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Topic: IOTA - page 749. (Read 1473405 times)

legendary
Activity: 2142
Merit: 1010
Newbie
October 28, 2015, 04:42:23 PM
So transaction security is actually reliant on the subsequent transaction volume for the overall network?
I imagine that the picture above would look quite different if the attacker simply chooses to mount his attack during a period of negligible transaction volume (thus low weight build-up on the legitimate tangle). I'm probably missing something (or a lot)...

Yes, we assume that there is a constant flow of transactions. If it's not the case (for example, tangle runs in North Korea where noone spends money during night time) then merchants should rise confirmation threshold during such hours.
legendary
Activity: 1154
Merit: 1001
October 28, 2015, 04:39:24 PM
So transaction security is actually reliant on the subsequent transaction volume for the overall network?
I imagine that the picture above would look quite different if the attacker simply chooses to mount his attack during a period of negligible transaction volume (thus low weight build-up on the legitimate tangle). I'm probably missing something (or a lot)...
legendary
Activity: 2142
Merit: 1010
Newbie
October 28, 2015, 04:34:03 PM
Isn't there are problem with merger of a split tangle then.

Maybe, I'm just not sure what you mean.

Is here our scenario:



Black squares are double-spends. Green ones - legit tangle, red - non-legit. Legit tip has score 11, attacker's tip has score 10.
sr. member
Activity: 376
Merit: 300
October 28, 2015, 04:27:36 PM
The algorithm for choosing the tips to reference "prefers" tips with larger cumulative weight. Those precomputed legit transactions will have much smaller cumulative weight (than other tips), and so they will probably not be referenced by others.


Isn't there are problem with merger of a split tangle then. If the network was split, then tips of the stronger part will have greater cumulative weight and will always be chosen to be referenced. The weaker subtangle just dies off.
The party which is interested in the survival of the weaker subtangle would "connect" it to the stronger subtangle by referencing 1 tx from here and 1 from there. If both subtangles are legit, they'll quickly merge.
sr. member
Activity: 376
Merit: 300
October 28, 2015, 04:25:57 PM
in the event a honest guy tries to reference a legit tip and the attacker's tip, he'll detect the contradiction and won't do it. Therefore, the attacker's subtangle will be abandoned.

This requires not just an honest guy, but a diligent one as well.
The risk is that honest guys will be lazy and rely on others to go far back in history to check all tx for double spending.


The lazy guys risk that their tx's will be abandoned, because the majority of the nodes won't reference them.
hero member
Activity: 572
Merit: 506
October 28, 2015, 04:21:20 PM
The algorithm for choosing the tips to reference "prefers" tips with larger cumulative weight. Those precomputed legit transactions will have much smaller cumulative weight (than other tips), and so they will probably not be referenced by others.


Isn't there are problem with merger of a split tangle then. If the network was split, then tips of the stronger part will have greater cumulative weight and will always be chosen to be referenced. The weaker subtangle just dies off.
legendary
Activity: 2142
Merit: 1010
Newbie
October 28, 2015, 04:19:32 PM
Even in bitcoin we've seen some miners being too lazy to do full node checking and instead relying on SPV, and thus risk building on top of invalid blocks.

This reminded me that miners are that lazy that don't even do double-spends when control 51% of hashing power (Deepbit).
legendary
Activity: 990
Merit: 1108
October 28, 2015, 04:10:12 PM
in the event a honest guy tries to reference a legit tip and the attacker's tip, he'll detect the contradiction and won't do it. Therefore, the attacker's subtangle will be abandoned.

This requires not just an honest guy, but a diligent one as well.
The risk is that honest guys will be lazy and rely on others to go far back in history to check all tx for double spending.

Even in bitcoin we've seen some miners being too lazy to do full node checking and instead relying on SPV, and thus risk building on top of invalid blocks.
sr. member
Activity: 376
Merit: 300
October 28, 2015, 03:59:59 PM
If the attacker started to create his double-spending subtangle long time ago, then the initial tx's of this subtangle reference some rather old tx's, with not-so-big cumulative weight. While the attacker waits, the cumulative weight of the legit tangle continues to grow, so he won't be able to catch up.

Of course, this assumes that the attacker's max possible tx's rate is much less then the "usual" tx's rate of the rest of the network.
The first (legit) transaction references the same old transactions as the doublespend. The attacker doesn't need to compete with the rest of network.
OK, but the legit tx quickly starts to accumulate weight (as the honest nodes reference it, directly or indirectly), so, by the time the merchant accepts it, most of the tips of the legit tangle are already referencing it.  Even if the attacker publishes his subtangle at that moment, why the honest guys would reference it? The tips from the attacker's subtangle have smaller cumulative weight, and, in the event a honest guy tries to reference a legit tip and the attacker's tip, he'll detect the contradiction and won't do it. Therefore, the attacker's subtangle will be abandoned.
hero member
Activity: 572
Merit: 506
October 28, 2015, 03:48:41 PM
If the attacker started to create his double-spending subtangle long time ago, then the initial tx's of this subtangle reference some rather old tx's, with not-so-big cumulative weight. While the attacker waits, the cumulative weight of the legit tangle continues to grow, so he won't be able to catch up.

