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Topic: Petition to remove Wasabi from recommendations of bitcoin.org - page 6. (Read 3084 times)

legendary
Activity: 2730
Merit: 7065
I would suggest not engaging with Kruw and allowing him to derail yet another thread with his repeatedly debunked copy-and-paste nonsense.
He is not going to get tired of sweeping the problems under the carpet and taking the attention away from those problems to other Wasabi features or explaining how other competitors are much worse, so please don't get tired of pointing out how full of shit he is. If you do, only his views and comments will remain and be taken as the truth because no one is contradicting them.
member
Activity: 378
Merit: 93
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I would suggest not engaging with Kruw and allowing him to derail yet another thread with his repeatedly debunked copy-and-paste nonsense. I've debunked the same post he has copy and pasted above multiple times over the last several months:

https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/--5286821
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.62800032

Where's this "debunking" you claim to have performed?  In the post you linked above, you admitted these Whirlpool coinjoins all produced unmixed change and input consolidation that could be tracked:

The post doesn't even demonstrate that. It only demonstrates unmixed change being consolidated with other unmixed change.

If this user had upgraded to the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol, this tracing I performed would have never been possible because there would have been no unmixed change produced or common input ownership revealed.

The fact that he continues to post it when it is blatantly false, means either he doesn't understand anything about coinjoins or he knows what he is posting is a complete lie. Either way, he is not interested in discussion and only in pushing his agenda.

I've provided the proof, you can verify it for yourself. You can't hide from deanonymization if you use Whirlpool:

Instead of enrolling three post-mix inputs as usual the coordinator will now enroll additional post-mix inputs. This makes the coinjoin transactions larger and therefore even harder to break

Why don't they create rounds larger than 5-8 inputs?  zkSNACKs' coordinator creates coinjoins with 150-400 inputs, which provides much greater anonymity per transaction.

These two new inputs are created from an initial transaction called Tx0 which splits the amount of be coinjoined in to the needed denominations to join the chosen pool, along with a few extra sats in to each input to pay the fee for that first coinjoin transaction.

This is an enormous waste of block space and less private compared to skipping tx0 and creating your equal sized denominations directly from the coinjoin transaction itself (like JoinMarket's coinjoins and Wasabi 1.0's ZeroLink implementation).

btw, is there a statistic showing how many coin-join tx whirlpool is running per day? Just curious to see how popular their service has become.

The count of coinjoin transactions is not a good way to measure its popularity since some coinjoin transactions can have more or less inputs/outputs than others and more or less value mixed.  For example, users of the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol mix 3x as much new BTC and remix >10x total BTC compared to Whirlpool despite creating 1/6 of the amount of coinjoin transactions.  This is preferred since it is far more private and block space efficient to create larger sized coinjoins than smaller sized coinjoins.

Regardless of which one you choose, I would spend some time reading about that specific implementation works, how it handles things like toxic change, and the steps you need to take to not mess up and negate the privacy it provides.

Nice dashboard, bookmarked! I might be wrong, but I suppose you're an avid user of coin-join usage. What would be the best method that one could apply to run a coin-join? I suppose using Sparrow Wallet would be the best bet?

Wasabi Wallet, BTCPay Server, or Trezor are your best choices since they support the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol and are prepackaged with Tor enabled by default. Like o_e_l_e_o mentioned, you need to be aware of how toxic change works.  Whirlpool coinjoins create toxic change that can be tracked when it is spent in a future transaction.  WabiSabi coinjoins eliminate toxic change by decomposing your input value into various sized denominations.  Additionally, Whirlpool exposes common input ownership from coins you use in tx0 transactions.  WabiSabi coinjoins also prevent common input ownership association, allowing multiple inputs to be registered privately by a user into a single round.

In terms of privacy to an outside observer, then at the moment it depends on how you use them, but in the future I would say Whirlwind will provide better privacy than Whirlpool. If you coinjoin on Whirlpool, then your privacy is dependent on how many times you let the coins be mixed before you spend them. Assuming 5-input and 5-output coinjoins, then after one mix your backwards looking anonymity set is a maximum of 5. After two mixes, a maximum of 25. After three mixes, a maximum of 125. And so on. I say maximum, because if other people in the coinjoin do something stupid and deanonymize their coins, than that lowers your anonymity set. If you leave your coins in Whirlpool for months and months and end up with 10+ remixes then that's a very good anonymity set, but if you just let them be coinjoined once or twice before you spend them then that's not a very good anonymity set. This same principle applies to any coinjoin implementation. Whirlwind, on the other hand, currently has an anonymity set of 414 as long as you don't deposit huge amounts, and this is only going to grow. In the future, you will be able to get an anonymity set with Whirlwind of 10,000 or more.

