Topic: ♻️ [banned mixer] — FAST, SECURE and RELIABLE BITCOIN MIXER (Since 2016) ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ - page 30. (Read 48175 times)
March 10, 2018, 07:00:54 AM
Sad to see that still nothing has changed. I don't want to overexagerate but as long as this hasn't been fixed the whole mixing is useless and easily traceable even with open source blockchain analysis tools like BlockSci. And I am sure there exist even more powerful proprietary tools of services like Chainalysis and Elliptic which are already used to trace transactions of mixing services. When a service which pretends to offer privacy is shown that their privacy model is utterly broken one should at least hope that this problem is fixed asap.
February 21, 2018, 07:16:15 AM
My advice to improve the privacy of your service would be:
First attack vector: Add a small randomly chosen amount to your transaction fee. This hides the fact that a transaction is send by the same service/wallet.
Second attack vector: Offer the functionality of choosing the delay on minute basis OR add a randomly chosen delay (for example +- 10 minutes from the chosen hourly delay) to your transaction time.
First attack vector: Add a small randomly chosen amount to your transaction fee. This hides the fact that a transaction is send by the same service/wallet.
Second attack vector: Offer the functionality of choosing the delay on minute basis OR add a randomly chosen delay (for example +- 10 minutes from the chosen hourly delay) to your transaction time.
These improvements sound reasonable. We are constantly improving our algorithms and believe there is never too many measures when you deal with security and privacy. Thank you for your feedback!
It would be nice to see these improvements implemented as fast as possible so that anybody using your service receives a far better privacy. Can I somehow speed up this process by helping to implement those changes or send you some financial support?
PS: Sadly I can't send you private messages because of my Newbie status. If you are interested then leave me a private message with some contact information. Thank you!
February 20, 2018, 02:51:06 PM
I am using your service for a long time now and I am very satisfied with it. But lately I have been investigating possibilities to track transactions which were send over mixing services and I found two possible attack vectors to cluster transactions which were mixed with your service.
The first one is less effective but there is still a decent risk. The transaction fees of your service are constant when the transaction has the same size. For example three transactions with one input and two output addresses had the same size of 42.598 sat/B. Obviously the fees vary when there are more input addresses but most of the time I received transactions with one input two output and the fees were constant.
The second is more severe. Let's say we have a setup of x-forward addresses and all of them are differently delayed in time. Normally you should think that this setup is bullet proof but it isn't. As the delay steps in your service are hour based and your service is sending the transactions at exactly the same time just hourly shifted (for example: 01-01 21:10:21, 01-01 14:12:20, 01-01 03:12:18) it is easy to cluster all transactions which are connected to one mixing step. With the help of the first attack vector the analysis becomes even more effective.
With the help of those information it should be no big deal for future blockchain analysis techniques to track down the source of mixed coins. This is a big risk for a mixing service which should offer a high grade of privacy.
My advice to improve the privacy of your service would be:
First attack vector: Add a small randomly chosen amount to your transaction fee. This hides the fact that a transaction is send by the same service/wallet.
Second attack vector: Offer the functionality of choosing the delay on minute basis OR add a randomly chosen delay (for example +- 10 minutes from the chosen hourly delay) to your transaction time.
The first one is less effective but there is still a decent risk. The transaction fees of your service are constant when the transaction has the same size. For example three transactions with one input and two output addresses had the same size of 42.598 sat/B. Obviously the fees vary when there are more input addresses but most of the time I received transactions with one input two output and the fees were constant.
The second is more severe. Let's say we have a setup of x-forward addresses and all of them are differently delayed in time. Normally you should think that this setup is bullet proof but it isn't. As the delay steps in your service are hour based and your service is sending the transactions at exactly the same time just hourly shifted (for example: 01-01 21:10:21, 01-01 14:12:20, 01-01 03:12:18) it is easy to cluster all transactions which are connected to one mixing step. With the help of the first attack vector the analysis becomes even more effective.
With the help of those information it should be no big deal for future blockchain analysis techniques to track down the source of mixed coins. This is a big risk for a mixing service which should offer a high grade of privacy.
My advice to improve the privacy of your service would be:
First attack vector: Add a small randomly chosen amount to your transaction fee. This hides the fact that a transaction is send by the same service/wallet.
Second attack vector: Offer the functionality of choosing the delay on minute basis OR add a randomly chosen delay (for example +- 10 minutes from the chosen hourly delay) to your transaction time.
