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Topic: [ANN] [KEY] KeyCoin | Fair Launch | Daily Updates | 8/9 Status Update - page 11. (Read 188834 times)

full member
Activity: 125
Merit: 100
it looks to me that we are teetering on the edge. some good news from the devs is needed or we could slide right down.
we need some trust building announcements and soon. or the fudders win

I hate to break it to you...  It's the dev's that manipulate the key market the most.  Prom is buying as much of this coin as he can right now.  This coin will be his black coin. 20k to 500k here we go.
sr. member
Activity: 391
Merit: 250
How did you come to this conclusion?

I compiled it and tested it. And I completely understand how it works. I just can't run this program on the linux laptop that I'm currently using.


He came to that conclusion because you've used that excuse and similar excuses for about the 10th time now.

Also, just one simple question for you:  you've previously claimed that you are genuinely concerned about anonymity tech and its issues, so why haven't you questioned or challenged the Cloak or XC people about their anon?  You've been very obsessed with just Keycoin. Appears incredibly biased to me.
newbie
Activity: 56
Merit: 0
pbremen01: It's amazing how full of crap you are and any time you are challenged to prove something you always have an excuse.

Don't worry I'm in the process of setting up a test for you now with several completely unconnected wallets. If you can't deanonymise it yourself due to [insert excuse here] then feel free to pass it on to one of your friends who claim that they can do so.

Hell I'll even provide all of the wallet.dat files upon the conclusion of the test so that it can be independently verified if the test has been a success or failure. (After they've been emptied of funds of course).

If you send the same amount at the same time then of course this program could print the wrong addresses. What is here to prove?

But by manually sending the same amount of coins you're actually manually replicating other technologies for anonymization that are not implemented in KeyCoin. In fact, you're actually claiming that there exists better methods for anonymization than these that are implemented in KeyCoin (for example, CoinJoin with "denomination").

And your method isn't practical at all. If you own 10 coins, then with your method you can't send 10 coins anonymously (because you need to have at least (for example) 50 coins to send 5 separate transactions of 10 coins).



Of course my method isn't practical for the average user but it will prove that you can't really track from the destination to the source in this kind of scenario which would likely be replicated when there are many transactions moving at any one time.

The only thing that makes it possible currently is a blockchain with very few transactions. The program merely makes an educated guess on the source transactions and therefore the wallet address(es) that sent it in the first place. It doesn't disprove the anonymity solution works, it is merely exploiting the lack of transactions to jump to that conclusion easier.



Lack of transactions makes things easier for this program. However, similar methods can be employed in bitcoin and they work. Mixers have to be very sophisticated to hide transactions. But it seems that the mixer in keycoin is not.

hero member
Activity: 630
Merit: 502
pbremen01: It's amazing how full of crap you are and any time you are challenged to prove something you always have an excuse.

Don't worry I'm in the process of setting up a test for you now with several completely unconnected wallets. If you can't deanonymise it yourself due to [insert excuse here] then feel free to pass it on to one of your friends who claim that they can do so.

Hell I'll even provide all of the wallet.dat files upon the conclusion of the test so that it can be independently verified if the test has been a success or failure. (After they've been emptied of funds of course).

If you send the same amount at the same time then of course this program could print the wrong addresses. What is here to prove?

But by manually sending the same amount of coins you're actually manually replicating other technologies for anonymization that are not implemented in KeyCoin. In fact, you're actually claiming that there exists better methods for anonymization than these that are implemented in KeyCoin (for example, CoinJoin with "denomination").

And your method isn't practical at all. If you own 10 coins, then with your method you can't send 10 coins anonymously (because you need to have at least (for example) 50 coins to send 5 separate transactions of 10 coins).



Of course my method isn't practical for the average user but it will prove that you can't really track from the destination to the source in this kind of scenario which would likely be replicated when there are many transactions moving at any one time.