Whirlwind scammed their users, what makes you think they didn't also sell their data?

Whirlwind tries to minimize the consequences of this by dividing custody into multiple trustworthy forum members, but it doesn't eliminate it completely, and it's yet to implement this shared custody.

Whirlwind scammed their users, there's no excuse to give up custody of your funds or data.

No, the coins remain under your control in either Samourai (mobile) or Sparrow (desktop), but with the obvious risk that these are hot wallets.

The WabiSabi coinjoin protocol allows you to coinjoin from a hardware wallet.  Trezor already supports this.

The first is the fee to Whirlpool itself, which is a flat fee depending on the pool you are joining.

The flat pool entry fee structure is designed to incentivize worst privacy practices.  Since fees are not collected directly based on volume, it is cheaper to participate in a smaller pool and create more outputs than participate in a larger pool and create less outputs. Additionally, it incentivizes revealing common inputs ownership of premix UTXOs since it is cheaper to consolidate them to enter the pool once than to enter the pool with each UTXO individually.  Samourai has never explained why they purposely chose a fee structure that heavily penalizes the most private usage of their protocol.

Because of this backwards design, you can easily link premix inputs to postmix outputs in many cases.  Notice how this Whirlpool tx0 premix creates 70 outputs for 0.05 BTC - https://mempool.space/tx/63679c9ec82f246811acbab0c04cc0fc77ba050e1b6c23661d78afcfc13cf8aa

Notice how every single input of this Whirlpool exit transaction is a direct descendant of rounds created by the aforementioned premix transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/ce2f84f7c5ff74fb1da103acb7b279bd34f02f5e9e3a2e1b6417ce8b9b7392db

When many inputs used in the postmix exit transaction are created directly from a round that the premix transaction entered, it makes it trivial to trace the user through Whirlpool.  Fortunately, the user abandoned Whirlpool and upgraded to using the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol instead, which made him completely untraceable: https://mempool.space/address/bc1qjjw5gaglkycu2lm5fskl7qhktk0hec4a5me3da


Anyone who wants to see the truth about Wasabi coinjoins being demixed, Wasabi doxxing their competitors, and Wasabi funding mass surveillance, can simply read the Wasabi thread. Any time he copies and pastes the same old nonsense again, just reply with a link to this post.

The Wasabi thread proves that WHIRLPOOL coinjoins can be demixed, not WabiSabi coinjoins.  Stop confusing the traceable Whirlpool coinjoin protocol used by Samourai Wallet and Sparrow Wallet with the untraceable WabiSabi coinjoin protocol used by Wasabi Wallet, BTCPay Server, and Trezor.

Wasabi is not a good choice for privacy and it's a lie to pretend it is.

Wasabi is completely private: It protects your IP from being leaked with Tor, it prevents your xpub address from being leaked with block filters, and it protects your addresses from being linked together on chain with coinjoin.
hero member
Activity: 882
Merit: 792
Watch Bitcoin Documentary - https://t.ly/v0Nim
This whole thing is incredibly stupid though. Why should you pay blockchain analysis for the privilege of censoring your own users?
As they claim, in order to ensure the survival of the project, they had to partner with Blockchain Analysis companies, read this: https://blog.wasabiwallet.io/zksnacks-blacklisting-update/
To be honest, I understand this step of theirs but they should be frank with their customers, Wasabi is not a good choice for privacy and it's a lie to pretend it is.

The irony is that nor do their blockchain partners know. Blockchain analysis is a scam. Nearly every action they take when tainting coins is evidently based on inaccurate data. And Wasabi knows about that.
That's the BOLD truth!