I have given merit to your account since I'm been also using cryptomixer for a long time and I have notice the same specially the second attack vector.
I would love to see it being implement a delay of -/+ 10 minutes will be OK I guess on my end.
My advice to improve the privacy of your service would be:
First attack vector: Add a small randomly chosen amount to your transaction fee. This hides the fact that a transaction is send by the same service/wallet.
Second attack vector: Offer the functionality of choosing the delay on minute basis OR add a randomly chosen delay (for example +- 10 minutes from the chosen hourly delay) to your transaction time.
First attack vector: Add a small randomly chosen amount to your transaction fee. This hides the fact that a transaction is send by the same service/wallet.
Second attack vector: Offer the functionality of choosing the delay on minute basis OR add a randomly chosen delay (for example +- 10 minutes from the chosen hourly delay) to your transaction time.
These improvements sound reasonable. We are constantly improving our algorithms and believe there is never too many measures when you deal with security and privacy. Thank you for your feedback!
Thank you for your fast reply. I hope that we can see this implemented in the future release of cryptomixer and more power to you guys.
February 20, 2018, 02:44:51 PM
My advice to improve the privacy of your service would be:
First attack vector: Add a small randomly chosen amount to your transaction fee. This hides the fact that a transaction is send by the same service/wallet.
Second attack vector: Offer the functionality of choosing the delay on minute basis OR add a randomly chosen delay (for example +- 10 minutes from the chosen hourly delay) to your transaction time.
First attack vector: Add a small randomly chosen amount to your transaction fee. This hides the fact that a transaction is send by the same service/wallet.
Second attack vector: Offer the functionality of choosing the delay on minute basis OR add a randomly chosen delay (for example +- 10 minutes from the chosen hourly delay) to your transaction time.
These improvements sound reasonable. We are constantly improving our algorithms and believe there is never too many measures when you deal with security and privacy. Thank you for your feedback!
February 17, 2018, 07:26:24 AM
I am using your service for a long time now and I am very satisfied with it. But lately I have been investigating possibilities to track transactions which were send over mixing services and I found two possible attack vectors to cluster transactions which were mixed with your service.
The first one is less effective but there is still a decent risk. The transaction fees of your service are constant when the transaction has the same size. For example three transactions with one input and two output addresses had the same size of 42.598 sat/B. Obviously the fees vary when there are more input addresses but most of the time I received transactions with one input two output and the fees were constant.
The second is more severe. Let's say we have a setup of x-forward addresses and all of them are differently delayed in time. Normally you should think that this setup is bullet proof but it isn't. As the delay steps in your service are hour based and your service is sending the transactions at exactly the same time just hourly shifted (for example: 01-01 21:10:21, 01-01 14:12:20, 01-01 03:12:18) it is easy to cluster all transactions which are connected to one mixing step. With the help of the first attack vector the analysis becomes even more effective.
With the help of those information it should be no big deal for future blockchain analysis techniques to track down the source of mixed coins. This is a big risk for a mixing service which should offer a high grade of privacy.
My advice to improve the privacy of your service would be:
First attack vector: Add a small randomly chosen amount to your transaction fee. This hides the fact that a transaction is send by the same service/wallet.
Second attack vector: Offer the functionality of choosing the delay on minute basis OR add a randomly chosen delay (for example +- 10 minutes from the chosen hourly delay) to your transaction time.
The first one is less effective but there is still a decent risk. The transaction fees of your service are constant when the transaction has the same size. For example three transactions with one input and two output addresses had the same size of 42.598 sat/B. Obviously the fees vary when there are more input addresses but most of the time I received transactions with one input two output and the fees were constant.
The second is more severe. Let's say we have a setup of x-forward addresses and all of them are differently delayed in time. Normally you should think that this setup is bullet proof but it isn't. As the delay steps in your service are hour based and your service is sending the transactions at exactly the same time just hourly shifted (for example: 01-01 21:10:21, 01-01 14:12:20, 01-01 03:12:18) it is easy to cluster all transactions which are connected to one mixing step. With the help of the first attack vector the analysis becomes even more effective.
With the help of those information it should be no big deal for future blockchain analysis techniques to track down the source of mixed coins. This is a big risk for a mixing service which should offer a high grade of privacy.
My advice to improve the privacy of your service would be:
First attack vector: Add a small randomly chosen amount to your transaction fee. This hides the fact that a transaction is send by the same service/wallet.
