May I post a suggestion here?
Since some DRK features are implemented, and some could be improved upon, the original concept for the Darkcoin masternodes (RC2/RC3 releases) involved a protocol-level enforcement of the masternode payments. The problem with these releases was that there was some kind of bug that triggered sporadic network forking by misbehaving nodes or mining clients. The consensus wasn't working as it should.
In a sense, Darkcoin tried to use a dual consensus for every block: One for the transactions / mining, and one for the masternode payout. This didn't work as planned (there were sporadic forks of the network) and DarkSend development was lagging - so a workaround system was created instead that was "safer" and relieved some of the price speculation (it was the period of the great pump - and all eyes were on DRK news and how something would succeed or fail).
In that payment system (an evolution of which, is the current system of MN payments) the pools decided whether to pay or not in a semi-voluntary scheme. If a pool wanted to cheat payment, they could. The strategy was to shame the pools that "cheated" and it worked to compliance levels of 80-90%. The added threat of "enforcement" where Evan would "flip the switch" to fork off the non-compliant pools was also added as an extra measure. However, in my view, this is not the ideal solution to the problem. Rather, it should be done like it initially was conceived so that misbehaving clients are simply forked by themselves out of the network. No centralization / enforcement switch, no need for asking pools to play nice etc etc.
Perhaps the dev wants to give it a look* and see if he can come up with a system that works and which is free of forking bugs. It could also be implemented by DRK if successful, and it would also give added credibility to SPR itself for improving something in a significant way. The good thing with SPR is that, unlike DRK which is more mature, it can risk multiple hard forks to try things out.
* Perhaps the RC2/RC3 bugged solutions of DRK where there was a voting system in place to decide the MN payments are not the ideal concept for this implementation and another idea can be used altogether.
SPR is a bit different from DRK in that there are no pools, only solo miners. I suppose some means must be found of making sure miners that find blocks pay the Masternodes according to whatever block split Mr Spread settles on. Hopefully having nothing but wallets and Masternodes will simplify the system and make it easier to build this in at the protocol level, thus avoiding the whole 'having to deal with cheating pools' situation.
I'm pleasantly surprised that no SPR miners have complained about the prospect of losing some block reward to Masternodes - they all seem to grasp that Masternodes (and thus optional anonymous transactions, and upcoming InstanTX) will bring far more value to the coin than any loss to them individually in block reward. Plus if the early miners end up running MNs - and they should - they'll be doubly well off.
