Topic: [XMR] Monero - A secure, private, untraceable cryptocurrency - page 1956. (Read 4670562 times)

I am starting to see higher lows and higher highs on a 15 min chart, so I am starting to feel vindicated in the claim that 0.0026 was the bottom.  I expected a faster recovery to .005, which was wrong, but I am happy to wait for it in this, more sustainable, regime.

Question 1: Can it be set with something like a slide-bar, on demand, per transaction? Like I want to launder it 5 times or 2 times.

Question 2: Can an evil entity attack the blockchain by artificially bloating it with tons of bogus transactions? What would be the estimated cost of the attacker in order to make the blockchain unusable?

The devils only fight when they are able to see the angels advance.

On the issue of bloat, there is a very simple way to reduce it. Just use a mixin count of 1 (mixing two outputs). This still gives deniability although it does not give great tracing resistance. But to get back tracing resistance, do multiple transactions in sequence. If you do 7 transactions each with 2-way mixing, you have tracing resistance of 128 with bloat of only 13x. In practice there is per-transaction overhead not just per signature so maybe something like 3 or 4 is better than two. But you certainly never need to use very high mixin counts. Eventually wallets can be made to do this automatically.

Yes, but if the protocol is giving you away if you don't use IP obfuscation, then how is that anonymous in itself?

Have you forgotten that he critics Darkcoin even more ?

He bases this on 2 things:

1. He wants built-in IP obfuscation. You could also argue that it's an independent function that's already available with other software. In any case, I think CN-based coins will eventually have I2P once a dev gets around to it. It makes sense to make it easier (for the less technically-capable user), but this is not a systemic limitation and it doesn't have anything to do with CN v. Zero v. CoinJoin.

He also wants something better than Tor or I2P. I asked him what, and he said what he envisioned that exist yet. AnonyMint is an idealist who will find fault in everything (not that there's anything wrong with that). You should maybe see his other post where he compared the practical aspects of the various anonymity systems and said CN probably has the best trade-off choices. gmaxwell said the same.

2. He misunderstood the implementation of ring signatures. Outputs are broken down so matching pairs can always be found and rendered indistinguishable. He initially thought that they weren't, which would require exact matching of totals. Hence the comment that the opportunity to use ring signatures is rare. You can actually always use them with the way BCN implemented it. (It's actually CoinJoin that has this very problem, because it requires concurrent participants.)

Ok, I'm clueless.

Question: Is Anonymint clueless? Is he blind that he does not see "actual anonymity"? When he says that most of the anonymity will come from IP obfuscation, is that a vote of confidence for the protocol itself?

I already answered that and you can use tor and i2p just fine with monero already.
You seem to have no clue about IT in general if you aren't able to route Monero through tor via tsocks or use a VM system like Whonix which has a decided TOR Gateway VM.
google: proxifier, tsocks, whonix etc...

Crypto Zoidberg is correct...

AlexGR, it would be nice if u stay in your DRK thread, we all know you are a big bagholder there and we don't care about it, this is about Monero and nothing else.

The quantum computer nonsense is also already answered.

Ok, I'm clueless.

Question: Is Anonymint clueless? Is he blind that he does not see "actual anonymity"? When he says that most of the anonymity will come from IP obfuscation, is that a vote of confidence for the protocol itself?

Buy and sell your MRO at https://cryptonote.exchange.to

Don't use Poloniex. Had several withdrawal issues, site constantly fails to load...

Very nice post sir.

How did you gain this deep knowledge of the protocols? If you are a coin dev if it would be great to have you on board this project.

That very infrequent opportunity for use is coupled with constant use of elliptical curve cryptography which is known to be broken under quantum computing, as well is suspect to broken by the NSA[1] or could be broken since it is number theoretic public key cryptography.

And the use of one-time ring signatures mucks up the pruning of the block chain of spent addresses. There is a tweak to improve this over the current CryptoNote (one of the tweaks I alluded to upthread).

Bottom line is most of your anonymity will come from obfuscating your IP address with something more reliable than Tor and I2P, not from the block chain mixing of CryptoNote or Zerocash/coin, i.e. if your IP is correlated to your identity, then the one-time ring signature doesn't obscure your identity when you spend.

The case where the one-time ring signature is really useful is a transaction with multiple inputs wherein the spender is merging his coins, thus enabling tracing of those coins to the same entity (the current spender). And it is very unfortunate the one-time ring signature is optional in this case, because it is the identity of the upchain spenders who suffer from this action by the current spender, thus the motivation is not there.

So we can see as it is currently structured, CryptoNote doesn't really support anonymity much.
Sorry to blow holes in your enthusiasm. Reality sucks if you haven't taken the time to do some serious work before launching.
Note that the use of a separate payee address for each transaction is a very useful strategy. This is a positive aspect of CryptoNote that adds anonymity, but again it is not so effective without reliable IP obfuscation, as the payee will reveal himself on spending.

If sync time is your argument against actual anonymity rather than pretend anonymity, that's rather unconvincing.

CryptoNote / Monero et al

CryptoNote's one-time ring signature as a way of obfuscating who is the payer (the spender), is optional and can only be used when there are other payees who have matching input amounts. In other words, it can't do any obfuscation for you on spending unless there are other coins that have the same balance as yours.

That very infrequent opportunity for use is coupled with constant use of elliptical curve cryptography which is known to be broken under quantum computing, as well is suspect to broken by the NSA[1] or could be broken since it is number theoretic public key cryptography.

And the use of one-time ring signatures mucks up the pruning of the block chain of spent addresses. There is a tweak to improve this over the current CryptoNote (one of the tweaks I alluded to upthread).

Bottom line is most of your anonymity will come from obfuscating your IP address with something more reliable than Tor and I2P, not from the block chain mixing of CryptoNote or Zerocash/coin, i.e. if your IP is correlated to your identity, then the one-time ring signature doesn't obscure your identity when you spend.

The case where the one-time ring signature is really useful is a transaction with multiple inputs wherein the spender is merging his coins, thus enabling tracing of those coins to the same entity (the current spender). And it is very unfortunate the one-time ring signature is optional in this case, because it is the identity of the upchain spenders who suffer from this action by the current spender, thus the motivation is not there.

So we can see as it is currently structured, CryptoNote doesn't really support anonymity much.

Sorry to blow holes in your enthusiasm. Reality sucks if you haven't taken the time to do some serious work before launching.

Note that the use of a separate payee address for each transaction is a very useful strategy. This is a positive aspect of CryptoNote that adds anonymity, but again it is not so effective without reliable IP obfuscation, as the payee will reveal himself on spending.