Pages:
Author

Topic: OVERVIEW: BITCOIN HARDWARE WALLETS █████████████████ Secure your Coins - page 7. (Read 122191 times)

hero member
Activity: 672
Merit: 500
Would receiving mining payments sent to the trezor or ledger wallet be good or bad?
legendary
Activity: 1806
Merit: 1164

Just read the whole Interview and i think that i knew most of the things before, I'm collecting to buy one as i think it is the most secured hardware wallet at the moment, but the cons is the high price.

I have both KeepKey and Trezor and really do not use the KeepKey much. The Trezor works with my phone and Trezor lets you create passphrase protected hidden accounts. KeepKey does not. I do not feel you are gaining any security by using KeepKey over Trezor. If you just like the looks of the KeepKey you are getting a basic hardware wallet with PIN protection only that works very well with Multibit HD. Nothing wrong with that at all, but you lose some of the advanced functionality only Trezor and BitLox have at this time. Just take the time to make sure the hardware wallet you buy meets your needs.
legendary
Activity: 1526
Merit: 1001

Just read the whole Interview and i think that i knew most of the things before, I'm collecting to buy one as i think it is the most secured hardware wallet at the moment, but the cons is the high price.
newbie
Activity: 31
Merit: 0
Once again, it's videos from BitLox.
Someone said I didn't have any videos of the Bitlox doing transactions, so I guess I'm overcompensating.  Grin

Here's one on doing transactions in the "expert" mode. I think this is cool, because you get to see and can verify all the raw hex that flows back and forth. Plus you can do your own verification before anything is sent to the network, or heck, you can turn off your network access once the transaction has been built, so that before it's signed, you're on an isolated system. Cut and paste the signed transaction then submit it any way you like after verifying.

Anyways, here's the video:

https://youtu.be/3qhFZmGsDos

You mention at the website that it is possible to set up hidden wallets on the BitLox. Is this done by using passphrases like Trezor?
A hidden wallet is set up exactly like a normal wallet. You can create a PIN for your wallet on the device via the keypad (the host only initiates the creation of a wallet) up to 20 characters long 0-9 a-z A-Z. No sensitive data is EVER created on or transmitted from the host app.

What differs is that this wallet is not enumerated when a wallet listing is done, it has no unencrypted part, so the wallet (if one were to examine the data block in which it sits) is indistinguishable from the random data that is used to initialize the wallet space (all 1s, all 0s, random, random, so every bit gets flipped at least once). When you create the wallet, you choose the index, a number between 51-100. The device only uses this to initialize the space, after that it has no knowledge if there is a wallet there or not.

To access a hidden wallet, you must address it directly by index, such as "load the 67th wallet".
If there is a wallet there, and the PIN is correct, it decrypts and is a usable wallet. If the PIN is incorrect OR there is no wallet there, it decrypts to gobbledygook. Same behavior for wallet there/bad PIN and no wallet actually there. Full deniability.
bit
Brute force attacks are stopped by having a "global" counter for wallet attempts. We can't keep track of what wallet numbers were successfully loaded or not, as that might imply the existence of hidden wallets (if they are there). So if _in aggregate_  3/5/7 bad attempts are made to load a wallet (expert/advanced/standard setup) the device immediately resets and a 45/30/15 minute delay to re-enter is imposed. Further bad attempt cause the lockout time to grow exponentially [edit - I just checked the code, sorry, it's the device and transaction PINs that go exponential.] (the wallet lockout times are deliberately harsh but not ridiculous, as they are reset by a correct device PIN entry).
Lockout time is evaluated BEFORE the device PIN is evaluated, so you MUST wait.

The only way around the delay is to wipe the entire device via the duress PIN "911" (which causes an immediate wipe of the wallet space) or to reflash the device.

Thanks for the reply! I did manage to find the link to the BitLox user manual which is very good. I think you are the only bitcoin hardware wallet vendor other than Trezor who has taken the time to write up a comprehensive user manual. I had to navigate to http://bitlox.io/support to find the user manual, perhaps consider a direct link to the manual from the menu at your main site bitlox.com? iPhone users finally have a bitcoin hardware wallet that works with their phone.

Good suggestion, I put the link up there so it's easy to find.

