Topic: The Holy Grail! I wish I could kiss the author of Bitmessage on his face. - page 6. (Read 92719 times)

Well for example, let's say the server disappears entirely...

The user sends a recovery request to the other pool members, who verify the situation and then vote to recover your coins.

This contingency is actually the whole reason for having voting pools in the first place. The server would be unwise to do such things however, as he cannot steal the coins anyway (they are in the pool.) Plus, he'd instantly lose access to any future transaction fees, as well as losing access to all the rest of his legitimate share of the coins in the pool.

Your next question might be: what happens if the entire pool disappears? Answer: you're screwed.

This is why the ultimate distribution of risk must occur inside the wallet itself (for example, allocating your funds across multiple pools.)

We cannot eliminate the existence of risk, we can only devise better and better mechanisms for distributing it in a user-centric way. In fact, this philosophy underpins Bitcoin itself.

This concept of a provider-independent distribution of risk is borrowed from Tahoe-LAFS. Kudos to Zooko!

What happens if the server fails to sign?

Let's say that you and I form a pool. (Some of the money in the pool comes from me, and some comes from you.)

As you can see, if I perform a false bail-out from the pool, I have actually stolen from you!

...Therefore you have an incentive to only allow valid bail-outs.

Therefore, as a pool voter, your incentive is to verify that both parties have signed the bail-out request, and that the transaction server in question doesn't fail its own audit.

Thus, the pool itself acts as the "issuer" would have acted, if the currency had been directly issued onto the transaction server. (In terms of verifying the audit data.) That is, they audit each other, and they have an incentive to do so.

The process:

1. (The user might have bailed-in 100 BTC, and then traded 90 of them away, leaving 10 BTC in his account.)

2. When the user bails out, he submits a signed bail-out request for 10 BTC to the server, who counter-signs it.

3. They send a copy of this receipt to the other pool members, who verify it and then vote on the blockchain to release the funds.

Can you explain how the bail-out request works? I recall reading detailed human-language transcripts of all the transactions that are involved, either on your wiki or on some of the sites it points to. I don't have a good picture of the differences between OT on the one hand and Loom, Lucre, and all the other concepts it uses / borrows from.

so how long until this is an android app that replaces what'sapp?

I ask because i understend completely ZERO of this thread. All I want is an anonymous communication tool.

I don't think so -- because the voters must verify OT-specific information before voting.

(Like verifying the user and server have both signed the bail-out request.)

This is probably why no one else is using voting pools yet, even though multi-sign is functional: because you need the OT side as well, to make it work.

However, if what you suggest is possible, then it will improve my system even more, so I hope such a thing is found!

I'm still trying to figure out how your system works, so the question may turn out to be meaningless. But I was wondering if there is a way to let a Bitcoin script verify that a person is authorised to redeem BTC from a backing account when presented with appropriately signed evidence.

I assume you are asking about the voting pools... My plan is to use the multi-sig bitcoin script, on the blockchain itself.

Can you please be more specific about the logic you have in mind?

Here's my own:

1. The user who wishes to transact on OT, bails his coins into a voting-pool (by sending them to a recipient on the blockchain composed of multiple BTC addresses.)

2. The server verifies that the coins are in the pool, and issues corresponding units inside OT to that user.

3. From here, all transactions occur off-chain. (So far, no voting is necessary...) Perhaps a thousand transactions occur at this step.

4. It's only when the user wishes to bail back out of the system, that a vote of the pool members (the other servers) becomes necessary.

5. The user himself plays no part in the actual vote, since his balance might be quite different on the way out, than it was on the way in.

Is there a way to prevent the need for voting by somehow putting the logic inside a Bitcoin script, perhaps with new opcodes if necessary?

Good question. Consider it in three layers...

Layer 1: the issuer directly operates the transaction server. (The guy who holds the gold, also processes transactions between the internal accounts.)

This applies to E-Gold and (I believe) Liberty Reserve. The problem is, if you process the transactions, then you are liable to monitor them and report them. This liability results in the seizing of the gold.

Layer 2: the issuer issues his currency onto a separate transaction server.