The only thing that makes it possible currently is a blockchain with very few transactions. The program merely makes an educated guess on the source transactions and therefore the wallet address(es) that sent it in the first place. It doesn't disprove the anonymity solution works, it is merely exploiting the lack of transactions to jump to that conclusion easier.

newbie
Activity: 56
Merit: 0
"Two examples of KeyCoin deanonymization with new deanonymizer program":
http://crypto-news.tumblr.com/post/94329216643/two-examples-of-keycoin-deanonymization-with-new
Seriously are you still on that? Tracking an anonymous transaction when there are practically no other transactions moving about isn't exactly difficult because it's not hard to make an educated guess as to the source transactions by looking back a few blocks and taking fees into account along the way. Anyone could do this by examining the block explorer. (You don't need a program to come to an educated guess).
These transactions seem to be fairly old and are from the good old times when there were at least some transactions in the blockchain
However, if I were to send several anonymous transactions of equal amounts, all from unique wallets, all within a short space of time there is no way in hell this program (or anyone trying to decipher it manually) would be able to come to an educated guess because there would be too much transaction congestion to figure out which transactions came from which wallet or end up at which destination.
That's true. If several wallets send the same amount at almost the same time, then this method won't work 100%.
However, this method still gives you list of the addresses that sender exerts at least some control over them (it owns private keys or it has the power to use them to create "fake" transactions). The "working" anonymity implementation should not allow even such "guesses" - such guesses are more than enough for someone (law enforcement etc.) to track you.
And this method could probably be modified to distinguish "fake" transactions from the "real" ones based on the the way how "real" transactions look in the blockchain (for example, "real" transactions use inputs that are outputs of the transactions in the same block, one could also "color" some coins and send them through the mixer etc.).

But the devs will have to prove that such attacks don't and can't work (even in the case when - for example - someone decompiles precompiled binaries etc.).

I'll tell you what I'll do. I'm going to set up a test for you with 6 brand new 100% isolated wallets, 5 of which will be the starting point for 5 anonymous transactions of equal value. The other will be a receiving wallet with 5 receiving addresses (one for each incoming transaction).
You can then test the program on the 5 incoming txids/block heights and see if you can figure out which wallet initiated any of them. I guarantee neither you or the program will be able to figure it out which addresses sent coins to which addresses. If you do it will be pure luck.

I can't run this program because I'm currently on linux box and I'm not going to mess with mono.
I don't understand what are you trying to prove. If you send same amount at the same time, then this program may find the wrong addresses. There's no need to prove this because it can be seen from source code.
However, it can (with modifications) find all these addresses that you control. This is enough for deanonymization.


I lol'd, you haven't even tested it yourself, now you're saying it needs modifications to work lmao. Thanks for showing everyone how full of shit you are. Now gtfo, key devs will deliver their promises soon enough.


How did you come to this conclusion?

I compiled it and tested it. And I completely understand how it works. I just can't run this program on the linux laptop that I'm currently using.
newbie
Activity: 56
Merit: 0
pbremen01: It's amazing how full of crap you are and any time you are challenged to prove something you always have an excuse.

Don't worry I'm in the process of setting up a test for you now with several completely unconnected wallets. If you can't deanonymise it yourself due to [insert excuse here] then feel free to pass it on to one of your friends who claim that they can do so.

Hell I'll even provide all of the wallet.dat files upon the conclusion of the test so that it can be independently verified if the test has been a success or failure. (After they've been emptied of funds of course).

If you send the same amount at the same time then of course this program could print the wrong addresses. What is here to prove?

But by manually sending the same amount of coins you're actually manually replicating other technologies for anonymization that are not implemented in KeyCoin. In fact, you're actually claiming that there exists better methods for anonymization than these that are implemented in KeyCoin (for example, CoinJoin with "denomination").