I'll be uploading a video on hidden wallets in a bit, keep on the lookout!
legendary
Activity: 1806
Merit: 1164
Once again, it's videos from BitLox.
Someone said I didn't have any videos of the Bitlox doing transactions, so I guess I'm overcompensating.  Grin

Here's one on doing transactions in the "expert" mode. I think this is cool, because you get to see and can verify all the raw hex that flows back and forth. Plus you can do your own verification before anything is sent to the network, or heck, you can turn off your network access once the transaction has been built, so that before it's signed, you're on an isolated system. Cut and paste the signed transaction then submit it any way you like after verifying.

Anyways, here's the video:

https://youtu.be/3qhFZmGsDos

You mention at the website that it is possible to set up hidden wallets on the BitLox. Is this done by using passphrases like Trezor?
A hidden wallet is set up exactly like a normal wallet. You can create a PIN for your wallet on the device via the keypad (the host only initiates the creation of a wallet) up to 20 characters long 0-9 a-z A-Z. No sensitive data is EVER created on or transmitted from the host app.

What differs is that this wallet is not enumerated when a wallet listing is done, it has no unencrypted part, so the wallet (if one were to examine the data block in which it sits) is indistinguishable from the random data that is used to initialize the wallet space (all 1s, all 0s, random, random, so every bit gets flipped at least once). When you create the wallet, you choose the index, a number between 51-100. The device only uses this to initialize the space, after that it has no knowledge if there is a wallet there or not.

To access a hidden wallet, you must address it directly by index, such as "load the 67th wallet".
If there is a wallet there, and the PIN is correct, it decrypts and is a usable wallet. If the PIN is incorrect OR there is no wallet there, it decrypts to gobbledygook. Same behavior for wallet there/bad PIN and no wallet actually there. Full deniability.
bit
Brute force attacks are stopped by having a "global" counter for wallet attempts. We can't keep track of what wallet numbers were successfully loaded or not, as that might imply the existence of hidden wallets (if they are there). So if _in aggregate_  3/5/7 bad attempts are made to load a wallet (expert/advanced/standard setup) the device immediately resets and a 45/30/15 minute delay to re-enter is imposed. Further bad attempt cause the lockout time to grow exponentially [edit - I just checked the code, sorry, it's the device and transaction PINs that go exponential.] (the wallet lockout times are deliberately harsh but not ridiculous, as they are reset by a correct device PIN entry).
Lockout time is evaluated BEFORE the device PIN is evaluated, so you MUST wait.

The only way around the delay is to wipe the entire device via the duress PIN "911" (which causes an immediate wipe of the wallet space) or to reflash the device.

Thanks for the reply! I did manage to find the link to the BitLox user manual which is very good. I think you are the only bitcoin hardware wallet vendor other than Trezor who has taken the time to write up a comprehensive user manual. I had to navigate to http://bitlox.io/support to find the user manual, perhaps consider a direct link to the manual from the menu at your main site bitlox.com? iPhone users finally have a bitcoin hardware wallet that works with their phone.
newbie
Activity: 31
Merit: 0
Once again, it's videos from BitLox.
Someone said I didn't have any videos of the Bitlox doing transactions, so I guess I'm overcompensating.  Grin

Here's one on doing transactions in the "expert" mode. I think this is cool, because you get to see and can verify all the raw hex that flows back and forth. Plus you can do your own verification before anything is sent to the network, or heck, you can turn off your network access once the transaction has been built, so that before it's signed, you're on an isolated system. Cut and paste the signed transaction then submit it any way you like after verifying.

Anyways, here's the video:

https://youtu.be/3qhFZmGsDos

You mention at the website that it is possible to set up hidden wallets on the BitLox. Is this done by using passphrases like Trezor?
A hidden wallet is set up exactly like a normal wallet. You can create a PIN for your wallet on the device via the keypad (the host only initiates the creation of a wallet) up to 20 characters long 0-9 a-z A-Z. No sensitive data is EVER created on or transmitted from the host app.

What differs is that this wallet is not enumerated when a wallet listing is done, it has no unencrypted part, so the wallet (if one were to examine the data block in which it sits) is indistinguishable from the random data that is used to initialize the wallet space (all 1s, all 0s, random, random, so every bit gets flipped at least once). When you create the wallet, you choose the index, a number between 51-100. The device only uses this to initialize the space, after that it has no knowledge if there is a wallet there or not.

To access a hidden wallet, you must address it directly by index, such as "load the 67th wallet".
If there is a wallet there, and the PIN is correct, it decrypts and is a usable wallet. If the PIN is incorrect OR there is no wallet there, it decrypts to gobbledygook. Same behavior for wallet there/bad PIN and no wallet actually there. Full deniability.