This applies to Loom, Truledger, Voucher-Safe, and even OT, if you use it that way. This represents an improvement, since the issuer is no longer directly processing any transactions. The problem is, violence can be used to force the issuer not to use specific servers.

Layer 3: The issuer issues his currency onto the blockchain as colored coins.

This is what I've proposed in this thread. This way:

-- The issuer cannot control which servers the users choose to transact on.

-- Thus: The issuer cannot be forced by any threats to choose which servers the users may transact on.

-- The issuer may not even be aware of which servers the users may be using to transact on.

Of course, the issuer still must be fully AML/KYC compliant, since he is sending/receiving bank wires as he buys/sells his own colored coins.

This guy is referring to the fact that I am the author of The Mystery Method.

I have not often mentioned this in the digital currency community, as I am rather well-known, and I have preferred to allow Open-Transactions to stand on its own merits.

However, I never spam-marketed the book, as it was published by St. Martins Press, and is sold in book stores and on Amazon. I'm certainly not ashamed of my success.

Why would Joshua Zeidner lie publicly, calling me a "spammer" and create unnecessary liability for himself? His true motives.

remember those ads you would get about 2 years ago for books about how to pick up girls?  that was Chris.

This thread is not self-moderated, so I can't delete posts here.

Also, I don't want to stoop so low as to conduct censorship. (Even against trolls.) I prefer to allow the forum moderators to do so.

I will not be engaging him tit-for-tat, however -- I will just refer people back to my official statement on the matter.

Why don't you let him start his own thread and delete his posts here?

Re: bluemeanie1

As long as you are posting in my threads, I think it's important that people know your true motives.

I am also saving a record of all of your false public statements.

For the record: I do not, nor have I ever, engaged in spam marketing.

 do you suggest that?  You were the one who wanted to remove the thread.

 Meanwhile, you have absolutely NOTHING to show for your claims.  Im starting to suspect that you are sock puppeting here, Reddit, and other sources of information on Bitcoin.  This new "OT + BitMessage = Kingdom Come" seems to have been exactly timed at the release of my paper(which you keep claiming you never read, but also referred to numerous times).  Being that Chris can't seem to conduct himself without making personal attacks(this is the second time), he forces me to account for our work together, his plan to commercialize OT at the expense of the community, and his all round sketchiness.  Why does it seems OT is being discussed, but no one seems to know exactly what it does?  This doesn't sound like an open source project to me.  That's because it isn't one.  How many open source projects do you know that have no real users, appear to be discussed constantly on every subject imaginable, and no one seems to know how it works, and there is a company already formed to implement ideas using it?  Remember Chris was an spam marketer before he decided to become a digital currency guru, this is probably why he knows a thing or two about how to hide your IP, how Tor works, etc.  Just consider how many REAL people you know who claim to have used OT for something useful.  Many people I know personally were complaining about his recent spam initiative entering their space through a variety of vectors and how annoying it was.

 Meanwhile, all I am doing on here is talking about a completely free and open digital currency concept which Chris appears to hate with a passion.

 IT SLICES, IT DICES, IT JULIANNES, IT'S OPEN TRANSACTIONS(tm)!  now with P2P flavor!  buy now and get a free internet!

 of course we can say that OT does all these things.  We can also say a toaster does the same things as a 747 if we just add a fuselage, a jet engine, wings, and a few other features.  We would only have this scenario if someone were trying to SELL us the toaster.  That might provide you with a hint.

do not trust this spam marketing leprechaun, I unfortunately did.

Sure, but what's the advantage of having the issuers separate from the servers? I'm not saying there isn't one, I'm just trying to understand the reasoning.

-- If it's a colored coin, then by definition there is an issuer.

-- The reason for doing the transactions on an OT transaction server is to gain the benefits of OT, such as untraceable cash, instant transactions, markets, cheques, stocks with dividends, basket currencies, micro-transactions, destruction of receipt history, off-chain transactions, etc.

Therefore it seems that even with colored coins, there will be issuers and servers.

If you use OT for trading coloured coins, is there still an advantage to having separate issuers and servers?

It's likely that gateways will run their own servers, but technically they don't have to. They do issue credit, by definition. They don't even issue credit, people have to extend them credit. They hold money for others.