And your method isn't practical at all. If you own 10 coins, then with your method you can't send 10 coins anonymously (because you need to have at least (for example) 50 coins to send 5 separate transactions of 10 coins).

full member
Activity: 195
Merit: 100
Magic internet moneys ftw
"Two examples of KeyCoin deanonymization with new deanonymizer program":
http://crypto-news.tumblr.com/post/94329216643/two-examples-of-keycoin-deanonymization-with-new
Seriously are you still on that? Tracking an anonymous transaction when there are practically no other transactions moving about isn't exactly difficult because it's not hard to make an educated guess as to the source transactions by looking back a few blocks and taking fees into account along the way. Anyone could do this by examining the block explorer. (You don't need a program to come to an educated guess).
These transactions seem to be fairly old and are from the good old times when there were at least some transactions in the blockchain
However, if I were to send several anonymous transactions of equal amounts, all from unique wallets, all within a short space of time there is no way in hell this program (or anyone trying to decipher it manually) would be able to come to an educated guess because there would be too much transaction congestion to figure out which transactions came from which wallet or end up at which destination.
That's true. If several wallets send the same amount at almost the same time, then this method won't work 100%.
However, this method still gives you list of the addresses that sender exerts at least some control over them (it owns private keys or it has the power to use them to create "fake" transactions). The "working" anonymity implementation should not allow even such "guesses" - such guesses are more than enough for someone (law enforcement etc.) to track you.
And this method could probably be modified to distinguish "fake" transactions from the "real" ones based on the the way how "real" transactions look in the blockchain (for example, "real" transactions use inputs that are outputs of the transactions in the same block, one could also "color" some coins and send them through the mixer etc.).

But the devs will have to prove that such attacks don't and can't work (even in the case when - for example - someone decompiles precompiled binaries etc.).

I'll tell you what I'll do. I'm going to set up a test for you with 6 brand new 100% isolated wallets, 5 of which will be the starting point for 5 anonymous transactions of equal value. The other will be a receiving wallet with 5 receiving addresses (one for each incoming transaction).
You can then test the program on the 5 incoming txids/block heights and see if you can figure out which wallet initiated any of them. I guarantee neither you or the program will be able to figure it out which addresses sent coins to which addresses. If you do it will be pure luck.

I can't run this program because I'm currently on linux box and I'm not going to mess with mono.
I don't understand what are you trying to prove. If you send same amount at the same time, then this program may find the wrong addresses. There's no need to prove this because it can be seen from source code.
However, it can (with modifications) find all these addresses that you control. This is enough for deanonymization.


I lol'd, you haven't even tested it yourself, now you're saying it needs modifications to work lmao. Thanks for showing everyone how full of shit you are. Now gtfo, key devs will deliver their promises soon enough. We need a moderated thread to ban this blabbering buffoon.
hero member
Activity: 630
Merit: 502
pbremen01: It's amazing how full of crap you are and any time you are challenged to prove something you always have an excuse.

Don't worry I'm in the process of setting up a test for you now with several completely unconnected wallets. If you can't deanonymise it yourself due to [insert excuse here] then feel free to pass it on to one of your friends who claim that they can do so.

Hell I'll even provide all of the wallet.dat files upon the conclusion of the test so that it can be independently verified if the test has been a success or failure. (After they've been emptied of funds of course).
newbie
Activity: 56
Merit: 0
I can't run this program because I'm currently on linux box and I'm not going to mess with mono.

I don't understand what are you trying to prove. If you send same amount at the same time, then this program may find the wrong addresses. There's no need to prove this because it can be seen from source code.

However, it can (with modifications) find all these addresses that you control. This is enough for deanonymization.

It's pretty obvious what I'm trying to prove and that is it doesn't actually deanonymise anything. It merely looks for values of a similar amount (taking account of fees) and makes a logical assumption about which transactions (and therefore wallets) originated it, a fact that is made easier by very limited transactions on the blockchain at any one time.

There is no real link between these transactions and if the blockchain was more congested it would be damn near impossible to figure out.

With 5 completely separate wallets as I am proposing there would be absolutely no way to trace any transaction back to the originating wallet, this is proof enough that in a more congested blockchain with many people sending anonymous transactions at any one time it would be impossible to track them.