Brute force attacks are stopped by having a "global" counter for wallet attempts. We can't keep track of what wallet numbers were successfully loaded or not, as that might imply the existence of hidden wallets (if they are there). So if _in aggregate_  3/5/7 bad attempts are made to load a wallet (expert/advanced/standard setup) the device immediately resets and a 45/30/15 minute delay to re-enter is imposed. Further bad attempt cause the lockout time to grow exponentially [edit - I just checked the code, sorry, it's the device and transaction PINs that go exponential.] (the wallet lockout times are deliberately harsh but not ridiculous, as they are reset by a correct device PIN entry).
Lockout time is evaluated BEFORE the device PIN is evaluated, so you MUST wait.

The only way around the delay is to wipe the entire device via the duress PIN "911" (which causes an immediate wipe of the wallet space) or to reflash the device.
legendary
Activity: 1806
Merit: 1164
Once again, it's videos from BitLox.
Someone said I didn't have any videos of the Bitlox doing transactions, so I guess I'm overcompensating.  Grin

Here's one on doing transactions in the "expert" mode. I think this is cool, because you get to see and can verify all the raw hex that flows back and forth. Plus you can do your own verification before anything is sent to the network, or heck, you can turn off your network access once the transaction has been built, so that before it's signed, you're on an isolated system. Cut and paste the signed transaction then submit it any way you like after verifying.

Anyways, here's the video:

https://youtu.be/3qhFZmGsDos

You mention at the website that it is possible to set up hidden wallets on the BitLox. Is this done by using passphrases like Trezor?
newbie
Activity: 31
Merit: 0
Once again, it's videos from BitLox.
Someone said I didn't have any videos of the Bitlox doing transactions, so I guess I'm overcompensating.  Grin

Here's one on doing transactions in the "expert" mode. I think this is cool, because you get to see and can verify all the raw hex that flows back and forth. Plus you can do your own verification before anything is sent to the network, or heck, you can turn off your network access once the transaction has been built, so that before it's signed, you're on an isolated system. Cut and paste the signed transaction then submit it any way you like after verifying.

Anyways, here's the video:

https://youtu.be/3qhFZmGsDos
newbie
Activity: 14
Merit: 0
Minimal hardware solutions are something I hve been looking into for a long while. It's good to see new pieces of tech coming out all the time. I'm still looking at full node solutions too.
newbie
Activity: 31
Merit: 0
Hi everybody, it's Dana from BitLox again, just thought I would link a video we just posted of using our hardware wallet with our iOS mobile app.

Quick Bitcoin transaction with BitLox and iOS mobile app:
https://youtu.be/eelukY_Wdug

legendary
Activity: 2912
Merit: 1852
Would anyone here buy a disposable hardware wallet that is programmed ONCE, and then cannot be programmed with a different private key.  Instead, you just toss it and buy a new one if you want a different address.  It would only have a single address, but I could still see this having some use.

It would only cost maybe $5 per wallet, so you could have 5 of them for pretty cheap, and then just get a new one if you need a new address (they wouldn't be HD, obviously).  It would be like the old paper wallets, but way easier and more secure to spend from.  Would anyone buy it?



I could see a market for a cheap hardware device that would have limited functions, but work well at just doing the basics.  The closest I have used is the Ledger Nano, but they want a firmware update.

I believe digitalbitbox has an "el cheapo" hardware wallet coming that will not require (nor even allow) any updates, I presume that it would also be easy to use (important!).  If these were to be cheap enough, then absolute 100% security may not be necessary (as one would presumably hide your wallets).
hero member
Activity: 798
Merit: 1000
Would anyone here buy a disposable hardware wallet that is programmed ONCE, and then cannot be programmed with a different private key.  Instead, you just toss it and buy a new one if you want a different address.  It would only have a single address, but I could still see this having some use.

It would only cost maybe $5 per wallet, so you could have 5 of them for pretty cheap, and then just get a new one if you need a new address (they wouldn't be HD, obviously).  It would be like the old paper wallets, but way easier and more secure to spend from.  Would anyone buy it?

I don't see any benefit by limiting our self to only one address for this wallet, this is going back in time, more addresses more features, more customers.
legendary
Activity: 1806
Merit: 1164
Would anyone here buy a disposable hardware wallet that is programmed ONCE, and then cannot be programmed with a different private key.  Instead, you just toss it and buy a new one if you want a different address.  It would only have a single address, but I could still see this having some use.