How is blacklisting in any way "dishonest"?
Wasabi project started as the "only chance" for Bitcoin to achieve fungibility. The same team is currently implementing blacklisting and providing funding for a company that belongs to a group of companies that likely pose the most significant threat to Bitcoin's future as a currency.
There is no threat for bitcoin, there are only opportunities to improve and become stronger. Bitcoin is not fixed like a statue, we can change code, improve it and implement new features. If there is a support from the community, which will be if there is a threat, we will be able to fork bitcoin and make it more powerful and resistant to threats. I believe, every problem is temporary for bitcoin.

Back on topic here: It is entirely fair to warn people that zkSNACKs are directly funding the enemy.
That's another BOLD truth!
legendary
Activity: 2268
Merit: 18711
I would suggest not engaging with Kruw and allowing him to derail yet another thread with his repeatedly debunked copy-and-paste nonsense. I've debunked the same post he has copy and pasted above multiple times over the last several months:

https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/--5286821
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.62800032

The fact that he continues to post it when it is blatantly false, means either he doesn't understand anything about coinjoins or he knows what he is posting is a complete lie. Either way, he is not interested in discussion and only in pushing his agenda.

I've had him on ignore for months; I suggest everyone else does the same:

It's been clear for some time now that Kruw is either incapable or unwilling to address the vast myriad of valid points made against Wasabi in this thread, and instead can only result to copious amounts of hand-waving and whataboutism. Furthermore, it's also clear that Kruw either does not understand how Whirlpool and JoinMarket work, or he does understand but deliberate lies about them to spread his narrative.

Either way, although I'll continue to point out to other users in this thread all the reasons they should avoid Wasabi, there is no point continuing to argue with Kruw.

Anyone who wants to see the truth about Wasabi coinjoins being demixed, Wasabi doxxing their competitors, and Wasabi funding mass surveillance, can simply read the Wasabi thread. Any time he copies and pastes the same old nonsense again, just reply with a link to this post.

Back on topic here: It is entirely fair to warn people that zkSNACKs are directly funding the enemy.
member
Activity: 378
Merit: 93
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How is blacklisting in any way "dishonest"?
Wasabi project started as the "only chance" for Bitcoin to achieve fungibility. The same team is currently implementing blacklisting and providing funding for a company that belongs to a group of companies that likely pose the most significant threat to Bitcoin's future as a currency. The same team is engaging in doxxing their competitors on Twitter, while their software having a wide range of issues that have been extensively discussed in the Wasabi thread, and which are ignored by the people in charge.

These are rhetorical questions.

Those aren't questions at all, you just made a bunch of blatantly false statements, you didn't even bother to be sarcastic. Wasabi does not have a "wide range of issues" and their team is not "engaging in doxxing their competitors on Twitter".

The coinjoin protocol you are thinking of that has a "wide range of issues" that was covered extensively in the Wasabi thread is WHIRLPOOL, which is used by Samourai Wallet and Sparrow Wallet:

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.
Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  Cry Cry Cry

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  Shocked Shocked Shocked

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.

Wasabi upgraded to the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol so no unmixable change is ever produced and common input is not revealed.
legendary
Activity: 1512
Merit: 7340
Farewell, Leo
How is blacklisting in any way "dishonest"?
Wasabi project started as the "only chance" for Bitcoin to achieve fungibility. The same team is currently implementing blacklisting and providing funding for a company that belongs to a group of companies that likely pose the most significant threat to Bitcoin's future as a currency. The same team is engaging in doxxing their competitors on Twitter, while their software having a wide range of issues that have been extensively discussed in the Wasabi thread, and which are ignored by the people in charge.

These are rhetorical questions.

Acting sarcastic doesn't answer my question.  It just makes you look bitter.
At the first time. At the 100th time, sarcasm is the most deserved response.
member
Activity: 378
Merit: 93
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How is blacklisting in any way "dishonest"?
Of course it isn't. How can it be when you are open-source and donating to TOR? If you do that, then it's completely fine paying a blockchain analysis company to tell you who deserves privacy and who doesn't based on no standards at all.
Now you can tell me how mixing services steal coins and sell customer data. I think it's the perfect opportunity to play that card.

Acting sarcastic doesn't answer my question.  It just makes you look bitter.

If your arguments are reduced to sarcasm, then I've made my point effectively.
legendary
Activity: 2730
Merit: 7065
Not just sell their services, but potentially sell the entire company: https://nitter.cz/SamouraiWallet/status/1708068554208117028#m
You have got to love the wording there. Rejecting UTXOs that "potentially come from questionable sources." Maybe they do, maybe not, but it's not like we care so we are just going to reject it to be safe and be government-friendly.