You don't need "link" between transactions in the blockchain to deanonymize it. There is probably no link because mixers probably don't send the same coins to the final recipient.

If you - for example - send 84.237482496 coins then looking in blockchain for amounts that are equal to this one (even if they are part of different transactions) usually yields only one result.

Such method of deanonymization works even in larger networks with lots of transactions, for example in bitcoin. That's why mixers have employed much more advanced methods of hiding transactions. For example, they steal some coins (the recipient doesn't receive

84.237482496 - transaction fees

but instead it receives

84.237482496 - transaction fees - amount of coins stolen

). And mixers also send coins to recipients to several addresses and over much longer period of time which may be very random (days or even weeks).


hero member
Activity: 630
Merit: 502
I can't run this program because I'm currently on linux box and I'm not going to mess with mono.

I don't understand what are you trying to prove. If you send same amount at the same time, then this program may find the wrong addresses. There's no need to prove this because it can be seen from source code.

However, it can (with modifications) find all these addresses that you control. This is enough for deanonymization.

It's pretty obvious what I'm trying to prove and that is it doesn't actually deanonymise anything. It merely looks for values of a similar amount (taking account of fees) and makes a logical assumption about which transactions (and therefore wallets) originated it, a fact that is made easier by very limited transactions on the blockchain at any one time.

There is no real link between these transactions and if the blockchain was more congested it would be damn near impossible to figure out.

With 5 completely separate wallets as I am proposing there would be absolutely no way to trace any transaction back to the originating wallet, this is proof enough that in a more congested blockchain with many people sending anonymous transactions at any one time it would be impossible to track them.
newbie
Activity: 56
Merit: 0
"Two examples of KeyCoin deanonymization with new deanonymizer program":

http://crypto-news.tumblr.com/post/94329216643/two-examples-of-keycoin-deanonymization-with-new



Seriously are you still on that? Tracking an anonymous transaction when there are practically no other transactions moving about isn't exactly difficult because it's not hard to make an educated guess as to the source transactions by looking back a few blocks and taking fees into account along the way. Anyone could do this by examining the block explorer. (You don't need a program to come to an educated guess).


These transactions seem to be fairly old and are from the good old times when there were at least some transactions in the blockchain


However, if I were to send several anonymous transactions of equal amounts, all from unique wallets, all within a short space of time there is no way in hell this program (or anyone trying to decipher it manually) would be able to come to an educated guess because there would be too much transaction congestion to figure out which transactions came from which wallet or end up at which destination.


That's true. If several wallets send the same amount at almost the same time, then this method won't work 100%.

However, this method still gives you list of the addresses that sender exerts at least some control over them (it owns private keys or it has the power to use them to create "fake" transactions). The "working" anonymity implementation should not allow even such "guesses" - such guesses are more than enough for someone (law enforcement etc.) to track you.

And this method could probably be modified to distinguish "fake" transactions from the "real" ones based on the the way how "real" transactions look in the blockchain (for example, "real" transactions use inputs that are outputs of the transactions in the same block, one could also "color" some coins and send them through the mixer etc.).

But the devs will have to prove that such attacks don't and can't work (even in the case when - for example - someone decompiles precompiled binaries etc.).

I'll tell you what I'll do. I'm going to set up a test for you with 6 brand new 100% isolated wallets, 5 of which will be the starting point for 5 anonymous transactions of equal value. The other will be a receiving wallet with 5 receiving addresses (one for each incoming transaction).

You can then test the program on the 5 incoming txids/block heights and see if you can figure out which wallet initiated any of them. I guarantee neither you or the program will be able to figure it out which addresses sent coins to which addresses. If you do it will be pure luck.

I can't run this program because I'm currently on linux box and I'm not going to mess with mono.

I don't understand what are you trying to prove. If you send same amount at the same time, then this program may find the wrong addresses. There's no need to prove this because it can be seen from source code.

However, it can (with modifications) find all these addresses that you control. This is enough for deanonymization.


