For can set bounty for -
1. Signatures, display pics on the forum (Higher the level higher the bounty).
2. Discord group invited bounties.
3. Twitter post bounties.
4. A blog or video about the project.
These are the most simple ways people can earn rewards.
Topic: [ANN][2POW] Luck - A new consensus algorithm to eliminate large mining pools - page 20. (Read 6551 times)
June 18, 2020, 10:09:46 AM
June 18, 2020, 09:44:59 AM
The testnet is about to open next week. After the test, we plan to design some bounty campaigns. Anyone have some relevant experience or ideas about bounty compaigns are welcome to make some good suggestions. 
June 18, 2020, 09:18:15 AM
Any new release?
I have been following this project for a while and look forward to a new release.
June 18, 2020, 08:09:52 AM
Large mining pools are the biggest threat to decentralization. Any proposed weakened pools must be marked better.
Good luck.
Good luck.
You are right, good projects deserve more attention
Somehow that is what is happening. BTC may look decentralize but there seem to be a central authority when it comes to mining the huge vote will disrupt consensus if there is something to decide. This project though may still now be very successful without support from big community. For it to have a community to begin with you will have to spend for bounty campaigns and promotions.
Thank you for your attention. We do not plan to design pre-mining and ICOs, but after the test, we will still design some bounty compaigns.
June 17, 2020, 10:11:57 PM
Large mining pools are the biggest threat to decentralization. Any proposed weakened pools must be marked better.
Good luck.
Good luck.
You are right, good projects deserve more attention
Somehow that is what is happening. BTC may look decentralize but there seem to be a central authority when it comes to mining the huge vote will disrupt consensus if there is something to decide. This project though may still now be very successful without support from big community. For it to have a community to begin with you will have to spend for bounty campaigns and promotions.
June 17, 2020, 10:02:38 PM
Any new release?
June 17, 2020, 09:38:45 PM
Large mining pools are the biggest threat to decentralization. Any proposed weakened pools must be marked better.
Good luck.
Good luck.
You are right, good projects deserve more attention
June 17, 2020, 09:22:12 PM
Large mining pools are the biggest threat to decentralization. Any proposed weakened pools must be marked better.
Good luck.
June 15, 2020, 02:54:34 AM
Testnet will be opened on June 25, 2020. Welcome to join.
Refer to https://lucknet.club for details.
Refer to https://lucknet.club for details.
June 14, 2020, 10:31:36 AM
this is the best solution I have seen to eliminate the threat of mining pools.
wait for testnet.
wait for testnet.
June 12, 2020, 10:17:56 AM
Nice to see something new on bitcointalk, have to read your whitepaper, but new and simple idea are always welcome.
Will follow your updates!!
Any idea on testnet/mainnet release dates?
Will follow your updates!!
Any idea on testnet/mainnet release dates?
June 12, 2020, 05:28:08 AM
Thank you very much for your attention. We will release a notice about the launch of the testnet within the next week.
June 11, 2020, 11:11:29 PM
Good luck - looks very interesting，I already follow you
June 11, 2020, 08:27:18 AM
I want to know how to participate in mining. 
June 11, 2020, 07:06:30 AM
when will the test/mainnet launch ?
June 10, 2020, 10:22:00 AM
I'm not sure to fully understand your idea.
For the 4th part in your whitepaper, the difficulty function f(l) must be sensitive enough to l to satisfy E2(m)
I really don't understand the selfish mining attack in your whitepaper, and I don’t understand how the 1/m^2 was derived?
For the 4th part in your whitepaper, the difficulty function f(l) must be sensitive enough to l to satisfy E2(m)
I really don't understand the selfish mining attack in your whitepaper, and I don’t understand how the 1/m^2 was derived?
I think it can be understood like this.
when two miners do not cooperate in mining, their luck l1 will be better, and the mining difficulty f(l1) will be lower;
when they cooperate, their luck l2 will be worse, The mining difficulty f(l2) is higher.
Although the power of their cooperation is *2, when f(l2)>2*f(l1), it can satisfy E2
From another perspective, the variance of cooperation is greater than that of non-cooperation. one-cpu-one-vote is the result.
Thank you very much. You are right. From the perspective of minimizing risk, the expected output of cooperation is low and the variance is large. Rational miners will choose to mine independently.
June 10, 2020, 01:46:45 AM
If this mechanism works properly, I think the project has great potential.
Indeed, no matter which hash function you choose, as long as you use the same idea of traditional PoW, pools are inevitable.
Indeed, no matter which hash function you choose, as long as you use the same idea of traditional PoW, pools are inevitable.
June 09, 2020, 05:42:09 AM
Due to the difference in difficulty, the fork probability of the system is reduced, which is indeed a good solution.
Good luck to you!
Good luck to you!
June 09, 2020, 11:06:51 PM
I'm not sure to fully understand your idea.
For the 4th part in your whitepaper, the difficulty function f(l) must be sensitive enough to l to satisfy E2(m)
I really don't understand the selfish mining attack in your whitepaper, and I don’t understand how the 1/m^2 was derived?
For the 4th part in your whitepaper, the difficulty function f(l) must be sensitive enough to l to satisfy E2(m)
I really don't understand the selfish mining attack in your whitepaper, and I don’t understand how the 1/m^2 was derived?
I think it can be understood like this.
when two miners do not cooperate in mining, their luck l1 will be better, and the mining difficulty f(l1) will be lower;
when they cooperate, their luck l2 will be worse, The mining difficulty f(l2) is higher.
Although the power of their cooperation is *2, when f(l2)>2*f(l1), it can satisfy E2
From another perspective, the variance of cooperation is greater than that of non-cooperation. one-cpu-one-vote is the result.
June 09, 2020, 06:02:52 AM
I'm not sure to fully understand your idea.
For the 4th part in your whitepaper, the difficulty function f(l) must be sensitive enough to l to satisfy E2(m)
I really don't understand the selfish mining attack in your whitepaper, and I don’t understand how the 1/m^2 was derived?
For the 4th part in your whitepaper, the difficulty function f(l) must be sensitive enough to l to satisfy E2(m)
I really don't understand the selfish mining attack in your whitepaper, and I don’t understand how the 1/m^2 was derived?
I think it can be understood like this.
when two miners do not cooperate in mining, their luck l1 will be better, and the mining difficulty f(l1) will be lower;
when they cooperate, their luck l2 will be worse, The mining difficulty f(l2) is higher.
Although the power of their cooperation is *2, when f(l2)>2*f(l1), it can satisfy E2
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