And I see ads for beer that tell me that if I drink their beer women will adore me and I'll be a party animal.
You probably forgot your AXE body spray. It doesn't work without it.

How is blacklisting in any way "dishonest"?
Of course it isn't. How can it be when you are open-source and donating to TOR? If you do that, then it's completely fine paying a blockchain analysis company to tell you who deserves privacy and who doesn't based on no standards at all.
Now you can tell me how mixing services steal coins and sell customer data. I think it's the perfect opportunity to play that card.
member
Activity: 378
Merit: 93
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I neither thought that was possible, until Wasabi literally announced they will be funding a mass surveillance company for the.. benefit of knowing who to blacklist?  If that is not dishonest towards your people, I do not know what is.

How is blacklisting in any way "dishonest"?
sr. member
Activity: 364
Merit: 298
There's no way to commit mass fraud with coinjoining.

I neither thought that was possible, until Wasabi literally announced they will be funding a mass surveillance company for the.. benefit of knowing who to blacklist?  If that is not dishonest towards your people, I do not know what is.
legendary
Activity: 3500
Merit: 6320
Crypto Swap Exchange
'If you use our service your coins are private and clean' so pay to use our service.
Except that's not true, and there are numerous examples of Wasabi coinjoins being demixed and numerous examples of centralized exchanges still discriminating against coins form Wasabi coinjoins despite their cooperation with blockchain analysis.

And I see ads for beer that tell me that if I drink their beer women will adore me and I'll be a party animal.
It's marketing good / bad / true / not true it does not matter it's marketing and people will believe what they want.

And, following that thought. The people Wasabi are marketing to can then market to their customers with the same stuff.
'Look we do this with that use our service'

-Dave
member
Activity: 378
Merit: 93
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Absolute peak whataboutism stupidity. SBF made a bunch of charitable donations too. Should we therefore excuse his mass fraud? I tell you what - if you send me 10 BTC, I'll donate 1 BTC to the HRF and keep the other 9 for myself, and that will be totally fine and not at all shady. Roll Eyes

There's no way to commit mass fraud with coinjoining.  Coinjoins are completely non custodial.  Only "Mixing sites" are fraudulent since they are able to steal coins from their users.

Except that's not true, and there are numerous examples of Wasabi coinjoins being demixed

You are confused, only WHIRLPOOL coinjoins can be demixed.  WabiSabi coinjoins do not reveal common ownership or leave unmixable toxic change like Whirlpool:

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.
Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  Cry Cry Cry

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  Shocked Shocked Shocked

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.
legendary
Activity: 2268
Merit: 18711
If you do, their forum representative will tell you the software is open-source and that they make donations to the Human Rights Foundation and the TOR project.
Absolute peak whataboutism stupidity. SBF made a bunch of charitable donations too. Should we therefore excuse his mass fraud? I tell you what - if you send me 10 BTC, I'll donate 1 BTC to the HRF and keep the other 9 for myself, and that will be totally fine and not at all shady. Roll Eyes

But, they are looking to or have SOLD their services to big business. Those are the paying customers. That is what they want.
Not just sell their services, but potentially sell the entire company: https://nitter.cz/SamouraiWallet/status/1708068554208117028#m

'If you use our service your coins are private and clean' so pay to use our service.
Except that's not true, and there are numerous examples of Wasabi coinjoins being demixed and numerous examples of centralized exchanges still discriminating against coins form Wasabi coinjoins despite their cooperation with blockchain analysis.
legendary
Activity: 3500
Merit: 6320
Crypto Swap Exchange
The irony is that nor do their blockchain partners know. Blockchain analysis is a scam. Nearly every action they take when tainting coins is evidently based on inaccurate data. And Wasabi knows about that. I refuse to believe that there is not even one Wasabi developer who has passed adultescence and reads the current Bitcoin affairs. They have deliberately bought nonsense to not risk seemed "against the government", or whatever. Haven't they realized they ignored the risk to lose legitimate Bitcoin users as clients?

But....it's been discussed that they are not really targeting you and me as their clients. But rather large corporate clients. So they don't care if they loose you and me.
WE don't pay for the wallet or service. But, they are looking to or have SOLD their services to big business. Those are the paying customers. That is what they want.