Second attack vector: Offer the functionality of choosing the delay on minute basis OR add a randomly chosen delay (for example +- 10 minutes from the chosen hourly delay) to your transaction time.
February 12, 2018, 05:13:18 PM
ANNOUNCEMENT
Don't be confused by the new online chat widget on our website — we have changed it. E-mail ]support@[banned mixer] works as well. Feel free to mix your coins!
January 17, 2018, 02:13:30 PM
what kind improvement for this year?
Usability and speed
At first I want to ask you, maybe pretty old question, but want to get answer on it: You really own that number of bitcoins as you claim, you showed us proof, messages from those wallets were verified by DT members but is it safe for your users? Someone ever knew your wallets where you stored major bitcoins.... Wasn't that a silly action?
Thank you for your question, but dont let this fact confuse you. It only proves that in a certain moment of time there were a certain amount of coins in operation. All coins in reserve are being in the constant circulation, they have no links with the source or destination addresses and fresh coins are constantly entering the reserve.
January 15, 2018, 05:14:53 PM
what kind improvement for this year?
Usability and speed
At first I want to ask you, maybe pretty old question, but want to get answer on it: You really own that number of bitcoins as you claim, you showed us proof, messages from those wallets were verified by DT members but is it safe for your users? Someone ever knew your wallets where you stored major bitcoins.... Wasn't that a silly action?
January 15, 2018, 07:53:44 AM
what kind improvement for this year?
Usability and speed
January 15, 2018, 03:34:48 AM
what kind improvement for this year?
January 14, 2018, 09:07:16 AM
IMPORTANT NOTICE
BE VERY CAREFUL NOT CONFUSE THE SITE !!! FUCKING SCAMMERS USE SAME DESIGN https://coinmixer.io - FUCKING SCA MM EE RR SS https://coinmixer.io - SCAM, https://coinmixer.io - SCAM, https://coinmixer.io - SCAM !!!!!
Thank you for highlighting this! I have put your notice in the announcement post. The /][banned mixer] and cryptomixns23scr.onion domains are registered back in 2016 and have never changed! Bookmark this websites and do not let scammers fool yourself. If you don't bookmark the website always check the domain registration date via whois services. All scammers use freshly registered domains.
January 14, 2018, 08:56:25 AM
Hello there
Do you use segwit addresses? If no, do you plan to implement them in future? It will help with faster processing and will make lower possible fees
Thanks
Do you use segwit addresses? If no, do you plan to implement them in future? It will help with faster processing and will make lower possible fees
Thanks
We do not use segwit addresses, but we are currently researching this possibility. We are preparing a big update on the date of the 2nd anniversary of the mixer.
January 14, 2018, 08:42:01 AM
Is the site working without problems at the moment?
Please say me if it work perfectly?
Please say me if it work perfectly?
The website works perfectly, all transactions are being processed. There are some issues with Bitcoin network speed, but mixer process most transactions as soon as they get 1 confirmation. We have no one lost transaction at all times (since 2016). Feel free to mix your coins!
January 05, 2018, 04:25:45 PM
Hello there
Do you use segwit addresses? If no, do you plan to implement them in future? It will help with faster processing and will make lower possible fees
Thanks
Do you use segwit addresses? If no, do you plan to implement them in future? It will help with faster processing and will make lower possible fees
Thanks
BEE VERY CAREFUL NOT CONFUSE THE SITE !!! FUCKING SCAMMERS USE SAME DESIGN https://coinmixer.io - FUCKING SCA MM EE RR SS https://coinmixer.io - SCAM, https://coinmixer.io - SCAM, https://coinmixer.io - SCAM !!!!!
January 03, 2018, 04:49:15 AM
Hello there
Do you use segwit addresses? If no, do you plan to implement them in future? It will help with faster processing and will make lower possible fees
Thanks
Do you use segwit addresses? If no, do you plan to implement them in future? It will help with faster processing and will make lower possible fees
Thanks
December 17, 2017, 10:23:44 AM
Is the site working without problems at the moment?
Please say me if it work perfectly?
Please say me if it work perfectly?
December 15, 2017, 07:39:44 AM
report back if it worked without problems pls
December 14, 2017, 03:31:38 PM
Gonna give this a try.
1st mixer that i'll be using.
1st mixer that i'll be using.
December 14, 2017, 04:35:27 AM
Any experience with this service lately?
December 08, 2017, 04:50:04 AM
SERVICE IS ACTIVE
The both clearnet /]website and TOR mirror are active! Feel free to mix your coins!
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