It would only cost maybe $5 per wallet, so you could have 5 of them for pretty cheap, and then just get a new one if you need a new address (they wouldn't be HD, obviously).  It would be like the old paper wallets, but way easier and more secure to spend from.  Would anyone buy it?


Not when I can get a Ledger HW.1 including shipping for less than $20.
member
Activity: 73
Merit: 10
Would anyone here buy a disposable hardware wallet that is programmed ONCE, and then cannot be programmed with a different private key.  Instead, you just toss it and buy a new one if you want a different address.  It would only have a single address, but I could still see this having some use.

It would only cost maybe $5 per wallet, so you could have 5 of them for pretty cheap, and then just get a new one if you need a new address (they wouldn't be HD, obviously).  It would be like the old paper wallets, but way easier and more secure to spend from.  Would anyone buy it?
newbie
Activity: 31
Merit: 0
added BitLox.

Thanks!

I'm the developer of the BitLox, so if anybody has questions, shoot away!


The BitLox look like interesting products.  But, there is a lot of competition, and the prices are high.

Maybe a VIDEO on how the device works would be nice at your website, also a FAQ.

Other than the titanium (vs. aluminum), is there any difference between the "Advanced" and the "Ultimate"?

I look forward to any reviews...
I saw a video of it working underwater.  Interesting... but haven't seen it actually sending btc yrt

We've been really busy as we were just at the Miami show doing demos and sold some units there.
Here's a video of the desktop chrome app sending coins with the BitLox:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fEhHdm4VWDA
hero member
Activity: 854
Merit: 500
Trezor/Keepkey = 100% open source, but more vulnerable to physical attacks on its generic controller to extract plaintext mnemonic. (mitigated by use of passphrase)

Ledger Nano/HW.1 = partially closed-source smartcard element to store plaintext seed (no passphrase option), on which physical attacks are much more difficult than on a generic controller, but possibly backdoored?

that's about right - just consider that the STM32 could also be backdoored at a lower level. That's a common issue with hardware, you have no way to be sure unless you build it yourself, which is not possible to achieve.
-snip

Why does HW.1 cost much more cheaper than the trezor or keepkey.

Maybe it is backdoored or pre-malware installed? How safe could the bitcoins be in this wallet
1. No screen
2. No PCB, and other stuff, just a smartcard that plugs into a USB port.

They have good funding and  most of their code is open source, so you should probably review the code first and then decide whether it is backdoored.
legendary
Activity: 1806
Merit: 1164
Does anyone know if the Keepkey allows entering the passphrase by means of the same keyboard cipher input it uses for the mnemonics recovery?  

Or are users forced to enter their passphrase plaintext on the host computer each time, like on the Trezor?

KeepKey is different from Trezor. The KeepKey does not support passphrase encryption in addition to the PIN. If you want to use Electrum instead of the Chrome extension instructions for Windows are here.

That is the major advantage Trezor has over KeepKey. You can set up multiple passphrase protected accounts at myTrezor.com and access the same accounts using Mycelium on your Android phone.
full member
Activity: 133
Merit: 100
Does anyone know if the Keepkey allows entering the passphrase by means of the same keyboard cipher input it uses for the mnemonics recovery?  

Or are users forced to enter their passphrase plaintext on the host computer each time, like on the Trezor?
full member
Activity: 133
Merit: 100
Why does HW.1 cost much more cheaper than the trezor or keepkey.

In addition to what btchip already stated above, the trezor and keepkey do not store the plaintext SEED directly on the device like Ledger does. Instead, they use the onboard processor to reconstruct it for each use.  This allows for extra security, because you can have a seed that is created from a combination of mnemonics (security "sentence", as keepkey calls it) AND a passphrase.  The trezor/keepkey stores the mnemonics in its memory, but when you plug it in and want to spend, you need to enter your passphrase and allow the trezor/keepkey to combine it with the mnemonics and recompute the seed each time.   

The other reason for the processing power is obviously to use the screen and all of its attendant capabilities, such as choosing mnemonics directly on the device, showing the scrambled PIN pattern, and verifying transaction details before confirmation.  Ledger can do most of these things too, but requires the use of other devices and offline secure setup to maintain the a similar level of security and functionality.

In short, the trezor/keepkey are more of an all-in-one solution, whereas the HW.1/Nano/unplugged is lightweight and requires other devices and more complicated setup to do what the trezor/keepkey does.
Pages:
Jump to: