Activity: 2576
Merit: 1186
Base payouts on exactly the last N shares submitted, where N < the expected number of shares that will yield one block.

Yes, that means on a long round that takes for example 3N shares to reach, there's no credit at all for the first 2N shares submitted. Tough cookies. They had as much a chance as any other to be rewarded, there was no way to know in advance they wouldn't, and there's no incentive to leave after contributing them because the future is unknown and has as much positive expectation as ever. Ignore Sunk Costs.

What if a round takes less than N shares, say N/2 shares? Reach back to the previous N/2 shares – those that already paid out once – and pay them again. This situation too was just as unpredictable as the chance the next N shares will yield no blocks, so people can't gain any advantage by timing their entry or departure.
Already thought of this. Someone pointed out it's even less fair than the score-based approaches.

Only making the expected return per next-share-contributed be totally independent of the pool history/round-lengths can strategic entry/exit be made profitless. One way to do this is to pay a fixed amount per share no matter what the relation to successful blocks.. but that requires the pool to have a reserve and insure the long dry spells.
MaxPPS is like this, but makes the "reserve" per-user so they can't cheat the pool by withholding blocks.

Underpayments on the long blocks will be made up retroactively regardless of whether a miner has continued on the pool or not.
Then how does this punish pool hoppers?  It just delays their payout, but does not diminish it?
It's not supposed to punish pool hoppers (it's their right to hop-- so punishing them would be wrong). They simply don't earn any more than someone mining normally, so there's no incentive to do it.

1. Would it be possible to combine the earnings of both pools so those of us mining on slower rigs can reach the 1 BTC cash-out amount quicker?
The "big upgrade" I'm working on will be able to combine the pools to work together. The minimum payout will also likely be reduced.

In the US pool, there is mention of two different metrics: value and earnings.  When I check the http://eligius.st/~artefact2/us/ website, I can only see my unpaid reward, which is basically the total of the lowest of both value and earnings.

2. Would it be possible to display both the earnings and the value in the report so I have an idea how much more BTC I can expect to gain on future long blocks?
This is planned for the permanent version of MaxPPS.

I think one complaint people have is the lack of transparency we have in the process.  Your US pool's HDD was running out of space, so you shut it out.  You mentioned it would be good for another 48 hours, then a few moments later you shut it down anyways.  Those 48 hours would've made the difference for me and I'm sure many others of getting near the the minimum payment quota.  You gave us no ETA on when the US pool will be re-opened, which is a first step for us to begin mining so we can generate enough shares to get our first payment.
It was running out of space fast, and I had the opportunity to move it somewhere relatively quickly (~12 hours). All real-time discussion, including what's going on with the pools, takes place in our IRC channel.

Is the EU pool at risk of closing down due to lack of HDD space also?
The Europe server is far more powerful and has far more space than the US server. I'm not worried about it.

full member
Activity: 123
Merit: 100
If we ever see per-address-signing, I may add some "premium" statistics for people who choose to donate a % of their rewards to the pool. But we're definitely not there yet.
newbie
Activity: 47
Merit: 0
To all of you who want a fee : there's nothing stopping you from donating a small percentage of your payouts back to the pool, really Tongue
The number of people who would donate would be a very small percentage of the pool.  A small percentage of people donating a small percentage of coins means a small donation overall, and wouldn't solve the problem.

That being said, I'll put my money where my mouth is and send 1% of my total Eligius earnings once I actually get paid the btc I'm owned by it.
full member
Activity: 123
Merit: 100
To all of you who want a fee : there's nothing stopping you from donating a small percentage of your payouts back to the pool, really Tongue

In fact, if a fee is ever going to appear, I think it should be bounded : for example min(1% per block, 2 BTC a day). In this example, this is the same as taking a fee on only the first 4 blocks of a day. This would avoid the "DeepBit effect" where you can get insanely rich if the pool gets really big.
newbie
Activity: 47
Merit: 0
I would pay up to 5% to keep the pool running as I'm in it for the lulz and not to optimize my profit.
I think even the pure profit folks would likely prefer a reliable/stable pool with a well funded maintainer than one that is purely volunteer/spare time maintenance only.

I really like Eligius' way of (not) registering clients.  This makes it really easy to add/remove/change my mining HW configuration.  I also like its transparency (except for the recent change).  I really want Eligius to succeed - and having some guaranteed BTC flow into Luke's pocket would help I think.
member
Activity: 112
Merit: 10
Firstbits: 1yetiax
+1

I would pay up to 5% to keep the pool running as I'm in it for the lulz and not to optimize my profit.
newbie
Activity: 14
Merit: 0
It would be interesting to do a poll to see how much people would be willing to allow an automatic fixed cut to be.  I wouldn't mind a few % if it gave Luke the resources needed to run this full-time.
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