Ah I said I wasn't reentering the thread, the slippery slope of the best intentions of mice and men... (I still want to depart for a while)
So, in your opinion, do any of the current crop of anonymous coins offer a 'good enough' solution
or is it still a 'work in progress' ??
I hope this is fair, objective, impartial...
(disclosure: can't be 100% sure because I could possibly be a competitor to all of these, yet due to the ability to borrow ideas from open source I might also be a contributor)
Work in progress, maybe 'good enough' near-term in Cryptonote's (Monero,
BlueBoolberry, etc) case for solving one aspect of anonymity. For example, one-time ring signatures is progress and is useable (thus has market value
NOW) but is a step backwards on scaling (which may present a problem with centralization of mining in the not near-term
FUTURE), at least in its current form. But Bitcoin mining is already centralized, so it is not a future we don't already have. DarkCoin (CoinJoin) is progress because although the masternodes can be Sybil attacked (see smooth's comments upthread for clear logic on this likelihood), you might assume you have a better chance with a plurality of master nodes that they are not all compromised than if you wanted to mix your coins with the uncertainty of potential Sybil attacks on Bitcoin employing Tor or I2P with a just a few master mixers such as bitcoinfog. DarkCoin appears to also add a scaling problem that didn't exist before on Bitcoin because there is either the simultaneity dilemma or the blockchain bloat of their premixing.
The
bullet list comparison I provided is upthread.
Whereas, Cryptonite solves a
FUTURE problem with blockchain bloat that no one needs
NOW and which is only a constant factor improvement over the potential to prune Bitcoin (which maybe can't be done most efficiently without a fork), unless you can argue that the current blockchain size is the reason Bitcoin is centralized with one or two pools controlling > 50% of the hashrate, which
doesn't appear to be the main reason.
I believe the above statements are an accurate summary of the upthread discussion (at least from my perspective). Hope that helps.
...but for trades against native counterparty assets and btc you have the trolling or DoS problems you speak of. They have come up with a few solutions but none have been ideal, What they are looking at doing now is using collaterised orders, where the seller must hold a small amount of a reserve token. The protocol will take a floating amount of that token on and award that to the buyer if they default on their BTCpay (proportionally based on amount of filled order) .
I think MSC sends fixed amount to their genesis address on every trade. You can pay tx fee to miners, but then pool-ops and such are in a advantaged position.It doesn't seem so hard to send to an obviously unspendable address though, unless I'm getting something wrong.
My comment is necessarily highly technical. If anyone thinks they can reword so laymen can more easily understand, please do.
Afaics, the insoluble problem with collateral held in escrow is that a decentralized protocol can't hold a private key, because everyone could see it. Thus for any funds to be held in escrow, there must be a centralized controller, i.e. a server.
Agreed as I wrote previously, tx fees can be sent to the ether, but the insoluble problem remains that the tx fees can also be DoS'ed or trolled because it is a two (or multiple) step process for each party to the exchange to commit their tx fees.
In summary in the analogous abstract with trading cross-chain assets there is an inverted 'race condition' on who pays last and the 'semaphore' or 'mutex' needed to resolve with infinitesimal delay is centralized control. Decentralized atomicity is achieved only with a non-zero delay, which thus opens to DoS attack.