Ignore everything else and just look at it as a for profit business and who they are trying to market to.
'If you use our service your coins are private and clean' so pay to use our service.
Then their attitude seems logical.

-Dave
legendary
Activity: 1512
Merit: 7340
Farewell, Leo
One of the problems is that no one (not even Wasabi or zkSNACKs) knows what isn't allowed and why. They simply trust the decisions of their blockchain analysis partner.
The irony is that nor do their blockchain partners know. Blockchain analysis is a scam. Nearly every action they take when tainting coins is evidently based on inaccurate data. And Wasabi knows about that. I refuse to believe that there is not even one Wasabi developer who has passed adultescence and reads the current Bitcoin affairs. They have deliberately bought nonsense to not risk seemed "against the government", or whatever. Haven't they realized they ignored the risk to lose legitimate Bitcoin users as clients?

If you do, their forum representative will tell you the software is open-source and that they make donations to the Human Rights Foundation and the TOR project.
They even fund the Bitcoin Core development. It's just sad how things turned out, but ignoring these little incidents like this one, means admitting defeat to blockchain scamalysis.
legendary
Activity: 2730
Merit: 7065
This whole thing is incredibly stupid though. Why should you pay blockchain analysis for the privilege of censoring your own users?
They don't want users with illegally obtained bitcoin to participate in coinjoins. One of the problems is that no one (not even Wasabi or zkSNACKs) knows what isn't allowed and why. They simply trust the decisions of their blockchain analysis partner. And don't bother asking them why they do it. If you do, their forum representative will tell you the software is open-source and that they make donations to the Human Rights Foundation and the TOR project. Seeing as you are wearing the signature of a mixing service, they will throw in a few sentences about you advertising a scam and/or that you are a thief or scammer yourself. 
legendary
Activity: 1568
Merit: 6660
bitcoincleanup.com / bitmixlist.org
zkSNACKs don't receive money from a blockchain analysis company, but rather the other way around - they pay a blockchain analysis to analyze any UTXOs which are trying to be coinjoined. Various members of the Wasabi team have confirmed that this is happening.

It is entirely fair to warn users that if they use Wasabi, the fee they are paying is directly being used to fund a blockchain analysis company to investigate their UTXOs.

Oh, I thought they were giving them the transactions and receiving the analysis for free. But you make sense though.

This whole thing is incredibly stupid though. Why should you pay blockchain analysis for the privilege of censoring your own users?

If that doesn't come from zksnacks' pockets, it's almost definitely being (as you said) funded by the Wasabi users.
legendary
Activity: 2268
Merit: 18711
unless something happened that I missed within the last 2 months, but you should mention more about the central coordinator's decision to send inputs to a chain analysis company (which is different from receiving money from them, which AFAIK we have no knowledge of such a thing happening).
zkSNACKs don't receive money from a blockchain analysis company, but rather the other way around - they pay a blockchain analysis to analyze any UTXOs which are trying to be coinjoined. Various members of the Wasabi team have confirmed that this is happening.

It is entirely fair to warn users that if they use Wasabi, the fee they are paying is directly being used to fund a blockchain analysis company to investigate their UTXOs.
legendary
Activity: 1568
Merit: 6660
bitcoincleanup.com / bitmixlist.org
"Proposal: adding a chain analysis warning in Wasabi wallet page".

https://github.com/bitcoin-dot-org/Bitcoin.org/issues/4125

Well, it's not exactly

Quote
By default this wallet uses a central coordinator to coinjoin, which funds a chain analysis company.

unless something happened that I missed within the last 2 months, but you should mention more about the central coordinator's decision to send inputs to a chain analysis company (which is different from receiving money from them, which AFAIK we have no knowledge of such a thing happening).

In the same way, if exchanges were listed on bitcoin.org, I would classify them - the KYC ones at least - as potentially submitting information to chain analysis companies, but you might find such a tag difficult to get merged, because Bitcoin.org doesn't really list privacy-unfriendly services like exchanges in the first place.
sr. member
Activity: 364
Merit: 298
"Proposal: adding a chain analysis warning in Wasabi wallet page".

https://github.com/bitcoin-dot-org/Bitcoin.org/issues/4125
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