And for such "manual" hiding of transactions you don't even need a mixer.

You could just manually create raw transaction that has inputs of the same size. This is how (some implementations of) CoinJoin work and I'm not sure that this is considered "anonymous" enough (I think that future versions of DRK may not use it, I'm not sure).

However, this coin went into another direction (mixers) but you're trying to manually replicate the inner working of other technology (CoinJoin).


hero member
Activity: 784
Merit: 1000
When I'm looking for a good coin, I usually check for three things:  Dev activity, people with money involved, and idiot haters that missed the boat.  This coin has all of them.
yes!keycoin has all of them!good dev,good activity!

Decentralized Anonymous System – 40% complete
Tor Integration – 65% complete
Trading Tools ( 100% complete beta – to be released soon)
Encrypted messaging – 90% complete

will be 200k soon!just wait!

That sounds exciting.  Amazing that ppl are selling.
newbie
Activity: 56
Merit: 0
"Two examples of KeyCoin deanonymization with new deanonymizer program":

http://crypto-news.tumblr.com/post/94329216643/two-examples-of-keycoin-deanonymization-with-new



Seriously are you still on that? Tracking an anonymous transaction when there are practically no other transactions moving about isn't exactly difficult because it's not hard to make an educated guess as to the source transactions by looking back a few blocks and taking fees into account along the way. Anyone could do this by examining the block explorer. (You don't need a program to come to an educated guess).


These transactions seem to be fairly old and are from the good old times when there were at least some transactions in the blockchain


However, if I were to send several anonymous transactions of equal amounts, all from unique wallets, all within a short space of time there is no way in hell this program (or anyone trying to decipher it manually) would be able to come to an educated guess because there would be too much transaction congestion to figure out which transactions came from which wallet or end up at which destination.


That's true. If several wallets send the same amount at almost the same time, then this method won't work 100%.

However, this method still gives you list of the addresses that sender exerts at least some control over them (it owns private keys or it has the power to use them to create "fake" transactions). The "working" anonymity implementation should not allow even such "guesses" - such guesses are more than enough for someone (law enforcement etc.) to track you.

And this method could probably be modified to distinguish "fake" transactions from the "real" ones based on the the way how "real" transactions look in the blockchain (for example, "real" transactions use inputs that are outputs of the transactions in the same block, one could also "color" some coins and send them through the mixer etc.).

But the devs will have to prove that such attacks don't and can't work (even in the case when - for example - someone decompiles precompiled binaries etc.).

I'll tell you what I'll do. I'm going to set up a test for you with 6 brand new 100% isolated wallets, 5 of which will be the starting point for 5 anonymous transactions of equal value. The other will be a receiving wallet with 5 receiving addresses (one for each incoming transaction).

You can then test the program on the 5 incoming txids/block heights and see if you can figure out which wallet initiated any of them. I guarantee neither you or the program will be able to figure it out which addresses sent coins to which addresses. If you do it will be pure luck.

I can't run this program because I'm currently on linux box and I'm not going to mess with mono.

I don't understand what are you trying to prove. If you send same amount at the same time, then this program may find the wrong addresses. There's no need to prove this because it can be seen from source code.

However, it can (with modifications) find all these addresses that you control. This is enough for deanonymization.




hero member
Activity: 630
Merit: 502
"Two examples of KeyCoin deanonymization with new deanonymizer program":

http://crypto-news.tumblr.com/post/94329216643/two-examples-of-keycoin-deanonymization-with-new



Seriously are you still on that? Tracking an anonymous transaction when there are practically no other transactions moving about isn't exactly difficult because it's not hard to make an educated guess as to the source transactions by looking back a few blocks and taking fees into account along the way. Anyone could do this by examining the block explorer. (You don't need a program to come to an educated guess).


These transactions seem to be fairly old and are from the good old times when there were at least some transactions in the blockchain


However, if I were to send several anonymous transactions of equal amounts, all from unique wallets, all within a short space of time there is no way in hell this program (or anyone trying to decipher it manually) would be able to come to an educated guess because there would be too much transaction congestion to figure out which transactions came from which wallet or end up at which destination.


That's true. If several wallets send the same amount at almost the same time, then this method won't work 100%.

However, this method still gives you list of the addresses that sender exerts at least some control over them (it owns private keys or it has the power to use them to create "fake" transactions). The "working" anonymity implementation should not allow even such "guesses" - such guesses are more than enough for someone (law enforcement etc.) to track you.

And this method could probably be modified to distinguish "fake" transactions from the "real" ones based on the the way how "real" transactions look in the blockchain (for example, "real" transactions use inputs that are outputs of the transactions in the same block, one could also "color" some coins and send them through the mixer etc.).

But the devs will have to prove that such attacks don't and can't work (even in the case when - for example - someone decompiles precompiled binaries etc.).

I'll tell you what I'll do. I'm going to set up a test for you with 6 brand new 100% isolated wallets, 5 of which will be the starting point for 5 anonymous transactions of equal value. The other will be a receiving wallet with 5 receiving addresses (one for each incoming transaction).

You can then test the program on the 5 incoming txids/block heights and see if you can figure out which wallet initiated any of them. I guarantee neither you or the program will be able to figure it out which addresses sent coins to which addresses. If you do it will be pure luck.
full member
Activity: 252
Merit: 100
need some big big big big gud news soon:S
legendary
Activity: 2184
Merit: 1028
#mitandopelomundo
to buy or not to buy. That's the question
newbie
Activity: 56
Merit: 0
"Two examples of KeyCoin deanonymization with new deanonymizer program":

http://crypto-news.tumblr.com/post/94329216643/two-examples-of-keycoin-deanonymization-with-new



Seriously are you still on that? Tracking an anonymous transaction when there are practically no other transactions moving about isn't exactly difficult because it's not hard to make an educated guess as to the source transactions by looking back a few blocks and taking fees into account along the way. Anyone could do this by examining the block explorer. (You don't need a program to come to an educated guess).


These transactions seem to be fairly old and are from the good old times when there were at least some transactions in the blockchain


However, if I were to send several anonymous transactions of equal amounts, all from unique wallets, all within a short space of time there is no way in hell this program (or anyone trying to decipher it manually) would be able to come to an educated guess because there would be too much transaction congestion to figure out which transactions came from which wallet or end up at which destination.


That's true. If several wallets send the same amount at almost the same time, then this method won't work 100%.

However, this method still gives you list of the addresses that sender exerts at least some control over them (it owns private keys or it has the power to use them to create "fake" transactions). The "working" anonymity implementation should not allow even such "guesses" - such guesses are more than enough for someone (law enforcement etc.) to track you.

And this method could probably be modified to distinguish "fake" transactions from the "real" ones based on the the way how "real" transactions look in the blockchain (for example, "real" transactions use inputs that are outputs of the transactions in the same block, one could also "color" some coins and send them through the mixer etc.).

But the devs will have to prove that such attacks don't and can't work (even in the case when - for example - someone decompiles precompiled binaries etc.).







legendary
Activity: 1778
Merit: 1043
#Free market
I missed the Twitter drama, What exactly did CoinsSource tweet out?  Huh Huh
sr. member
Activity: 280
Merit: 250
holy crap. the large players exited!

what do we do now?  Grin
newbie
Activity: 56
Merit: 0
Wow crashing Smiley Glad I got out at 106k man. Good luck here. Maybe i'll enter if things turn around but It sure doesn't look like it. Volume decreasing was a signal for me to back out. I posted this earlier. Could have gone way up or way down. Well, down it is for now.

yeah the volume shows where the large players exited, now the smaller users are waiting and slowly coming to the realization. looks like one or two got eaten alive since they left their walls in the 70-60k range to at least hope to get out close to even. (wait for that low volume pump)

to da moon!  Grin <-- sarcasm
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