Kapitalerhöhung für das angeschlagene Geldhaus fraglich
Datum: 08.07.2016 12:03 Uhr
Schiffskredite haben die Bremer Landesbank so in Not gebracht, dass sie ohne staatliche Hilfe nicht überleben kann. Direkte Kapitalhilfen aus Niedersachsen soll es aber wohl nicht geben.
Kapitalerhöhung für das angeschlagene Geldhaus fraglich
http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/banken-versicherungen/bremer-landesbank-kapitalerhoehung-fuer-das-angeschlagene-geldhaus-fraglich/13844078.htmlBail-In?…the new banking regulation (the BRRD) in place in the region since 2015 rules out what circumstances would suggest as the most reasonable and painless approach, i.e. a government sponsored systemic solution (either a bad bank along the lines of NAMA and SAREB in Ireland and Spain or a fully fledged bank recap). According to the new rules, any government funding is conditional on pre-emptive burden sharing, which amounts to wiping out/haircutting private investors’ stakes in the banks’ capital (equity, subordinated and senior debt). In our view, such an approach would be extremely risky and ill advised, and the likely burden sharing of retail-held bonds would send shock waves across the domestic depositor base.
[Do note the retail bit here -- NYT have said that "families own about a third of Italian banks’ debt securities" and as we get to below "Dan Davies, senior research adviser at Frontline Analysts, says the Italian government could argue that forcing losses on retail investors would fall under that exception."]
If dealt according to the rules, the problems of the Italian banking sector could easily morph into a domestic banking crisis, with a reversal of the solid improvement in the banking channel observed since mid 2014. In turn, that would have a negative impact on growth, possible disruptive repercussions on domestic political stability (in light of the weakening position of PM Renzi and the upcoming constitutional referendum) and a potential to unleash a broader Euro area banking crisis through contagion.
That’s from JPM’s Marco Protopapa (with our emphasis) who adds that this leaves us somewhere very predictable:
This is what we expect to happen. The Euro area avoided an existential crisis last year, when a new €86 billion rescue program was approved for Greece. The Italian banking problems involve much smaller figures (possibly very limited under the selective intervention scenarios), which could be easily committed by the Italian government without any participation from other European sovereigns.
At this stage, there seem to be sufficient wriggle room within the existing rules to avoid a full blown bail-in approach. Article 32 of the BRRD explicitly foresees some exception to the bail-in rules in the case of systemic risk. It is hard to argue that the Italian case does not raise systemic risk, in our view. Furthermore, the high NPLs burden is a legacy rather than a recent problem, and we expect that this would receive further recognition by the relevant authorities (the European Commission and the ECB) in due time.
Ultimately, an adequate solution to the Italian banking woes only involves manageable financial commitments, in our view. A solution is rather a matter of political will, which in turn revolves around the German stance on the policy response to the Brexit shock. So far, Germany has shown an intransigent position, but we believe that rising fears about the systemic implications of a self-inflicted Italian banking crisis will trigger a rethink. As discussed, the details on the treatment of retail investors are important, and collateral damage should be avoided.
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/07/07/2168476/italian-banks-this-is-euro-area-politics-we-think-you-already-know-each-other/?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true 