Of course, this assumes that the attacker's max possible tx's rate is much less then the "usual" tx's rate of the rest of the network.
The first (legit) transaction references the same old transactions as the doublespend. The attacker doesn't need to compete with the rest of network.
legendary
Activity: 1918
Merit: 1001
October 28, 2015, 03:09:53 PM
reserved
sr. member
Activity: 364
Merit: 250
October 28, 2015, 02:22:08 PM
ill keep watching on this project
sr. member
Activity: 376
Merit: 300
October 28, 2015, 02:07:55 PM

Amount of tips is supposed to be small

This is not necessarily the case, in the heavy load regime.
That could help to conduct a doublespend btw. A hacker accumulates a lot of PoW in legit small transactions forming huge amount of new tips, but doesn't broadcast them. Then he sends a legit transaction, waits for it to be confirmed, gets his purchase sent to him. Then he creates a doublespend (for example sends the same money back to himself) and floods the network with his precomputed legit transactions. So network hashpower now is spread over his tips and he needs much less hashpower to create enough transactions confirming his doublespend to overtake the first transaction.

The algorithm for choosing the tips to reference "prefers" tips with larger height. Those precomputed legit transactions will have much smaller cumulative weight (than other tips), and so they will probably not be referenced by others.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but what prevents the following attack?
A hacker creates two transactions, one of them will be a legit transaction, used to purchase something, another is a doublespend. Then the hacker invests a lot of PoW in confirming the second transaction. In order to do that he just creates a lot of transactions sending money between his addresses, all his trnsactions refer directly or indirectly the doublespend, so his doublespend gets huge confirmation score. Then he broadcasts the first transaction, and when it gets confirmed he broadcasts the whole doublespend branch.
Do I miss something?

If the attacker started to create his double-spending subtangle long time ago, then the initial tx's of this subtangle reference some rather old tx's, with not-so-big cumulative weight. While the attacker waits, the cumulative weight of the legit tangle continues to grow, so he won't be able to catch up.

Of course, this assumes that the attacker's max possible tx's rate is much less then the "usual" tx's rate of the rest of the network.
legendary
Activity: 2142
Merit: 1010
Newbie
October 28, 2015, 02:03:22 PM
Correct me if I'm wrong, but what prevents the following attack?
A hacker creates two transactions, one of them will be a legit transaction, used to purchase something, another is a doublespend. Then the hacker invests a lot of PoW in confirming the second transaction. In order to do that he just creates a lot of transactions sending money between his addresses, all his trnsactions refer directly or indirectly the doublespend, so his doublespend gets huge confirmation score. Then he broadcasts the first transaction, and when it gets confirmed he broadcasts the whole doublespend branch.
Do I miss something?

Nothing is missed.

http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/4942/what-is-a-finney-attack
legendary
Activity: 1428
Merit: 1001
Fucker of "the system"
October 28, 2015, 01:51:22 PM
Correct me if I'm wrong, but what prevents the following attack?
A hacker creates two transactions, one of them will be a legit transaction, used to purchase something, another is a doublespend. Then the hacker invests a lot of PoW in confirming the second transaction. In order to do that he just creates a lot of transactions sending money between his addresses, all his trnsactions refer directly or indirectly the doublespend, so his doublespend gets huge confirmation score. Then he broadcasts the first transaction, and when it gets confirmed he broadcasts the whole doublespend branch.
Do I miss something?

^^^^^^this guy right here this is why i love this place.. some smart mofos up in here.  
hero member
Activity: 572
Merit: 506
October 28, 2015, 01:40:26 PM
Correct me if I'm wrong, but what prevents the following attack?
A hacker creates two transactions, one of them will be a legit transaction, used to purchase something, another is a doublespend. Then the hacker invests a lot of PoW in confirming the second transaction. In order to do that he just creates a lot of transactions sending money between his addresses, all his trnsactions refer directly or indirectly the doublespend, so his doublespend gets huge confirmation score. Then he broadcasts the first transaction, and when it gets confirmed he broadcasts the whole doublespend branch.
Do I miss something?
hero member
Activity: 572
Merit: 506
October 28, 2015, 01:33:39 PM

Amount of tips is supposed to be small

This is not necessarily the case, in the heavy load regime.
That could help to conduct a doublespend btw. A hacker accumulates a lot of PoW in legit small transactions forming huge amount of new tips, but doesn't broadcast them. Then he sends a legit transaction, waits for it to be confirmed, gets his purchase sent to him. Then he creates a doublespend (for example sends the same money back to himself) and floods the network with his precomputed legit transactions. So network hashpower now is spread over his tips and he needs much less hashpower to create enough transactions confirming his doublespend to overtake the first transaction.
sr. member
Activity: 376
Merit: 300
October 28, 2015, 01:07:03 PM

Amount of tips is supposed to be small

This is not necessarily the case, in the heavy load regime.
hero member
Activity: 572
Merit: 506
October 28, 2015, 12:52:45 PM
In that case h rather depends on amount of peers polled or on the slowest peer to respond than on amount of tips.

Why?
Amount of tips is supposed to be small, so amount of data transfered is small. So the time to send a request and receive an answer should depend mostly on network and peers latency. If all requests are performed in parallel, than the slowest to respond peer determines the time. If requests are sent serially, then the time is roughly proportional to requests amount.
legendary
Activity: 2142
Merit: 1010
Newbie
October 28, 2015, 12:24:01 PM
In that case h rather depends on amount of peers polled or on the slowest peer to respond than on amount of tips.

Why?
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