Oh crap here we go again repeating the same logic as to why decentralized file system block chains are insolubly flawed...
Fucking low IQ time wasters!
It doesn't matter. The issue I cited is insoluble. You will never find a technical solution. Ever.
*citation needed
Read my 10,000+ posts so you can gain the level of expertise I have accumulated.
Otherwise, we can debate each issue here as follows to bring you up-to-speed on the relevant technological issues.
Btw, how much are you willing to pay me for this education and distraction from my own work?
The onus is on you to write a coherent, concise, and complete white paper so that I can bring to bear my expertise on tearing the nonsense white paper to shreds. I didn't volunteer to condense my 10,000 posts into a white paper to offer you a concise citation.
I am particularly incensed by you promulgating this crap technology as worthwhile. It wastes my time. I told you I invented proof-of-storage in 2013 and I thought about all the ways it could possibly be made to work and all possible ways were flawed. The onus is on you to do the same and not promulgate and hype faulty technology to the community.
The Sybil attack is, in my qualified opinion, the weakest part of the Sia protocol. But we do have sufficient defense against it, and that comes in the form of proof-of-burn.
Nope. I already explained why staking (analogously burning) doesn't provide sufficient security.
And I explained why you are incorrect.
You may myopically think so, but you are incorrect.
To reiterate, hosts burn coins to get weight. Renters are 2x as likely to pick a host with 2x the burned coins. An attacker can burn a whole bunch of coins 1 time to gain an advantage, but hosts in the ecosystem will ongoing be burning coins, and all of the hosts that have burned coins in the past will have preference that the attacker needs to overcome.
And you are not smart and/or experienced enough to see the flaw in this proposed design. Thus you should not be trusted by the community as a lead developer of anything to do with block chains.
If you presume that renters will prefer the host with the most burned coins, then hosts must either burn all their coins to be in the chosen top or they must join together to form an oligarchy of some sort (if that is possible) to stop other hosts from burning all their coins. Because the host that burns all his coins would then be chosen and he can then short the coin and delete all the data stored on the coin and walk away with the value that was in the coin.
If you presume some equilibrium level will be attained by the market where hosts can earn some profit, then the Sybil attacker can burn that many coins too, because he is being paid for all his Sybil hosts. The fact that he only stores the data once (for all his Sybil hosts) reduces his costs, so he can afford to burn more coins than the other honest hosts (or burn the same number of coins as other honest hosts yet have higher profits). And the renter ends up with only 1 copy of the backup instead of the many copies they paid for.
You've solved nothing. And that you can't see this obvious flaw means you don't have the IQ to even be attempting this. Please just do yourself a favor and quit now. This is above your pay grade.
A sufficiently disruptive attacker can be displaced with a simple blacklisting.
So you attempt to solve decentralized file storage by making it centralized.
Also you can't identify who the attacker is! For as long as the attacker is successfully storing only one copy but charging for multiple hosts, this is not detectable. That is the entire point I made about why this is insoluble. Duh! You really need a citation? It is a simple logic.
Your arguments are not sufficiently fleshed out. You do a substantial amount of handwaving...
Sorry you are just hyper ignorant.
I can't believe anyone placed investment with you. There are some super n00bs here. I am also amazed that smooth is so clueless that he needs you to write a white paper.
An attacker cannot gain cost-efficiency by storing all the data, because the redundant pieces are encrypted with different keys, and the attacker is unable to figure out which pieces are not needed.
Sure he can. He can put all the pieces in the same data center where he can maximize his economies-of-scale, e.g. build own datacenter next to hydropower. Are you so ignorant to not realize that the actual cost of the harddisks is not only component of the cost of storage focused datacenter.
You've just shifted the centralization incentive to the Sybil attack.
And what is the point? We can already pay now for cloud storage on many providers (hosts). The point was that people could stand up nodes, but as you see a datacenter focused Sybil attack will always be more efficient and thus can burn more coins than nodes by those with less economies-of-scale.
Notwithstanding the above which is already sufficient to make your oxymoronic design for a decentralized file store attackable by centralization, additionally any public data can't be encrypted in a way that can hidden from the attacker. So the design is an unarguable failure for hosting public files such as downloadable music, internet web page files, etc..
Additionally it is probably possible to detect which redundant encrypted pieces (in the case of non-public data) are the same, by failing on a request for a piece and correlating with timing analysis and client IP to the request for the other piece. There is no way to prove that a failed request was not a network timeout, which is another problem I haven't yet dropped on you.
