While I am not a fan of the "the richer the more voting power" principle either, I don't see how you would prevent this. If you have a lot of Lisk, you could just spread it over multiple accounts.
And on the other hand, I think you would need some kind of threshold. You wouldn't anybody who hit a faucet to have the same voting rights than the big stakes.
Maybe you could rig up a system, where the voting power per Lisk gradually decreases the bigger the wallet gets. And if someone would actually spread their Lisk, at least they would have to pay transaction fees…
There's questions on the forum, being ignored too.
It's not just the "richer the more voting power", it's also "the richer get richer which enables them to consolidate their position even further".
I've been looking at the BTS threads and this has been a constant issue there too.
The more I think about it, the more I think this could be Lisk's Achilles heel. I could have it all wrong, but no one has shown me how.
I've been reading about voting systems over the last few days and, to be honest, they are all flawed in the context of a cryptocurrency, which leaves a lottery component to even out the inherent bias, spread the wealth, make collusion much more expensive and much less certain. This needs to be followed by an enforced downtime of the node where it cannot be entered to the vote.
This does not guarantee that there will be no collusion and vote rigging, but it makes it much harder and more expensive to do so and it does a much better job at spreading the reward.
Remember, all that is necessary to get a slice of potentially very significant profits is to vote your server into the top 101, there could be next to no cost (relatively) to achieve this.
Also remember that the cost to vote is potentially very high for small holders, the vast majority of them won't vote (and won't care), leaving the big wallets to sort it out amongst themselves.
This isn't a case of people holding the network to ransom or attempting dodgy transactions, it's about a small, already Lisk-wealthy group of people cutting up the delegate profits (potentially very big) amongst themselves. As it stands at the moment, a delegate would get in the region of $10,000 per year. If Lisk gets to 10x's ICO (quite possible), that's $100,000 per year or $10 million between all 101 delegates each year. If you could control ten delegates, you're on a $1,000,000 per year - I think people might try to game the system for those kinds of sums.
i believe there should be an algorithm for voting nodes. maybe set a limit and a time span between votes. maybe when you vote your node is set aside for 3 voting cycles? something like this would help right?
